

The EU-Mauritanian Fisheries Relationship


A Political Scramble To Govern The Commons

Master thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for
the Degree of Master of Science in Environmental Governance

by

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Summary

Fish are becoming a scarce resource worldwide. European Union (EU) member states lost their ability long ago to satisfy domestic fish consumption from adjacent fishing grounds. As a consequence European companies expanded their distant water fleets towards other marine resources in the world. West African fishing grounds represent a resource of particular importance for the European fishing industry. Within the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states were able to expand their jurisdiction over maritime resources by establishing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Ever since, the EU maintains access to West African fishing grounds by negotiating agreements with the local governments. This research examines the impact of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship on Mauritania's fishery sector. Using triangulated data coming from literature research, statistical databases and expert interviews, a comprehensive overview of the case over the last 30 years has been assembled. Three fundamentally different types of International Relations (IR) theories have been used to analyze evidence from the case study. Coercion theories derived from Kwame Nkrumah's theory of Neo-Colonialism and Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of World System, a theory of power formulated by Hans J. Morgenthau and the theory of the Commons derived from the work of Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Through the application of these theories it was possible to analyze the case in a multi-layered manner. First, it was demonstrated that fisheries resources of the Mauritanian EEZ are mainly exploited for the benefit of the EU, Russia, China, Japan and others. EU investments in the Mauritanian fishery sector secure in the first instance the supply of raw fishery products to the EU. Looking in more detail at the power interplay between the involved negotiating parties (the Mauritanian government and the European Commission), it was demonstrated that the fishery agreements started as non-political commercial accords between the two "countries". However, several factors led to the European Commission's increasing interest in acquiring a share of the political power which had been obtained by the Mauritanian government through UNCLOS: The management of the EEZ. In this way, the fishery agreements became more and more political and the current relationship has been shaped by the EU's intention to increase its power by following an imperialistic policy and Mauritania's intention to maintain the status-quo. Through application of the theory of the Commons, the underlying reasons for this political dispute were traced. The characteristics of the EEZ identified the resources as highly complex Common Pool Resource (CPR)s. An inherent feature of these CPRs is that their users are rarely capable of overcoming the dilemma of overexploitation by themselves. However, it turned out that both the European Commission and Mauritania's government represent the main beneficiaries (and therefore also the main users) of the EEZ: The European Commission as representative of the EU fishing industry and Mauritania's government through the derivation of about 1/3 of its budget from its maritime resources. It could be concluded that in the case of Mauritania UNCLOS resulted in an allocation of property rights that is highly inadequate for dealing with the complexity of the Mauritanian EEZ. The study concludes with some preliminary recommendations that could lead to an improvement of the situation.

Keywords: Fishery Agreements, EU, Mauritania, Imperialism, Common Pool Resources

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List of Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AFD	French Development Agency
AON	Abdellahi Ould Nougueit
BADE	African Development Bank
CA	Competent Authority
CECAF	Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic
CEMARE	Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources
CEP	Center for the study of projects
CFP	Common Fisheries Policy
CFFA	Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements (in French CAPE)
CIF	Cost, Insurance and Freight
CNROP	Centre National de Recherches Océanographiques et des Pêches (Now IMROP)
CPR	Common Pool Resource
DC	Development Cooperation
DSPCM	Délégation à la Surveillance des Pêches et au Contrôle en Mer
DVIS	Département de Valorisation et de l'Inspection Sanitaire
DG SANCO	European Commission's Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection
ECU	European currency unit (from 1979 to 1998)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African Countries
EU	European Union
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FA	Fishery Agreement
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FIFG	Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FOB	Free On Board
FPAs	Fishery Partnership Agreements
FPA	Fishery Partnership Agreement
GRT	Gross Register Tonnage
GT	Gross Tonnage
HACCP	Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points
IFREMER	French Institute for the exploitation of the Sea
IMROP	Institut Mauritanien de Recherches Océanographiques et des Pêches (previously know as CNROP)
IR	International Relations
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing
MAOA	Med Abdellahi Ould Abdellahi
MCP	Sté Mauritano Chinoise de Pêche
MPEM	Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCT	Overseas countries and territories
PFA	Pelagic Freezer-trawler Association
PNBA	Parc national du Banc d'Arguin
RIM	Republic Islamic of Mauritania
SADR	Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic

SAU	The Sea Around Us Project
SFP	Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries
SMCP	Société Mauritanienne de Commercialisation du Poisson
SPS	Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
FVO	Food and Veterinary Office
VMS	Vessel Monitoring System
WSRW	Western Sahara Resource Watch
WTO	World Trade Organization

1 Introduction

Fish are becoming a scarce resource worldwide. In 2005, the FAO estimated that 52 percent of those species groups for which information is available are fully exploited. Another 17 percent is estimated to be over-exploited (FAO, 2005). The decline of numerous fish species is associated with the reorientation of the global fishing industry and a collapse of various domestic fisheries mainly located in less privileged countries. States within the European Union lost their ability long ago to satisfy domestic fish consumption from adjacent fishing grounds. As a consequence, European companies expanded their distant water fleets towards other marine resources in the world. Since the Second World War, West Africa has become an important fish basket for Europe, Russia and, more recently, China (Alder & Sumaila, 2004). Beginning in the 1970s, coastal states were able to expand their jurisdiction over maritime resources by establishing Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) within the framework of UNCLOS (CTA, 2006).

However, several authors have demonstrated that the current exploitation of western African fish resources has negative social and environmental impacts on bordering states like Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania and others (Kaczynski & Fluharty, 2002; Atta-Mills *et al.*, 2004; Ilnycky, 2007; Witbooi, 2008). As a result of competition from European and other international fleets, local fisheries record a severe decline in catches (Kenety, 2001 cited in Atta-Mills *et al.*, 2004). Consequences of the reduction of local catches reach so far that they have been identified as causes for unemployment, malnutrition and finally as push factors for migration from West Africa to Europe (Iossa *et al.*, 2008).

The EU¹ currently maintains fishery agreements with four West African countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Cap Verde and Mauritania). Under international pressure, these agreements have been revised several times, from accords based on short-term economic interests to so-called Fishery Partnership Agreements (FPAs), and a new restructuring of the external fishery relationships is expected with the reform of the EU's Common Fishery Policy in 2012/13. The fishery agreements between the EU and West African states have been criticized by various authors (see Ilnycky, 2007; Iossa *et al.*, 2008).

The aim of this research is to identify the impacts of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship for Mauritania and for the EU. The underlying causes of these impacts shall be traced.

The methodological approach to address this objective has been framed as a single case-study approach. It has been guided by the instructions of Yin (2003). The case of Mauritania was chosen because it currently represents the most important external fishery

¹In this report the term EU is used to refer to both the European Union after 1992 and to the European confederations of states before 1992.

relationship maintained by the EU. By using a method of triangulation, including a literature review, the comparison of statistical data and expert interviews, a comprehensive picture of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship was compiled. This overview covers a period of around 30 years, from 1980 till now. Furthermore, it incorporates various aspects of the relationship, including the official fishery agreements, trade restrictions, subsidies, landing data of various international vessels operating in Mauritania's EEZ, estimations of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU), as well as disputes and cooperation between the parties involved.

Three fundamentally different types of theories of IR were used to analyze evidence from the case study. Coercion theories derived from Kwame Nkrumah's theory of neo-colonialism and Immanuel Wallerstein's theory of World System, a theory of power formulated by Hans J. Morgenthau and the theory of the commons derived from the work of Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. While the first two types of theories (coercion and power) have been used as competing theories to frame the case study, the theory of the commons was used to fill those explanatory gaps that could not be captured by the other two theories. Through the application of these theories it was possible to analyze the case in a multi-layered manner.

Important research questions were:

- Are the outcomes of the research objectives formulated above dependent on the underlying theory applied to address the two questions?
- Can the two applied types of theories (coercion and power) explain the nature of the fishery relationship between Mauritania and the EU?

2 Theory

2.1 Coercion Theories

Various theories explain international relations in terms of the coercion of one nation or society by another. The underlying idea of this group of theories is the emergence of a capitalist economy in certain parts of the world. The permanent need for resources combined with a general scarcity of resources in the capitalist centers leads to the exploitation of some states and societies while increasing prosperity is accumulated in others. Important theories that use this concept are:

- Economic Imperialism (Lenin, Marx)
- Neo-Colonialism (Crozier, Nkrumah, Satre)
- Dependency Theory (Baran)
- World System (Wallerstein)

The concept of neo-colonialism is strongly related to *economic imperialism* (Crozier, 1964). According to Crozier, neo-colonialism is part of Lenin's concept of imperialism which he referred to as the ultimate stage of capitalism. The idea of neo-colonialism was coined by the work of Kwame Nkrumah, the former and first president of today's Ghana. The main thrust of Nkrumah's ideas is best described by a quotation from his book *Neocolonialism, the last stage of Imperialism*:

"The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. [...]The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation rather than for the development of less developed parts of the world. [...]Neo-colonialism is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. [...]Neo-colonialism, like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries." (Nkrumah, 1965, p. x-xii)

While Nkrumah's work is written rather as a political statement, Emanuel Wallerstein's theory of "*World System*" Wallerstein (2004) offers an analytical framework that allows for an objective analysis.

Following a model developed by Paul A. Baran Baran (1957) known as dependency theory and Marx's concepts of a capitalist economy Heinrich (2004) Wallerstein's concept is

based on an enduring axial division of the world into core, semi-periphery and periphery states. Between these states there exists a stabilized "division of labor". The core states have reached a high level of technological development which allows them to manufacture complex products. The technical development in the periphery states is low. Their function is to supply the core states with raw material, agricultural products and cheap labor. This supply facilitates the further expansion of wealth and capacity in the core states.

The economic exchange existing between core and periphery states is considered as taking place on unequal terms. The periphery is forced to sell products at low prices. Products from the core states have to be bought at relative high prices. This unequal state tends to reinforce itself due to inherent, quasi-deterministic constraints. Semi-periphery states function as a buffer zone between the core and the periphery states. According to Wallerstein, they are situated in the most difficult situation whereby they are under pressure from the core states at the same time that they are putting pressure on the periphery states. The core, semi-periphery and periphery states are neither fixed in time nor space. While it is inherent that states of all stages must exist, the relative position of single regions within the entire system might change over time. As a consequence, passing through the semi-periphery stage, core states might descend and represent a stage of periphery states while periphery states might rise towards a core position.

The dependency theory and World System are distinct from a concept known as modernization theory which is based on the work of scholars like Rostow (1959). This theory states that "underdeveloped" countries are currently at a stage today's "developed" countries have experienced in the past. "Developed" countries are able to help "underdeveloped" countries to reach a common path of development by means of investment, technological transfer, and market integration. Dependency theory counters that countries situated in the periphery stage are there as the direct result of unique features and structures, and that they are forced into a weaker position in the world economy by being confronted with a number of more powerful countries. Wallerstein (2004) In contrast to free market thinkers, dependency theorists argue that countries forced into a periphery position should reduce their connectedness with the world market. This idea was addressed by Nkrumah (1965) through the concept of nonalignment.

2.1.1 Critique of the coercion concepts

Several critiques have evolved of the coercion concepts described above. Doubts as to the relevance of the concepts for describing contemporary conditions and occurrences are reflected in the book "A New Scramble for Africa" edited by Southall & Melber 2009. The authors argue that there exist fundamental differences between former types of imperialism and the current scramble for Africa. The essence of their arguments is summarized in the

statement that industrial nations are currently negotiating access to African resources with African authorities. Therefore, Southall & Melber (2009) conclude that the new imperialism should be described as imperialism by consent rather than grand larceny.

A more fundamental critique of the entire concept is offered by Morgenthau (2006) in the book "Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for Power and Peace."² Morgenthau refers to the coercion concepts described above as "economic theories of imperialism" and divides them into Marxist, Liberal and "Devil" theories of imperialism (p. 59). These three variations are explained as having the following underlying ideas: For the Marxist's, capitalism is the main evil and imperialism its necessary or probable manifestation. The liberal form (represented by John A. Hobson) sees imperialism not as a necessary result of capitalism but as the result of maladjustments within the capitalist system. The difference to Marxism is the belief in domestic alternatives to imperialism. Strictly speaking, Morgenthau does not regard the "Devil" theory as theory. Under this category he subsumes those discourses where the term imperialism is used indiscriminately with reference to any foreign policy without regard to its actual character.

In reference to all three of these economic theories of imperialism Morgenthau argues that they are based on false concepts and that they are not substantiated by historical evidence. From an historical perspective the main period of colonial expansion preceded the age of full-grown capitalism. Therefore, they cannot be attributed to the inner contradictions of the capitalist system. However, since this research refers to the post-colonial era and to the coercion concepts in general his second argument is of more importance. Here he states that the belief that capitalists use governments as their tools to promote imperialistic policies is a "newspaper fairytale". Instead, historical evidence would point to the primacy of politics over economics. In addition, he argues that a capitalist system would require peace as a basis for rational calculations whereas all imperialistic activities bear the risk of war.

Morgenthau also offers explanations on how the "paradigm" of this school of thought was able to evolve. The one that seems to have most importance for this research is the argument of plausibility. He argues: *"Whenever the phenomenon of imperialism presents itself for either theoretical understanding or practical action, the simple scheme will provide an almost automatic answer that puts the mind at ease."* (p. 64)

²Hans Joachim Morgenthau died in 1980. The last edition of the book, published during his lifetime, dates from 1978.

2.2 Theory of Power

Hans J. Morgenthau is recognized as the founder of a realist's approach for the explanation of international relations. His theory can be used here to develop an alternative theory to the coercion theories. Several of his concepts need to be clarified in advance. These are "power", "status quo", "imperialism" and "prestige".

Morgenthau's concept of power refers to *"man's control over the minds and action of other men"*. Therefore, political power is defined as *"mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large"* (p. 30). He argues that, regardless of the ultimate aim, power is always the immediate aim of international politics. Accordingly, if with a certain action a nation is not seeking power, the nation is not in this moment acting within the realm of international politics. Furthermore, he separates power from both influence and force and he differentiates usable and unusable power as well as legitimated and illegitimated power. One nation has not only influence but also power over another nation if it is in the position to impose its will on that nation. If physical violence is used, for example by war, it means that political power has been substituted by military power. Power is than unusable if the mutual threats the nations impose on each other cancel themselves out. This might be the case when two nations are in possession of nuclear weapons but can disregard the threat of being destroyed based on the assumption of rational behavior of the other. Power is then considered as legitimated when it is perceived as morally or legally justified. Morgenthau argues that legitimated power is more likely to influence the will of its objects than power that is perceived as illegitimate.

The concept of power leads now directly to the remaining three concepts: status-quo, imperialism and prestige. Where a nation aims to retain its power, it is following a policy of status-quo. If a nation seeks to increase its power it is following a policy of imperialism. In this case it is necessary to modify the existing power structures. The third possibility is that a nation wants to demonstrate its power which is defined as a policy of prestige. Important at this point is Morgenthau's annotation that these policy concepts do not necessarily reflect the conscious motivations of statesmen or supporters. A nation might for example intend on following a policy of status quo while it is in fact promoting an imperialistic policy. Morgenthau developed this theory far more comprehensively. The above mentioned elements are embedded in a system of balanced power that evolved due to the striving for power of the involved nations. The theory considers various variations of this system. However, for application in the case presented here it is necessary to restrict the underlying theory due to the fact that only a specific component of the relation between the EU, Mauritania and all other nations is analyzed. This study is restricted to the fishery relationship between the EU and Mauritania. Even though fisheries represent an important element, other components (e.g. the Cotonou agreement) have not been considered.

Nevertheless, the theory described above is suitable for analyzing the case study when considering the following. Morgenthau identifies several activities that occur on a non-political level, meaning that they do not imply power and, thus, cannot be perceived as imperialistic. These might be activities such as the exchange of goods or the conclusion of treaties. By this means, Morgenthau offers a tool that allows for clear differentiation between political interactions of power (resulting in a policy of status quo, imperialism or prestige) and non-political interactions of mutual assent. The first would identify the political nature of the fishery agreements leading to the maintenance or increase of power of the EU or Mauritania. The latter would identify the fishery agreements as voluntary contracts entered into by the EU and Mauritania. They might have done so by choosing the most advantageous terms on offer to facilitate the exploitation of fish stocks by the most efficient operators. This perception is supported by Southall & Melber (2009) who argue that external actors are currently negotiating with African states in order to obtain access to the desired resources. They consider the reason for this to be the erosion of spheres of influence of former colonial power which is linked to the global scarcity of resources. Africa, in former times seen as a clear sphere of Western influence, is now of interest for newly emerging global players like China but also India and Brazil. The emergence of these actors is challenging the political dominance (power) of Western nations. This new variety of external actors offers an opportunity to West African countries to negotiate with interested parties and choose the party that offers the best conditions.

2.3 Theory of the Commons

Resources collectively owned are generally referred to as the commons. Theories that cope with the challenge to manage these resources are strongly linked to two scholars: Garrett Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Hardin (1968) concludes in his article "*The tragedy of the Commons*" that users of collectively owned resources are trapped in a process that leads to the destruction of these resources. The concept has been further elaborated by Ostrom *et al.* (1999) into a theory of common pool resources reflected in the article "*Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges*". Ostrom *et al.* (1999) differentiates between concepts related to resource systems and those related to property rights. The term CPR is used to refer to resource systems regardless of the question of which property right is applied. CPRs entail the following two characteristics:

- the exclusion of beneficiaries is extremely costly
- the exploitation by one user reduces the resource availability for other users (subtractability)

So called CPR dilemmas emerge because users pursue their short-term interests (exploitation for own benefits) and produce outcomes that are in no one's long term-interest (over-exploitation of the resource). Marine ecosystems are regarded as CPRs while they are considered depletable and renewable at the same time. Ostrom *et al.* (1999) define four groups of user of CPRs:

- free-riders
- cooperators (depended on free-riders)
- initiators
- genuine altruists

Free-riders always behave in a self-interested manner. Free-riding is possible through overuse of the resource without consideration of the negative effects for others or without contributing capacities to maintain the resource. Cooperators are those that are then willing to cooperate if it is ensured that they are not hoodwinked by free-riders. Initiators are those that initiate cooperation in the hope that others will participate. Those who try to achieve higher returns for a group are considered as genuine altruists.

In general it is difficult to design governance regimes for CFPs. This is due to circumstances such as the size, carrying capacity, the temporal and special availability of the resource flows and the storage of the system. Uncertainty often exists concerning existing information on these items. Ostrom *et al.* differentiate between four types of property rights in relation to CPRs (see table 1). According to the authors, open-access regimes used to manage CPRs result in the degradation and potential destruction of the resource. The difference between group-property and individual-property regimes is determined by the facility with which shares of the resources can be acquired. Government property refers to the ownership of the CPR by a national, regional or local public agency. This agent is able to permit or ban the use of the resource by individuals. Ostrom *et al.* (1999) state that empirical evidence suggests that none of the four property rights work efficiently or sustainably in relation to any CPRs.

Table 1: Types of property-rights systems used to regulate common-pool resources (Feeny *et al.*, 1990, cited in Ostrom *et al.* , 1999)

Property right	Characteristics
Open access	Absence of enforced property right
Group property	Resource right held by a group of users who can exclude others
Individual property	Resource right held by individuals (or firms) who can exclude others
Government property	Resource right held by a government that can regulate or subsidize use

Furthermore, Schlager & Ostrom (1992) define several types of rights that can be granted to single users:

- Access
- Withdrawal
- Management
- Exclusion
- Alienation

The right to access is defined as the right to enter a defined physical property. Withdrawal refers to the right to obtain products from a resource. The right of management refers to the right to control or regulated use patterns of resource. It also includes the right to transform the resource by making improvements. The right to decide who will have an access right and the how this right might be transferred is considered as the right of exclusion. Alienation refers to the right to sell or lease the right to manage and/or exclude.

Ostrom *et al.* (1999) argue that two elements are important for solving CPR problems: restricting access and creating incentives. Both elements are said to be necessary in order to prompt users to invest in the resource rather than to overexploit it. The first is usually achieved through assigning individual rights, or shares of, the resource. As mentioned above, the theory does not accept a model of economic rationalism of individuals but states that individuals might act differently when confronted with CPR problems. The authors state that various norms might evolve within the user group. Cooperation might be established if the proportion of free-riders is not too high. Groups of users who can identify one another are said to be more likely to develop norms that limit the use of the resource. Whether users are able to overcome CPR dilemmas depends on the benefits they perceive from a change but also on the costs of negotiations, monitoring and rule enforcement. Therefore, societal initiatives are not always perceived as tools to prevent overexploitation. It might be necessary for an external authority to develop, monitor and enforce rules.

3 Methods

3.1 Methodological Framework

The chosen methodology is framed in a single-case study design. The selected case is analyzed, following the guidance of Yin (2003) and Mayring (2007). The analyzed case is the fishery relationship between the EU and Mauritania. The case study has been chosen due to the fact that Mauritania is considered the most important fishery relationship of the EU.³

The casestudy was conducted to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the positive and negative impacts of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship for Mauritania and for the EU
2. What are the underlying causes of these impacts?
3. Are the answers of the two above named questions dependent on the underlying theory applied to address the questions?
4. Can the two applied types of theories (coercion and power) explain the nature of the fishery relationship between Mauritania and the EU?

3.1.1 Case Study

Yin offers the following definition of a case study:

”A case study is an empirical inquiry that

- Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
- The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident [...]
- Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data point, and as one result
- Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as an other result
- Benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003, p.13)

³European Union (1995-2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/mauritania/index_en.htm, last access 29.06.2010

Case studies have been criticized for several shortcomings. One oft-cited disadvantage is that it is not possible to generalize the achieved results. This is because of a relatively low number of cases which are, moreover, not selected with sampling methods. However, it would not be feasible to address the posed research question with methods that allow statistical generalization, because this would require a considerable amount of resources (Yin, 2003). Nevertheless, the research allows for an analytical generalization (Yin, 2003); that is to test whether coercion theories, Morgenthau's theory of power and the theory of the commons are useful to describe the external EU fishery relationships and their impacts on sustainable fishery management.

Another criticism is that the outcome of case studies is prone to manipulation by the researcher and that often researchers do not follow systematic procedures. Various quality criteria have been used to address these problems and to guarantee the explanatory power of the study (see 3.1.2).

The case study type applied in this research can be categorized as an *explanatory, single (embedded)* case study.

The explanatory type is distinct from two other possible types, namely *descriptive* and *exploratory* (Yin, 2003). Explanatory means that the research aims at explaining the substructure of the relationship and does not offer a purely descriptive perspective.

Finally, the term embedded is used to distinguish the setup from a holistic one. Both terms are used to refer to the units of analysis (see chapter 3.2). A holistic⁴ setup contains only a single unit of analysis whereby this study contains various units.

3.1.2 Quality Criteria

As proposed by Yin (2003) and Mayring (2007) four quality criteria have been used to increase the explanatory power of the results:

- Construct Validity
- Internal Validity
- External Validity
- Reliability

Construct Validity refers to the requirement that operational measures applied in the research are appropriated to analyze the research questions. The use of multiple sources of

⁴The term holistic is used when the framing of a case study does not allow the identification of subunits. Instead the global nature of the issue is examined (Yin, 2003).

evidence (triangulation) helps to guarantee the construct validity of this research. A further method is the establishment of a chain of evidence, which enables the reader to trace the origin of facts and evidence mentioned in the results section of this work. The chain of evidence applied in this research enables the reader to easily access the original data cited in the results part of this research (chapter 4). Statistical and numerical data used to describe the case are provided in various tables in the appendix. Information coming from the literature analysis or expert interviews has been cited by using a predefined coding structure. An example shall be provided with the footnote attached to this sentence.⁵ The footnote consists of three components: (a) a code for the nature of the source where it is coming from (in this case OP), (b) the usual citation including author and year (in this case European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b)), (c) a position indication that specifies where the original quotation can be found in the appendix (in this case see citation 4 at 11.2.41). The nature of the source refers to the question whether the citation comes from an article, a web page, an official protocol, etc.. Possible codes and their meaning can be seen in table 2. Entire quotations are provided in the appendix of this report. *citation 4 at 11.2.41* means that the original quotation can be found under point 4 in chapter 11.2.41 in the appendix. Chapter 11.2.41 in the appendices contains all quotation used from European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b). At the beginning of the chapter in the appendix it is indicated under which name the original document can be found on the attached CD (in this case OP-FPA-Mauritania-2008-2012). In most cases a web address is indicated from where the document can be downloaded. Due to copy right issues the database on the attached CD can only store data that was freely available on the web. When the report is read as pdf the chain of evidence can be followed by using the provided hyperlinks.

Table 2: Codes of Documents used for Citations

Code	Type of Document
AR	Article peer-reviewed
OP	Official Protocol, Agreement, Council Decision, Treaty, etc.
R	Report
I	Interview
WA	Web article
OWP	Official Webpage (e.g. UN or EU)

Internal Validity is important for causal relationships only (Yin, 2003), and requires the researcher to investigate whether alternative theories could explain the entire phenomenon or some parts of it more effectively. The applied analytical method gave attention to this issue by integrating two types of competing theories: The coercion theories and the power theory. In addition a third theory (the theory of the commons) has been used to address those questions that could not be explained by the other two theories.

⁵OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b), see citation 4 at 11.2.41 (EXAMPLE)

External Validity deals with the question of how far results of a research can be generalized. As mentioned above, a statistical generalization to a population is neither possible nor desired in case study research. In contrast case study research aims for analytical generalization. This means that it should be feasible to generalize the results of the research to a broader theory (Yin, 2003). This is for example the case regarding the coercion theories. In addition, a separated chapter has been dedicated to explore fundamental differences of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship with other fishery relationships of the EU in the region of West Africa (see chapter 5).

Reliability deals with the requirement that the entire study is replicable. That means that another researcher would come to the same results when repeating the research with the same case study by using the same method (Yin, 2003). A clear documentation procedure by linking the results to a database (see above) and a comprehensive documentation of the applied methods has been used to fulfill this requirement.

3.2 Units of Analysis

Units of analysis are the elements within the case study that have to be analyzed in order to answer the posed research question. The single units of analysis relevant for this research can be assigned to four framework categories and are presented in table 3. Table 3 indicates also units of analysis which have not been analyzed entirely. These units were either considered to be of less importance to address the research objectives or they have been included by secondary information as was the case for "Development Aid". In the results part of this study some of the units of analysis are presented in separated subchapter (e.g. SPS). Results for other units of analysis (e.g. Reported Landings) have been integrated in subchapters of other units of analysis.

These units of analysis have been identified by analyzing a selection of documents dealing with EU - West African fishery agreements in general. Documents were intentionally selected from different sources including:

- The latest official agreements and protocols of the two relationships
- Statments of the European Commission
- Scientific articles
- Reports and other gray literature
- Websites
- Official statistics

Table 3: Units of Analysis of the presented Case Study

Units of Analysis
The Fishery Sector of Mauritania
UNCLOS
EU fishery in Mauritanian prior to the Agreements
Fishery Agreements and Protocols
Institutions of the Agreements
Licenses
Payments
Landings
Signing-on of Mauritanian Seamen
Interests of Parties and Negotiations
Fisheries Categories
Value of Landed fish
IUU and Control Mechanisms
Subsidies
Mauritanian access to the EU fish market
General Discours on the Agreements
Recommendations and Demands of Stakholders

A list of the sources consulted in this step can be retrieved from table 13 in the appendix. In addition, an informal interview was conducted with a representative of a European NGO engaged in fisheries issues of West Africa.

3.3 Sources of Evidence and general methods used to analyze these sources

Items providing the necessary information to analyze the units of analysis in respect to the research questions are called sources of evidence. An important characteristic of the case study approach is the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). In this research the multitude of sources of evidence has been warranted on two levels. First, three different source categories have been used to analyze each single unit of analysis: Documents and literature, statistical information and the knowledge of experts. Second, the sources of evidence within each source category have been selected from different origins including various stakeholder groups. An overview about the sources of evidence within each source category used in this research is given in table 4.

3.3.1 Documents and Literature

The database *EUR-Lex.europa.eu*⁶ has been used to obtain official information about the fishery agreements of the EU with Mauritania. The same database has been used to derive information on SPS restrictions for fish exports from Mauritania to the EU. This

⁶EUR-Lex, available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>, last access 11.08.2010

Table 4: Relevant Sources of Evidence

Source Category	Origin	Sources of Evidence
Documents & Literature	Acts	Fishery agreements
		Fishery Protocols
		UNCLOS
	Government	Fishery Council proceedings
		European Parliament proceedings
		EU Member States' statements
	Inter- governmental	FAO reports and codes of conduct
		Statements from UN
	Other Stakeholder	Statements from fishers' organizations
		Reports from NGO
		Newspaper articles
		Public media
	Science	Peer-reviewed articles, books
Statistical Information	Government	EU data base on fishery capture production and trade
		IMROP data base (Mauritania)
	Inter- Governmental	FAO fishery data bases on capture production and trade
		UN data base on trade
	Science	Fishery data base of the Sea Around Us Project
Expert Knowledge	Various	Personal interviews with key informants
		Requests by mail

information includes agreements, protocols, council regulations and official letter exchange. A full list of the consulted documents is compiled in table 14 and 15 in the appendix. All other information within the source category *Documents & Literature* has been accessed through web based literature search using the snowball method or were based on expert recommendations (from experts of different stakeholder groups).

In general documents have been analyzed following instructions of Mayring (2007) by using the identified units of analysis (see above) as categories.

3.3.2 Statistical Information

Analyzed statistical data was derived from the two involved governmental bodies of the EU and Mauritania, the intergovernmental organization FAO and UN as well as from the scientific collaboration "The Sea Around Us Project" of the University of British Columbia and the Pew Environment Group. Considering statistical data on capture production four different sources of information have been consulted:

- Eurostat Catches-East-central Atlantic data base
- IMROP documentations
- FAO Fishstat plus data base
- The Sea Around Us Project (SAU) data base

Eurostat is the statistical office of the EU.⁷ Regarding capture production the data set *Catches-East-central Atlantic (fish ca atl 34)*⁸ has been used for this research.

The data base of IMROP covers the period 1992 to 2006. Since the early 1980s IMROP has used logbooks and onboard observer data to estimate the landings of the industrial fishery operating in the EEZ of Mauritania (p. 108 Gascuel *et al.* , 2007) The data have been published by Gascuel *et al.* in the article *Reconstructed catches in the Mauritanian EEZ* with the focus on the entire artisanal and industrial fishery within the EEZ of Mauritania. For this research the IMROP data base on industrial landings which also allows inference to landing reports of European vessels has been provided by Gascuel. To define data coming from this data base from other IMROP data this source will in the following be referred to as IMROP/Gascuel.

⁷eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/about_eurostat/corporate/introduction, last access 06.09.2010

⁸Available at <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/fisheries/data/database>, last access 28.08.2010

Fishstat plus is a statistical software of the FAO. For this research most important data sets within the data base were *commodities production and trade 1976-2007*⁹ and *capture production 1970-2008*.¹⁰ In the later the origin of the capture production within the *FAO Major Fishing Region 34* is subsumed into major divisions. Relevant divisions for this research were *Sahara Coastal (Division 34.1.3)* and *Cape Verde Coastal (Division 34.3.1)*.

The data base of SAU¹¹ relies on the work of Watson *et al.* (2004) who used a method called spatial aggregation to reallocate FAO landing reports to EEZ level. Thereby, data on taxon distribution, fishing access agreements, and the fishstat plus data base of the FAO were combined to reconstruct catches to spatial cells covering 30 min both of latitude and longitude.

Statistical data on the ex- and import of fish products of the EU, Mauritania and Guinea have been derived from three different data basis:

- Eurostat
- FAO Fish stat plus (Data set *Commodities production and trade 1976 - 2007*)
- UN Comtrade¹²

3.3.3 Expert Knowledge

A total of three expert Interviews have been conducted with representatives of the European Commission, the European fishery sector and a European NGO that collaborates with the Mauritanian small scale fishery sector. Unfortunately, any interview could be conducted with Mauritanian stakeholders. Interviews have been carried out in a semi structured manner. Experts were considered as source of information on the units of analysis and not as the objectives of analysis by them selves. All interviews were carried out as telephone interviews. Two interviews have been recorded and transcribed. To guarantee the anonymity of the interviewed person the transcription of interview 3 could not be included in the report. The third interview was document using a protocol. The protocol was send to the interviewed person for review. The transcription of the interviews can be seen in chapters 11.3.1 to 11.3.4 in the appendix. The material coming from the interviews has been analyzed by using the units of analysis (see 3.2) as categories.

⁹FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Statistics and Information Service. 2010. CECAF (Eastern Central Atlantic) capture production 1970-2008. FISHSTAT Plus - Universal software for fishery statistical time series (online or CD-ROM). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/software/fishstat/en>, last access 10.09.2010

¹⁰FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Information and Statistics Service 2009. Fisheries commodities production and trade 1976-2007. FISHSTAT Plus - Universal software for fishery statistical time series (online or CD-ROM). Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Available at: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/software/fishstat/en>, last access 10.09.2010

¹¹The SAU data base is online available at <http://www.seaaroundus.org/>, last access 06.09.2010

¹²UN comtrade, available at <http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx>, last access 06.09.2010

3.4 Triangulation

Each unit of analysis was explored using a method of triangulation (development of converging lines of inquiry) as proposed by Yin (2003). The method is illustrated in figure 1. Data on the various units of analysis have been collected by using three different methods (document and literature review, comparison of statistical information and expert interviews). In addition information analyzed by the various methods has been derived from a multitude of sources. Reviewed literature has been derived from various stakeholder groups, statistical data has been derived from various databases and expert interviews have been conducted with representatives from three different stakeholder groups. However, for some units of analysis (e.g. Signing-on of Mauritanian Seamen) real triangulation was not possible due to the lack of information. Tabel 5 shows the applied methods for the single units of analysis. Five possible units of analysis were identified but not included in the research due to time constrains. These were: WTO, Cotonou Agreement, Rule of Origin, Development Aid and the FAO Code of Conduct.




Figure 1: The method of triangulation

Table 5: Triangulation on the Units of Analysis

Units of Analysis	Literature	Statistics	Interviews
The Fishery Sector of Mauritania	X	X	
UNCLOS	X		
EU fishery in Mauritanian prior to the Agreements		X	
Fishery Agreements and Protocols	X		X
Institutions of the Agreements	X		X
Licenses	X	X	X
Payments	X	X	X
Landings	X		X
Signing-on of Mauritanian Seamen	X		
Interests of Parties and Negotiations	X		X
Fisheries Categories	X	X	X
Value of Landed fish	X	X	
IUU and Control Mechanisms	X	X	X
Subsidies	X	X	X
Mauritanian access to the EU fish market	X	X	X
General Discours on the Agreements	X		X
Recommendations and Demands of Stakholders	X		X

3.5 Specific Analysis

In this section, methods applied to derive evidences about the units of analysis shall be explained. Only those methods are addressed which do not become clear when reading the presentation of the particular unit of analysis in chapter 4. The following explanation of applied methods is not strictly ordered by units of analysis. In some cases (e.g. reported landings described in 3.5.3) the described method has been relevant to gather evidences for various units of analysis.

3.5.1 Fisheries Agreements and Protocols

The indentified units of analysis have been used to analyze official fishery agreements and protocols. Those quotations from the official documents relevant for the study and included in the results can be seen in chapters 11.2.37 to 11.2.47 in the appendix.

3.5.2 Payments

In general, payments from the EU and EU vessel owners could directly be derived from the various agreements and protocols. The overall result can be seen in table 30 in the appendix. The payments are arranged in accordance to the various fishing categories granted from Mauritania to the EU (see table 6 in chapter 4) Payments per GT or vessel

itemized by according year of the protocols and fishing categories can be seen in table 31 and table 32 in the appendix. However, for vessel owner contributions of categories 3, 7, 8 and 9 minor modifications had to be done in order derive the payments and to guarantee the comparability of the data over the years.

Calculation of Category 3: From 1993 till 2006 fees are different for vessels under and for vessels over 100 GT. However no note was found about the share of these two sized on the total GRT. Therefore an average was taken.

Calculation of Categories 7 and 8: For these categories fees were calculated based on Euro per caught tonnes. Ship owner have to pay an indicated lump sum in advance. At the end of a year real catches were calculated. In the case that these calculated catches exceeded the amount of catches presumed to calculate the lump sum they had to be repaid by the ship owner. On the other side underused lump sums were not repaid to the ship owner. It was presumed that the lump sum corresponds to the real payments and was used for the calculations. Since 2006 fees of category 8 was separated into Bottom-longliner (3500 Euro lump sum per year per vessel) and pole-and-line tuna vessel (2500 Euro per year per vessel). However, no note was given which share each vessel type has on the total number of vessels. For the Calculation an average amount of 3000 Euro per year was taken.

Calculation of Category 9: In the later agreements since 1996 only vessel numbers were given. However license fees were given per GT. To derive the according licenses in GT two tables that indicate technical data on vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania in 2005 and 2006 were taken from the 2008-2012 protocol.¹³ Average GT per vessels of 4896 GT for 2006 and 4974 for 2005 (4935 GT on average) were calculated. For further calculation an average of 4935 GT per vessel was used. Since 2006 license fees were different for different vessels sizes. The indicated categories were 5000-7000 GT, 7000-7500 GT and 7500-9500 GT. Due to the fact that the 2005 and 2006 average lies in the first categories (5000-7000) it was presumed that most vessels can be ranged into the first and second category. For further calculations the average fee of these categories was used.

3.5.3 Reported Landings

The two data base of Eurostat and SAU are based on data originating from landing reports of the particular countries to the FAO. The IMROP/Gascuel data base was the single available data source independent from these reports. In general SAU and FAO databases report lower landings than those indicated in the IMROP/Gascuel database. Statistical information on landing data presented in the results part of this study were based on the IMROP/Gascuel database for the years 1992 to 2006. For the year 2005 and 2006

¹³European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III (the tables are provided also in the appendix as figure 71 and figure 72)




Figure 2: Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major Fishing Area 34) with its subdivisions (Source: FAO, www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area34/en)




Figure 3: Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major Fishing Area 34) with its subdivisions (Source: FAO Fishstat plus / CECAF)

additional data from the 2008-2012 protocol¹⁴ of the EU-Mauritanian FPA have been used. Possible information from the other databases were used to compare the results where adequate. Results for the years 1950 to 1991 were based on the SAU data base and the published article *Reconstructed catches in the Mauritanian EEZ* of (Gascuel *et al.* , 2007). This decision has been based on detailed comparison of the available databases. A more detailed description of this comparison is provided in the following:

The four available data bases (see chapter 3.3.2) were compared with each other to identify peculiarities, similarities and the range of information. The examination of the *Commodities production and trade 1976 - 2007* data set of Fishstat plus revealed that FAO divisions do not match with areas of West African EEZs (compare Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 106). The division 34.1.3 includes apart from the Mauritanian EEZ also parts of Western Sahara's resources¹⁵ and the division 34.3.1 includes the EEZs of Mauritania (southern part), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Gambia. Therefore, direct inference to landings from the EEZs of Mauritania is impossible by using this data base. An inquiry was send to FAOSTAT by mail but the FAO team referred in the answer only to the here mentioned data base.

The same divisions as in the FAO Fishstat plus data base built the basis for available data of the *Catches-East-central Atlantic (fish ca atl 34)* data set of Eurostat.¹⁶ While the *Commodities production and trade* data set of the FAO Fishstat plus data base allows information on division level only, the Eurostat data base provides information on the

¹⁴OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III

¹⁵Western Saharan resources have been treated so far under the agreement between the EU and Morocco. On the 21st of January 2009 the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) declared an EEZ at the Western Saharan coast. (See Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW), 2009, available at http://www.wsrw.org/files/dated/2009-01-23/eez_media_release.pdf, last access 06.08.2010)

¹⁶In the Eurostat data set the FAO major fishing area 34 is also referred to as CECAF area.




Figure 4: Comparing data from the two data bases SAU and FAO *Commodities production and trade 1976 - 2007* of total landings originating from the Major Fishing Area 34

subdivision level for the years 2004 to 2008. Taking the two subdivision 34.1.32 and 34.3.11 together they match with the Mauritanian EEZ but include parts of Western Sahara in addition. Upon request Eurostat confirmed that they can not provide more detailed data for the EEZs of Mauritania.

The data base of SAU is based on FAO data (see chapter 3.3.2). In the SAU data base landing information is attributed to EEZs. Comparison of the SAU and FAO data was possible with the least common denominator. The area of FAO divisions 1.1, 1.3 and 3.1 approximately correspond to the EEZs of Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia and Guinea.¹⁷ Thus total landings of above named EEZs from the SAU data base could be compared with landing data originating from the three named divisions provided by the FAO *Commodities production and trade* data set. This comparison revealed that SAU estimations exceed those of the FAO with an amount ranging between 340,000 tonnes (1995) and 830,000 tonnes (1980) (see figure 4). The SAU data base provides information about landings itemized by both species and fishing country. However, it does not allow inference to landings of certain species by a certain country. Furthermore, data is only available for some of the member states of the EU known to operate in these waters (Spain, Netherlands, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania). Upon request it was stated by SAU that they were not willing to provide data in more detail.

The IMROP/Gascuel data base contains detailed landing estimations that allowed inference to species landings by countries within the EEZ of Mauritania. However, it covers

¹⁷In addition the EEZ of Morocco includes a comparable small area of the Mediterranean Sea and the EEZ of Guinea reaches with a small area into division 3.3.




Figure 5: Comparing data from the data bases IMROP/Gascuel, the data set *Catches-East-central Atlantic* of Eurostat and data provided in the Protocol of the FPA Mauritania-EU 2008

only a relatively short period from 1992¹⁸ to 2006. Data were compared to the landings of the subdivisions 34.1.32 and 34.3.11 of the above named data set of Eurostat (see figure 5 and table 16 in the appendix). Although, the two subdivisions contain a larger area as the EEZ of Mauritania reported landings of the IMROP/Gascuel data base were much higher. The Protocol covering the period 2008-2012 of the FPA between Mauritania and the EU provides some landing data for the years 2005 and 2006.¹⁹ These data match well with the data of the IMROP/Gascuel data base for the year 2005 but report 103,112 tonnes higher total landings originating from the Mauritanian EEZ for the year 2006 (see figure 5). Indicated total landings for the EEZ of Mauritania are generally higher in the IMROP/Gascuel data base reaching a maximum discrepancy of 480,000 tonnes in 2002 (see figure 6). For the years 1994 and 1997 the SAU data base reported slightly higher landings of 3,500 and 8,800 tonnes.

Considered landing data cover the period 1980 to 2006. This period has been selected to include some information about the period before the first fishery agreement was signed between the EU and Mauritania. Within this period various states that had and have an impact on the fishery relationship joint the EU. Greece became a EU member in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986. Landings of all three countries have been assigned to EU landings starting in the year of their entry. Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Poland

¹⁸Available data for 1991 are not complete.

¹⁹OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III (the tables are provided also in the appendix as figure 71 and figure 72). In Article 1 of the protocol it is stated that the Mauritanian authorities laid down these data "on the basis of available scientific advice and regularly updated". It is therefore most likely that the data originate from sources of IMROP as well.




Figure 6: Comparing total landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania from the two data bases SAU and IMROP/Gascuel

and Malta joined the EU the first of May 2004. For these countries landings were assigned to the EU from 2005 onwards. Romania entered the EU the first of January 2007 and, therefore, could not be considered in respect to the available data.

Data analysis was realized in several steps. First, total EU landings originating from the Mauritanian EEZ were examined and related to overall activities in these EEZ. The role of single EU member countries was analyzed. In a second step, data were filtered by species or species groups. For a general examination species were grouped into six taxa groups: Crustaceans, Demersal Fish, Hake, Mollusks, Octopus and Pelagic. Table 17 provides information about each taxa group and the species that were assigned to it. A more detailed analysis was conducted for species or categories of special importance for the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship. These are overall, octopus, shrimps and species targeted by the industrial pelagic sector. Species of particular importance for the Mauritanian industrial and artisanal fishery were identified from the literature. A more detailed analysis was conducted considering landing data of various countries on these species.

3.5.4 Value of Reported Landings

The total value of EU landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania were derived by multiplying landing data for species groups extracted from the IMROP/Gascuel data base with prices of the frozen product of that species in the respective year. The three data bases FAO Fishstat plus (Data set *Commodities production and trade 1976 - 2007*),

Eurostat (CN8) and UN Comtrade were used to reconstruct the various prices. Prices in USD per tonne were derived by dividing the total annual export value of a certain species or species group by the total import quantity (in tonnes). Used USD - EUR²⁰ exchange rates are indicated in table 55 in the appendix. The derived values in EUR per tonne are shown in table 40 to 45 in the appendix. Export values of the databases were taken because they are indicated in Free On Board (FOB), thereby excluding costs of transport, insurance and others.²¹ Since prices for each species group vary from data base to database a maximum and a minimum series has been derived for each species group. This again resulted in maximal and minimal values of the total landed catches.

If available, data were taken from the country that recorded the highest landings for the taxa-group the species or species group was assigned to (see table 17 in the appendix). Therefore, data from Spain were preferentially taken for the taxa-groups Crustaceans, Demersal Fish, Hake, Mollusks and Octopus (compare tables 42 to 46 in the appendix). Data from the Netherlands were preferentially taken for species from the Pelagic taxa-group (compare table 47 in the appendix). In the case of anchovies export data of France and Italy were taken. For tuna export data of France were taken in addition to the data of Spain. Regarding the species group hairtales export values of China, Rep. Korea and Japan have been taken because these were the only available data. Therefore, prices for hairtales might have been estimated to high. However, EU landings of hairtales were negligible till 1996 and since than (between 1999 to 2006) stayed under 1 % of the total EU landings. In 1997 and 1998 they reached only 1.9 and 2.6 % of total EU landings. Prices for species groups like diverse cephalopods reflect the prices of the various species included in that group. The five crustaceans groups have been combined to one value group. Due to data availability the values of angler(monk) and shellfish are in each case based on the information of only one database. Values for angler were only available from 1995. Therefore, the 1995 value has assumed for the three preceding years. However, reported EU landings of angler and shellfish were very marginal. It is important to notice that the describe calculation can only be considered as rough estimation. There are a number of disadvantages considering the method used to calculated landing values:

- the form in which data used to calculation prices of fish products was deposited in databases did not allow the calculation of statistical attributes like variance, standard deviation etc. An example how export data are stored is: In 1992 Spain exported 40,494 tonnes of frozen octopus for a value of 100.88 USD to the world. Thus one tonne of octopus traded by Spain was worth 2,491 USD in 1992. However, this is already an average price of the various frozen octopus exports of Spain in 1992. Therefore, using data coming from three different databases to derive min and max

²⁰In this report EUR is used for both the currency unit Euro and the currency unit European currency unit (from 1979 to 1998) (ECU) that was used as European currency from 1979 to 1998

²¹in contrast import values are indicated in Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) which indicates that they include costs of transport and insurance and others

prices means calculating min and max prices out of average prices.

- trading data of frozen products have been used to calculate prices. However, it is not known whether all fish caught in Mauritania has been traded as frozen product in reality.
- an essential indicator for the price of various products is the size or weight of the traded unit (e.g. the weight of octopus). However, no exact data about the sizes or weight of the fish caught in the EEZ of Mauritania was available.
- one might expect that not all fish caught by EU vessels in the EEZ of Mauritania is later on exported to other countries (Dutch pelagic landings are mainly exported to other African countries, see chapter 4.11.3) Therefore, it is unclear whether export prices are the right values to use.

3.5.5 Subsidies granted to EU vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania

Subsidies granted to EU vessels have been analyzed by using a subsidies database available at <http://www.fishsubsidy.org/>. The database allows the tracing of funding granted to specific vessels by entering the name of the vessel of interest. In the FAQs of the website it is stated that the data has been provided directly by the European Commission. Names of vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania have been traced in two different ways. A report published by Greenpeace International in 2010²² provided names of vessels that were observed on a Greenpeace mission at the coast of West Africa. In this report data have been indicated including coordinates of encounter, date and name of the vessels. Those vessels detected between latitudes 16°4'N and 20°46'N (southern and northern limits of the EEZ of Mauritania) were selected. When available subsidies granted to these vessels were extracted from the subsidies database. Furthermore, names of vessels belonging to the Pelagic Freezer-trawler Association (PFA) have been collected from various websites of those companies belonging to the PFA. Subsidy data for these vessels have been extracted as described above.

²²R. Obaidullah & Osinga (2010) at 11.2.18

Results of this analysis are indicated in tables 53, 52 and 54 in the appendix. It is important to notice that these data can only give a rough indications about subsidies granted from the EU and its member countries. (a) They include only those vessels that were indicated in the Greenpeace report or on the websites of PFA companies. (b) They include only those vessels included in the fishsubsidy database. (c) They include all vessels belonging to the PFA regardless of the question whether a certain vessels has been operating in the EEZ of Mauritania or not. However, in this case one might argue that the company operating in the EEZ has been supported by the subsidy. Therefore, the data seem to underestimate real subsidies directly granted to the fleet operating in Mauritanian waters.

3.5.6 Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Regulations

Three different sources of information have been used to identify the operational structure of those vessels from which the export of fisheries products to the EU is currently allowed or had been authorized in the past. First, names and identification numbers of vessels from which fisheries exports were authorized in 1996 has been provided by a list included in Decision 96/425/EC of 28 June 1996.²³ A list of names and identification numbers of those vessels from which exports to the EU is currently allowed could be downloaded from the website of DG SANCO²⁴. Furthermore, the appendix of a report published by MPEM in 2005²⁵ contains a list of all industrial vessels that has been registered in Mauritania in this year. In addition, the same report specifies the organizational structure of those companies owning the vessels registered in Mauritania. The results of this analysis can be seen in table 26 and 28 in the appendix.

The above named sources (Commission of the European Communities (1996b) and DG SANCO (2010)) provided also lists of processing plants authorized to export to the EU in 1996 and 2008. The combined list can be seen in table 18. It was intended to obtain information of the structures of these companies through a web based research. However, available information was too few to allow acceptable inferences to the structure of the companies.

²³Commission of the European Communities (1996b), see 11.2.35

²⁴DG SANCO (2010), see 1

²⁵Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005), see also tables 20 to 20

4 Results

4.1 The Fishery Sector of Mauritania

Mauritania has a coastline with a length of 720 km²⁶ and declared its EEZ in 1978²⁷. Estimations of the surface covered by Mauritania's EEZ range from 155,422²⁸ to 162,166²⁹ square kilometers. The EEZ is known as being very rich in fishery resources. This is due to nutrients carried by the Canary Current and cold water up wells.³⁰ Continental fishery (in lakes and rivers) is only important for local consumption. Apart from some experimental projects (creation of oyster in the Bay de Levrier and creation of fish in the barrier lake Fouta Legleita) aquaculture does not exist.³¹




Figure 7: Number of pirogues in Mauritania (source: Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 106)

In former times the artisanal fishery of Mauritania was less developed and only represented by a few hundred pirogues.³² A first progress within the sector occurred in the 1950s due to the development of the salted and dried market. In these times production increased from around 3,000 t per year to over 7,000 t per year. Till the 1980s production remained lower than 15,000 t per year and less than 750 pirogues were involved (see figure 7). The situation changed with a rapid increase beginning in the 1990s.³³ Nowadays, the artisanal sector uses small pirogues in the range of 1 to 5 GRT with length less than 26 m.³⁴ A large variety of gears is used which include among others hook-and-line, seine nets and

²⁶WA FAO (2004-2010), see 11.2.22

²⁷WA The Sea Around US Project (2010), see 11.2.23

²⁸WA The Sea Around US Project (2010), see 11.2.23

²⁹WA FAO (2004-2010), see 11.2.22

³⁰R Martín (2010), see citation 1 at 11.2.15

³¹WA FAO (2004-2010), see 11.2.22, on p. 18 in the document stored in the data base

³²Chavance and Girardin (1991) and Chavance (2004) cited in Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 107

³³Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 105, see citation 3 at 11.2.3

³⁴WA FAO (2004-2010), see 11.2.22

traps.³⁵ Local fishers usually operate within six miles from the coast.³⁶ The mean annual catch per pirogue increased from 18 t per year in 1982 to 25 t per year in 2002. According to Gascuel *et al.* (2007) this data reflect a strong increase in fishing efficiency, moreover, because they have to be regarded against a general decrease in resource biomass.³⁷ All analyzed sources report a total artisanal fishery production of around 80,000 t (see figure 8) in recent years.³⁸ The FAO estimated for the year 2003 a 35% share of demersal fish, 7 % Cephalopods and no catches of crayfish.³⁹ Gascuel *et al.* estimated the share of demersal catches far higher at 75 % (60,000 t per year).⁴⁰ A third estimation from a study of the UNEP (PNUE in french) indicates artisanal catches for the year 2000 with 32 % pelagics and 68 % demersal which include about 4,000 t of octopus. Of the total of 80,000 t 62 % are estimated to be produced in the norther zone, 35 % in the southern zone and 2 % in the PNBA.⁴¹ Although very diverse in general, captures of the artisanal sector are dominated by mullet (overall black mullet), fish of the Sparidae community (especially porgy), goliath grouper and bass. Octopus is overall caught in the northern zone while sardinella is rather chatched in the southern zone.⁴²

The marine fishery sector is considered as one of the key sectors of Mauritania's economy. It is increasingly regarded as a potential contributor to national food security. Data is available that in 1998, 25,000⁴³ people have been employed in the fishery sector, 30,000⁴⁴ in 2001 and around 45,000⁴⁵ in 2010. Out of these, 31 % are generated by small-scale fishing and 12 % by industrial fishing (of which most are generated by foreign fleets). Jobs in the fishery sector on land account for around 54 % , 3 % are generated in other secondary activities.⁴⁶ In 2004, it represented the second most important source of export.⁴⁷ Currently, the fishery sector is stated to account for around 10 % of the GDP and between 35 and 50 % of export earnings. The sector contributes around 29 % to the state budget⁴⁸ In 2001 this contribution was estimated to be around 25 %.⁴⁹

Nevertheless it is stated that the sector is not integrated into the national economy.⁵⁰ Reasons for this are seen in the fact the development of the fishery sector is hindered by

³⁵Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 105

³⁶FAO (2004-2010): Profils des pêches et aquaculture par pays - Mauritanie- Profils, see 11.2.22

³⁷Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 106

³⁸WA FAO (2004-2010), see 11.2.22, Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 105, see citation 1 at 11.2.3, PNUE, 2006, see citation 2 at 11.2.19

³⁹FAO (2004-2010): Profils des pêches et aquaculture par pays - Mauritanie- Profils, see 11.2.22, see figure 59

⁴⁰Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 105, see citation 1 at 11.2.3

⁴¹PNUE, 2006, see citation 2 at 11.2.19

⁴²PNUE, 2006, see citation 3 at 11.2.19

⁴³B (Murison, 2004, p. 706-707)

⁴⁴R UNDP (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.20

⁴⁵R Martín (2010), see citation 6 at 11.2.15

⁴⁶R Martín (2010), see citation 6 at 11.2.15

⁴⁷B (Murison, 2004, p. 706-707)

⁴⁸R Martín (2010), see citation 6 at 11.2.15

⁴⁹R UNDP (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.20

⁵⁰R UNDP (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.20




Figure 8: Catches of the artisanal sector within the Mauritanian EEZ in tonnes from 1950 to 2005 (source: Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 119)

the lack of finance and high interest rates. As a result, both fishery and processing sectors are trapped by a high level of debts. It is stated that production facilities are obsolete and sometimes undersized.⁵¹ Catches made by the Mauritanian fleet are low compared to those made by foreign fleets operating in the EEZ.⁵²

The Mauritanian fishing policy has been reformulated in the 1980s due to an increasing interest and the presence of foreign fleets. This reformulation resulted in the obligation for foreign companies or governments to form joint ventures with Mauritanian interests which were supposed to hold a major share of the equity capital. In addition, foreign enterprises were obliged to land their fish in Mauritania (till 1992). Consequently exports increased sharply and export earnings from the fishery sector became for the first time more important than those of iron. In 1986 the fishing sector accounted for 10 % of the GDP. The 1985-1988 recovery program allocated almost 9 % of the total of new project investment toward fishery development. However, the volume and value of catches declined again in the late 1980s. In 1994 the GDP contribution of the fishery sector was around 5%.⁵³ The contribution declined further to 2.8 % in 1999.⁵⁴ In 1995 a one month suspension of all fishing operations was imposed by the Mauritanian government. The main intention of this break was to allow the marine stock (overall octopus and squid) to recover.⁵⁵

⁵¹R Martín (2010), see citation 6 at 11.2.15

⁵²R Martín (2010), see citation 2 at 11.2.15

⁵³B (Murison, 2004, p. 706-707)

⁵⁴R UNDP (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.20

⁵⁵B (Murison, 2004, p. 706-707)

4.2 UNCLOS

After 14 years of negotiations, the third UNCLOS was open for signature the 10th of December 1982.⁵⁶ Anticipating the conclusion of the convention many coastal states established Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the mid 1970s. Thereby, they increased their control over maritime resources from 3-12 to 200 sea miles. By this means almost 90 % of the world's exploitable fish resources have been brought under the jurisdiction of coastal states.⁵⁷ Article 62 "Utilization of living resources" is of particular importance for the management of fisheries within these EEZs. There it is stated that:

- Coastal states shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources
- in the case that the coastal state is not capable to harvest the entire capacity of the resources it shall offer access to the surplus to other states through agreements
- nationals of other states fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the conservation measures established in the laws and regulations of the coastal state⁵⁸

The creation of EEZ in West Africa is seen as a way for coastal states to control fisheries and generate new income.⁵⁹

4.3 European Fishery in Mauritania beyond the EU-Mauritanian Fishery Agreements

Fishing activities of European countries off the coast of Mauritania commenced prior to the conclusion of the framework of UNCLOS and the official Fishery Agreements between the EU and Mauritania. The SAU database (see table 36 in the appendix) indicated landings by Spain already since the year 1950 (the first year included in this database). Spain became a member of the EU in 1986. Therefore, first information about EU landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania started in this year with some 23,000 tonnes landed by Spanish vessels (see figure 9).

Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia joined the EU in 2004. Landings of these countries from Mauritania have been indicated in the SAU data base already since 1958 (see table 36 in the appendix)⁶⁰. According to this data base, landings of all three countries experienced similar developments breaking the 1,000 tonne mark in 1967. From 1970 to 1993 an average of almost 30,000 tonnes per year was recorded for both Lithuania and Latvia and around

⁵⁶OWP United Nations (2010), see 11.2.29

⁵⁷R CTA (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.9

⁵⁸OP United Nations (1982), see citation 1 at 11.2.30

⁵⁹R Cullberg & Lövin (2009), see citation 4 at 11.2.10; AR Alder & Sumaila (2004), p. 157

⁶⁰Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia were part of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, early 1990s

45,000 tonnes per year for Estonia. Records for Estonia ended in 1993. For Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, landing data were recorded between 1961 and 1993.




Figure 9: EU landings compared to total industrial landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: 1970-1991 The Sea Around Us Project (SAU), 1992-2004 IMROP/Gascuel, from 2004-2006 FPA Protocol between the EU and Mauritania of 2008)




Figure 10: Landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania by countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

4.4 Fishery Agreements and Protocols

The first official fishery agreement between the EU and Mauritania was concluded in July 1987⁶¹ after Portugal and Spain joined the EU in 1986. This Agreement is seen as the continuation of the bilateral agreement concluded between Mauritania and Portugal in 1984 which also included Spanish vessels.⁶² Since then, five further agreements have been signed in 1990, 1993, 1996, 2001 and 2006 respectively (see figure 11). Each single fishery agreement consists of three official documents: The Agreement, the Protocol and the Annex.⁶³ The 2006 agreement was signed for six years and is renewable for a further six years if no notice of termination is given by either of the two parties.⁶⁴




Figure 11: Concluded fishery agreements and protocols between the EU and Mauritania

Various modifications have been made to the agreements in the past. Within the 1993-1996 agreement a supplement to the protocol was adopted for the period from mid-November 1995 to end of July 1996. This supplement granted, for the first time, cephalopod licenses to the EU and rearranged compensation payments.⁶⁵ In the 1996-2001 agreement some changes were made in 1997 concerning the licenses for cephalopods, pelagic fish, pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners as well as the financing of scientific observers.⁶⁶ The

⁶¹WA European Union (1995-2010), see citation 2a at 11.2.25

⁶²R Martín (2010), see citation 9 at 11.2.15

⁶³OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see (e.g.) citation 5 at 11.2.37

⁶⁴OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b), see citation 4 at 11.2.41

⁶⁵OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1996b), see citation 1 and 2 at 11.2.44

⁶⁶OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1997), see citation 1 at 11.2.39 (The exact date of the application this amendment could not be traced)

2001-2006 agreement was modified by an amendment to the according protocol, effective from 1. January 2005. The reason for the modification was the temporary reduction of cephalopod licenses. The decision for this reduction was said to be based on scientific opinion and two meetings of the Joint Committee in September and December 2004. At the same time licenses for pole-and-line tuna vessels, surface longliners, and pelagic freezers were increased.⁶⁷ In 2008, a new protocol for the 2006-2012 agreement was adopted although the 2006-2008 protocol could have been twice renewed.⁶⁸ The Commission argued that licenses were not fully used by EU vessels and that, therefore, fishing opportunities and financial compensations should be renegotiated.⁶⁹ The current protocol will be valid till 31. July 2012 unless notice of termination is given by either of the two parties.⁷⁰

4.5 Institutions of the Agreements

Institutions of main relevance for the fishery agreement are the Joint Committee, the Scientific Committee and the Délégation à la Surveillance des Pêches et au Contrôle en Mer (DSPCM). The Joint Committee represents a platform to manage the "daily business" of the agreement and could be referred to as a technical-political working group.⁷¹ It began to assume importance in 1990 was strengthened in 1996 and is supposed to meet once a year but might also hold extraordinary sessions.⁷² The Scientific Committee consists of an average of 10 scientists from Mauritania and the EU. An important function is to examine whether catch quota overshoot the carrying capacities of the fish stocks. Data produced by the Scientific Committee is stated to be an important basis for negotiations.⁷³ It is argued that the role of the Scientific Committee in the 2001-2006 Agreement was not satisfactory: Meetings were too few and called at the last minute and the Joint Committee took recommendations only partially into consideration. According to the current agreement it is required to meet once a year.⁷⁴

The DSPCM is a Mauritanian institution responsible for the civil control and surveillance of fishing activities. It is administratively and financially independent from the Fisheries Ministry. Besides others it is also responsible for controlling the migratory flows including those to the EU. It is stated the DSPCM uses 33 % of the amount stipulated in the EU Mauritanian fishery agreements.⁷⁵

⁶⁷OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006a), see citation 1 at 11.2.40

⁶⁸OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c), see citation 4 at 11.2.46

⁶⁹OP Commission of the European Communities (2007), see citation 1 at 11.2.56

⁷⁰OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 6 and 7 at 11.2.47

⁷¹I Interview 4, see citation 12 at 11.3.4

⁷²R Martín (2010), see citation 15 and 16 at 11.2.15

⁷³I Interview 4, see citation 13 at 11.3.4

⁷⁴WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 15 at 11.2.7

⁷⁵R Martín (2010), see citation 17 at 11.2.15

4.6 Licenses

Until the 2006 agreement, fishing licenses for the Mauritanian EEZ were granted to the EU in Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) for some fishing categories and in number of vessels for others. With the 2006 Agreement the unit of measurement GRT was replaced with the unit Gross Tonnage (GT).⁷⁶ Until now, licenses for 10 different fishing categories have been granted to the EU. It is useful to differentiate between the demersal and the pelagic sector. Table 6 gives an overview.

Table 6: Fishing Categories relevant for the EU-Mauritanian fishery agreements

Demersal Licenses		Pelagic Licenses	
No 1	Crustaceans	No 7	Freezer Tuna Seiners
No 2	Black Hake and Bottom Longliner	No 8	Pole-and-Line Tuna Vessels, Surface Longliner and Bottom Longliner
No 3	Demersal Species other than Black Hake and other than Trawler	No 9	Pelagic Freezer Trawler
No 4	Deepwater Demersal Trawlers other than Black Hake	No 9 b	Pelagic Freezer Trawler and Seiner
No 5	Cephalopods	No 9 c	Non-Industrial Pelagic Seiner
No 6	Crawfish (Spiny Lobster since 2006)	No 11	Non-Freezer Pelagic Vessels
No 10	Crab		

Detailed information about the development of licenses over time is illustrated in figure 12 for the demersal and in figure 26 and 27 (see appendix) for the pelagic sector. Most important for the demersal sector are at present Category 1 (Crustaceans) and 5 (Cephalopods). The share of Category 2 (Black Hake and Bottom Longliner), the dominant category within the 1987-1990 agreement, has continuously diminished with time.

⁷⁶A direct inference from GRT to GT is impossible since vessels are reassessed by using different criteria in order to calculate the GT value (see I Interview 3 citation 21 at 11.3.3)




Figure 12: Licenses in GRT (GT since 2006) as granted by the fishery agreements to the EU for the Mauritanian EEZ for categories other than pelagic

Not all licenses are used by the extent indicated in the protocols. Between 2008 and July 2010 Categories 1, 5, and 9 were fully used. Categories 2 and 3 were not used entirely.⁷⁷ A detailed overview for the Period 2006 to 2010 is provided in figure 29 in the appendix.

4.7 Payments

Payments from the EU to Mauritania are arranged in the respective Agreements and further specified in the Protocols and Annexes. These payments consist of three elements:

- a financial due for access of EU vessels to the Mauritanian EEZ (Access due)
- an earmarked (conditioned) financial support (Earmarked financial support)
- fees due by EU vessel owners to obtain licenses (License fees)

Total EU payments (including all three components) increased both in terms of absolute payments and in terms of payments per GRT over time (see figure 13, due to a modification of the protocol in 1995 the exact payments could not be identified for the accounting year 1995-1996). Remarkable financial inflations took place with the Agreement 1996-2001 and the Agreement 2001-2006.

In 1996, the total estimated amount of payments increased from 13.2 million to 65.2 million EUR. The main reason for this uprating was the inclusion of the PFA agreements into the 1996-2001 agreement whereby the number of EU pelagic vessels that fished under the official EU-Mauritanian agreement rose from 35 to 79 units (see table 32 in the appendix). Additional cephalopod licenses were already granted with the supplement to the protocol in 1995 whereby the total licenses for demersal fish rose from 23,600 GRT for 1995/1996 to 31,500 GRT for 1996/1996 and to 39,000 GRT for the 2000/2001 accounting year (see table 31 in the appendix). In 2001, total estimated payments rose from 66.2 million to 100.7 million EUR. Compared to 1996 the 2001 financial uprating was not accompanied by any remarkable increase in fishing licenses.

Analyzing the share of each single element of the total EU payments (see figure 14) is important to understand the financing structure of the Agreements.

In the first agreement, access dues contributed around 66 % to total payments from the EU (see table 34 in the appendix). With the financial uprating of the 1996-2001 Agreement the share of access dues on total payments rose to 83 % (see figure 14, due to a modification of the protocol in 1995 the exact payments could not be identified for the accounting year 1995-1996). At the same time the share of license fees declined to less than 16 %, meaning

⁷⁷R Martín (2010), see citation 11 at 11.2.15

that the uprating in 2001 was mainly covered by direct EU contributions. However, during the run-time of the 1996-2001 Agreement the access due was diminished from 54.1 million to 50.5 million EUR while the estimated contribution of ship-owners through license fees rose from 10 million to 14.6 million EUR (see table 33 in the appendix). The general increase of license fees contribution was achieved by a continuing augmentation of fees per GRT in all categories apart from tuna (Category 7 and 8) as well as Black Hake and Bottom Longliner (Category 2) (see table 31 and 32 in the appendix). The newly granted cephalopod category made up for the largest share of the license fees increment. By increasing both licenses in GRT and payments per GRT the estimated license fees coming from this category rose from 2.7 million EUR in 1996 to 6.6 million EUR in 2001 (see table 35 and figure 28 in the appendix). Similar to 1996 but less severe, the uprating with the 2001-2006 Agreement resulted in a higher share of access dues and a lower share of license fees. For the run-time of this agreement granted cephalopod licenses stayed at 16,500 GRT or 55 vessels and the yearly increase of fees per GRT were much lower than in the previous agreement. Therefore, for the entire period of the agreement, the share of license fees stayed on a relatively low level of around 15 % as was already the case in 1996/1997. The share of the access due on the total payments started declining with the 2006-2012 Agreement and will reach 57 % in 2011/2012. However, this sharp decline is mainly caused by a reallocation of the access due payments to the earmarked financial support which will increase to 20 million EUR (22.8 % of the total) in 2011/2012.

As regards the license fees, the relative high values documented in the 2006-2008 Protocol have to be considered with caution. As has been stated above licenses of this protocol were not used entirely.⁷⁸ It is known that most unused payments were dedicated to Pelagic Freezer Trawlers (Category 9)⁷⁹. These payments were reduced by around 2 million EUR (see table 35 in the appendix). Granted Pelagic Freezer Trawler licenses were however claimed to be insufficient as regards the 2008-2012 Protocol⁸⁰ It seems therefore rational to assume that values of figure 13 overestimate real license fee contributions for the 2006-2008 Protocol by around 1.5 million EUR per accounting year.

The single agreements allowed for an adjustment of the EU payments in case of a change in fishing opportunities granted to the EU.⁸¹

In all protocols till the Agreement 2001-2006 it is stated that Mauritania should have the sole responsibility⁸² or full discretion⁸³ regarding the use of the financial compensation. However, certain designated uses concerning parts of the financial compensation were

⁷⁸OP Commission of the European Communities (2007), see citation 1 at 11.2.56

⁷⁹I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3

⁸⁰I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3

⁸¹The adjustment provision is included in all the agreements. As example see the 1987 and 2008 protocols: OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 2 at 11.2.37 and OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 1 at 11.2.47

⁸²OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 1 at 11.2.37

⁸³OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2001), see citation 1 at 11.2.45




Figure 13: Payments of the EU and vessel owners from the EU to Mauritania as arranged in the respective Protocols of the fishery agreements for each single according year (August to July), (The indicated vessel owner contribution is the maximum amount that would have been paid in the case that all licenses were used)

already included in the first agreement.⁸⁴ From there on the requirements under which the conditioned financial support was granted to Mauritania increased over time.

Table 7 shows the envisaged purposes of the earmarked financial support and the development of focuses over time. In the protocol of the First Agreement (1987-1990) it was briefly stated that the earmarked financial support should be dedicated to scientific and technical programs to improve information on the fishery resources.⁸⁵ Apart from this direct financial support, in the Agreements from 1987 to 1996 the EU was also obliged to recipe Mauritanian nationals in EU establishments as well as to provide study and training awards.⁸⁶ In the 1990-1993 Agreement it was added that part of the earmarked

⁸⁴In the Agreements 1987-1990 and 1990-1993 the earmarked financial support was formulated in an separate article as "The Community shall also contribute [...]". Therefore, it was clarified that Mauritania could not decide freely over these additional financial contributions (OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 3 at 11.2.37). Beginning with the agreement 1993-1996 the responsibility provision referred to the total financial contribution of the EU. It was then stated in an separated article: "Of the amount of total financial compensation [...]Mauritania shall allocate [...]" (OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1993), see citation 2 and 3 at 11.2.43. These formulations seem to contradict the responsibility provision.

⁸⁵OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 3 at 11.2.37

⁸⁶OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 4 at 11.2.37 and OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1991), see citation 2 at 11.2.42




Figure 14: Share of the three different elements of payments on total payments of the EU according to the fishery agreements (Reference values for the share of the vessel owner contribution are the maximum amounts that would have been paid in the case that all licenses were used)

amount should be used for the assessment of the crawfish stocks. In the Agreements from 1990 to 1996 it was furthermore added that part of the earmarked amount may be used to cover costs of participating in international meetings or training courses on fisheries.⁸⁷ In the 1996-2001 Agreement earmarked payments were provided for building up health inspections, fisheries research and a policy to improve fish stocks. Part of the money was furthermore dedicated to develop and strengthen human resources and to participate in international seminars and meetings.⁸⁸ The protocol of the 2001-2006 contained a list with nine items that had to be addressed with the earmarked payments. A certain amount of financial resources was directly linked to each single item. The most important items were (ordered according to the amount of money dedicated to them): Fishery surveillance, improvement of information and monitoring of fishery resources, developing of small-scale fishing, organizing and participating in international seminars, and maritime training to develop human resources.⁸⁹ Since the 2006 Protocol it is stated that the total earmarked amount should be dedicated to the development and implementation of the national strategy for the sustainable development of Mauritania's fisheries sector.⁹⁰ The following main

⁸⁷OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1991), see citation 2 at 11.2.42 and OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1993), see citation 3 at 11.2.43

⁸⁸OP Commission of the European Communities (1996d), see citation 2 and 3 at 11.2.67

⁸⁹OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2001), see citation 2 at 11.2.45

⁹⁰OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c), see citation 1 at 11.2.46 and OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 2 at 11.2.47

objectives were thereby emphasized in the 2008-2012 Protocol:⁹¹

- fisheries development and rent optimization
- increased economic and social impact of the sector
- protection of the marine environment, habitats and the coastline
- legal and institutional framework

Table 7: Purposes of the earmarked financial support in million EUR as determined in the protocols of the various fishery agreements (Some purposes were aggregated to a higher level. The X indicates that the exact amount was not indicated in detail but that the "X total amount" in the second last column should be utilized for all purposes tagged with and X)

Purpose	1987-1990 per year	1990-1993 per year	1993-1996 per year	1996-2001 per year	2001-2006 per year	2006-2008	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12
Improving information	0.2	0.3	0.3	X	0.85	X	X	X	X	X
Surveillance					1.5	X	X	X	X	X
Monitoring						X	X	X	X	X
Receipt RIM nationals in EU facilities										
Provide study and training (human resources)	0.09	0.12	0.12	X	0.3					
Seminars and International Meetings				0.2	0.4					
Institutions and Management					0.1	X	X	X	X	X
Develop Fish stocks				X		X	X	X	X	X
Develop Infrastructure						X	X	X	X	X
Small Scale Fishing					0.8	X				
Hygiene and Health conditions				X		X	X	X	X	X
Non-industrial Fishery and Aquaculture						X	X	X	X	X
Restructuring industrial fleet						X				
Rescue Service					0.05	X				
Promoting Private Investment							X	X	X	X
Env. Protection							X	X	X	X
PNBA						X	1	1	1	1
X total amount				0.6		11	10	15	17	19
Total	0.29	0.42	0.42	1.05	4	11	11	16	18	20

Regarding control mechanisms for the utilization of the earmarked financial support, the protocol of the 1987-1990 Agreement required a brief from the Mauritanian authorities.⁹² According the 1990-1993 agreement, programs, were to be drawn up by CNROP (now IMROP) and the content of the programs had to be approved by both parties before the

⁹¹OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 3 at 11.2.47

⁹²OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 3 at 11.2.37

corresponding amount was paid by the EU.⁹³ No control requirements could be traced for the 1996-2001 agreement. Since the 2001-2006 protocol, an annual report is requested from the Mauritanian Ministry on the measures and achievements implemented. Furthermore, the EU reserves the right to request additional information and to review the concerned payments.⁹⁴ With the 2006-2008 Agreement the according protocols also contained a provision that allowed the EU to suspend the application of the protocols immediately in the case that Mauritania failed to comply with the commitments regarding the earmarked financial support.⁹⁵

Critics note that the EU might seek a stronger influence on the decision making process of Mauritania's fishery policy through the earmarking of payments. This is seen as a potential danger for the small-scale sector that operates in direct competition with the EU fleet.⁹⁶ However, the influence of the EU on the spending of the earmarked financial support is controversial. Several sources give indications that the money generated from the agreements is not invested within the fishery sector⁹⁷ and it is questioned in how far the Mauritanian government is willing to spend the earmarked amount within this field⁹⁸

Several reasons could be traced for the failure to invest in the sector. One reason is that the payments do not in fact reach the fishery ministry. The European Commission stated that Mauritania is currently providing more information on the application of the money than required by the agreements. However, the mandatory report due in June 2010 was not transmitted in time. Subsequent investigations revealed that the money did not reach the fishery ministry but instead remained in the treasury department. As dispute resolution, Mauritania proposed a part transfer of 50 % (9 million EUR) of the subsequent payments in summer 2010 while the remaining 50 % would be paid in December 2010.⁹⁹ However, this solution was only possible through mutual agreement between the parties. In the framework of the current agreement the earmarked amount is, like the access due, directly linked to the granting of licenses. Therefore, earmarked payments could usually only be detained by canceling the entire agreement.¹⁰⁰

After the coup d'état in 2008 and in accordance with Art 96¹⁰¹ aid paid by the EU to the Mauritanian government, state agencies and state-owned enterprises was drastically

⁹³OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1991), see citation 1 at 11.2.42

⁹⁴OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2001), see citation 3 at 11.2.45

⁹⁵OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c), see citation 3 at 11.2.46

⁹⁶WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 14 at 11.2.7

⁹⁷I Interview 1, see citation 19 at 11.3.1; R Cullberg & Lövin (2009) see citation 1 at 11.2.10

⁹⁸I Interview 1, see citation 19 at 11.3.1; NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 10 at 11.2.21; NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 9 at 11.2.21

⁹⁹I Interview 4, see citation 5 at 11.3.4

¹⁰⁰I Interview 4, see citation 5 at 11.3.4

¹⁰¹Art. 96 of the Cotonou Agreement refers to the situation that one party considers that the other party " failed to fulfill an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9", OP ACP/EC (2000), see citationcotonou2000-1 at 11.2.4

reduced.¹⁰² However, the fishery agreement with the EU including the according payments continued throughout the period of the dictatorship.¹⁰³ These payments must have constituted an important financial support for the regime. The European Commission had no possibilities to maintain negotiations and an examination of the spending for the earmarked amount was impossible. An entire evaluation of the expenses is considered feasible in 2011.¹⁰⁴

The way in which earmarked payments are granted to Mauritania is perceived as another barrier to investment in the fishery sector. On the Mauritanian side, uncertainty exists about the amount of money that it actually receives from the agreements. The amount can easily change due to renegotiations (see above), canceling or modifications of fishing opportunities. Therefore, the budget is not spent in form of long-term investments but used to cover running costs; running cost for infrastructure that does not operate effectively due to the lack of investment. This vicious circle might provoke corruption and what is described by the EU as "*lack of absorption capacity*."¹⁰⁵ Interview 4 with the European Commission revealed that the earmarked amount granted to Mauritania is not sufficient to really improve the local fishery infrastructure.¹⁰⁶

The financial support earmarked for the artisanal sector between 2001 and 2008 (see figure 7) was criticized. The sector was said to already be over-funded due to support from the African Development Bank (BADE) and the French Development Agency (AFD).¹⁰⁷

4.8 Landings

According to the current agreement, EU vessels are not obliged to land their catches in Mauritania.¹⁰⁸ The 2001-2006 Agreement obliged the demersal fishery to land catches in total 70 times in Nouadhibou. Several conditions had to be fulfilled by Mauritania to facilitate these landings.¹⁰⁹ Since the 2006-2008 Protocol a reduction of license fees for those EU vessels landing or transshipping at least 15 % of their catches in Mauritania shall function as economic incentive. The reduction is set at a maximum of 25 % of the license fees for the period when landings or transshipments are conducted. The exact reduction depends on the share of the cargo that is actually landed or transshipped.¹¹⁰

¹⁰²OP Commission of the European Communities (2009), see citation 1 at 11.2.57

¹⁰³I Interview 4, see citation 5 at 11.3.4

¹⁰⁴I Interview 4, see citation 5 at 11.3.4

¹⁰⁵I Interview 1, see citation 2, 3 and 18 at 11.3.1

¹⁰⁶I Interview 4, see citation 9 at 11.3.4

¹⁰⁷WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 13 at 11.2.6

¹⁰⁸I Interview 4, see citation 9 at 11.3.4

¹⁰⁹OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1996b), see citation 4 at 11.2.45

¹¹⁰OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c), see citation 2 at 11.2.46; OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citations 5 and 10 at 11.2.47

Nevertheless, it is stated that catches are in general not landed in Mauritania.¹¹¹ The vast share of EU catches is instead landed in Las Palmas or Lanzarote. It is stated that the poor infrastructure of the Nouadhibou harbor is the main reason for this.¹¹² For Mauritania, landings in its own harbors are essential for stipulated value adding within the national processing sector. It is therefore an essential demand of Mauritania.¹¹³ In 2006 Mauritania was only processing 12 % of its catches while the vast majority of value-adding took place in Europe.¹¹⁴ One source states that the Mauritanian authorities will require in negotiations for upcoming agreements that 50% of the total catches originating from the EEZ are landed in Mauritania.¹¹⁵ However, according to Interview 3 this is still not an official statement by Mauritania.¹¹⁶ It was stated by the European Commission that it has a political concern to facilitate landings in Mauritania as often as possible. However, as long as the port infrastructure is not well developed vessel owners could not be forced to land their catches in Mauritania.¹¹⁷

4.9 Signing-on of Mauritanian Seamen

Table 8 gives an overview of the number of Mauritanian seamen that have/had to be employed by EU vessels in accordance with the agreements. Between 1987 and 1996, EU boats were obliged to sign-on a number of seamen that amounted to 35 % but at least 25 % of their crew.¹¹⁸ Beginning with the 1996-2001 Agreement the obligations were indicated in absolute numbers and in relation to the vessel size. One or more of the employed seamen should have the status of an officer or observer, depending on the size of the vessel.¹¹⁹ Separate benchmarks have been included for the pelagic sector. In the current agreement Tuna vessels are obliged to employ one Mauritanian seaman, Pole-and-Line vessels three. Vessels of the category Pelagic Freezer Trawler are liberated from the signing-on of Seamen in the first six months of fishing in the Mauritanian EEZ. In the following six months they are obliged to employ 50 % of the seamen indicated in table 8.¹²⁰ Penalties would have been due in cases where less seamen were employed than the numbers stipulated in the protocols. These amounted to 200 EUR per month in 1987¹²¹ and are fixed at 20 EUR per day in the current Agreement¹²² for each seamen not employed in reference to the benchmark (35% in 1987, e.g. 7 for vessels between 300 and 350 GT in the current agreement). Contracts offered to Mauritanian seamen have to guarantee the

¹¹¹I Interview 1, see citation 2 at 11.3.1

¹¹²I Interview 4, see citation 9 at 11.3.4; I Interview 3, see citation 19 at 11.3.3

¹¹³I Interview 1, see citation 1 at 11.3.1

¹¹⁴R UNDP (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.20

¹¹⁵WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 2b , 2c and 2f at 11.2.27

¹¹⁶I Interview 3, see citation 19 at 11.3.3

¹¹⁷I Interview 4, see citation 9 at 11.3.4

¹¹⁸OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 6 at 6

¹¹⁹OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 11 at 11.2.47

¹²⁰OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 17 at 11.2.47

¹²¹OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 6 at 11.2.37

¹²²OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 14 at 11.2.47

” *social security cover applicable to them*” which included life assurance as well as sickness and accident insurance.¹²³ In the current protocol it is stated that ” *Conditions granted to Mauritanian seamen shall not be lower than those applied to Mauritanian crews and shall comply with ILO standards and under no circumstances be below those standards*”.¹²⁴

Table 8: Number of Mauritanian Seamen that have/had to be employed on EU vessels when operating in the EEZ of Mauritania

Period	Vessel Size in GRT / GT									
	smaller 200	200-250	250-300	larger 300	300-350	larger 350	350-500	larger 500	larger 800	larger 2000
1987-1990	more than 25 % (35 %) of the non-office crew engaged (Officer on request of Mauritania)									
1990-1993										
1993-1995										
1995-1996										
1996-1997	2	3	4	5						
1997-2001	3	4	5	6						
2001-2006	4	5	6		7	35 % (min 7)				
2006-2008	3	4	5		7		8	9	36 % (min 10)	37 % (min 14)
2008-2012	3	4	5		7		8	9	37 % (min 10)	37 % (min 14)

¹²³OP European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987), see citation 7 at 11.2.37;

OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 12 at 11.2.47

¹²⁴OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 13 at 11.2.47

4.10 Interests of the Parties and Negotiations

Negotiations on the fishery agreements take place between the European Commission and the Government of Mauritania.¹²⁵

Based on a study of IFREMER¹²⁶, CEMARE¹²⁷ and CEP¹²⁸ published in 1999, the EU's interest in maintaining fishery agreements with third countries are summarised in three points:

- securing access to "raw material" (The EU processing industry has a growing demand for fish at the same time that the EU's own resources are over-exploited)
- secure value creation (by adding value to the "raw material" in Europe)
- secure jobs (mainly in the processing industry)¹²⁹

Several objectives concerning the EU-Mauritanian agreements were formulated in 1996 by the European Commission:

- a validity period of the agreements of around five years to ensure stability for the fishing activities of the EU fleet
- employment of an increasing number of vessels
- opportunities for cephalopod and pelagic fisheries while considering the state of the fish stock and the situation of Mauritania's fishery sector
- increasing cooperation in the area of monitoring (VMS, scientific observation, communication of information)
- socio-economic cooperation with the Mauritanian fishery sector for mutual advantage (joint development of the fisheries sectors of the EU and Mauritania)¹³⁰

Since the 2002 CFP reform, the EU's intention of supporting the development of the fisheries sectors of the partner country has been emphasized by the European Commission.¹³¹ The European Commission stated that it strives towards sustainable management of the

¹²⁵I Interview 1, see citation 9 at 11.3.1

¹²⁶French Institute for the exploitation of the sea

¹²⁷Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources

¹²⁸Center for the study of projects

¹²⁹R CTA (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.9

¹³⁰OP Commission of the European Communities (1996d), see citation 1 at 1

¹³¹R Fisheries (unknown), see citation 1 at 11.2.12

fisheries resources in Mauritania.¹³² The EU shows an interest in avoiding interruptions to vessel access to the Mauritanian EEZ.¹³³ The European Commission sees official EU fishery agreements as frameworks to improve the current situation. It is argued that bilateral and private Agreements would replace the official EU agreements in case of a termination. This is seen as having a negative impact on the legal framework and the transparency.¹³⁴

Due to the recent coup d'états (2005 and 2008) and subsequent reelections, the position of Mauritania's government is not easy to capture. However, in interview 1 it was stated that due to the structure of the political arena in Mauritania, changes to government do not necessarily result in a complete change of political ideas. Often the same people are involved in the various governments.¹³⁵ The Minister of Fisheries after the military coups in August 2008 stated in an interview that "*the fish in Mauritania's waters belong to everyone in the world*". He argued that it is Mauritania's task to manage the resource in the best possible way. However, the fish should generate more investment in Mauritania. Furthermore, he emphasized that in principle, Mauritania's government has full sovereignty over the payments derived from the agreements but that the country is open for a dialogue with the EU to ensure that earmarked payments benefit the fisheries sector. He argued that for Mauritania the focus should be on economic development.¹³⁶ In 2010, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Development of Mauritania was cited in a web article. He emphasized that Mauritania has a strong interest in deriving more value and employment from its resources.¹³⁷ This is reflected in request to achieve higher landings of fish in Mauritanian harbors mentioned in chapter 4.8.

Information exists that the negotiations of several of the Agreements have not always been straightforward. Disagreement between the two parties evolved for example in negotiations for the 2006-2012 Agreement when Mauritania put a value of 150 million EUR (compared to 83 million offered by the EU) on the amount of licenses to be granted.¹³⁸ The negotiations for 2001-2006 Agreement were described as "*intense*".¹³⁹

Several findings provide evidence on the possibilities available to both parties to influence the outcome of the negotiations. Important is to notice that besides the fishery agreements the EU maintains various relationships with Mauritania. Therefore, the fishery of Mauritania can also be influenced by other means such as trading, SPS and IUU regulations.¹⁴⁰ The ability to pay high sums of money is an important factor of influence of

¹³²I Interview 4, see citation 4 at 11.3.4

¹³³OP Commission of the European Communities (1993), see citation 1 at 11.2.66; WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 1 at 11.2.8

¹³⁴I Interview 4, see citation 16 at 11.3.4

¹³⁵I Interview 1, see citation 5 at 11.3.1

¹³⁶R Cullberg & Lövin (2009), see citations 5, 6 and 6 at 11.2.10

¹³⁷WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 2f at 11.2.27

¹³⁸WA InshoreIreland (2007), see citation 3 at 11.2.26; WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 1a at 11.2.27

¹³⁹NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 2 at 11.2.21

¹⁴⁰I Interview 1, see citation 11 at 11.3.1

the EU.¹⁴¹ Several sources state that a high share of the Mauritanian state budget comes from the fishery agreement with the EU (depending on the source of information a share of 20 to 33 % is estimated).¹⁴² It is argued that the high financial dependency has reduced Mauritanian's negotiation power.¹⁴³ It is said that the recent progress of Mauritania as an oil exporting country has strengthened its position in negotiating with the EU.¹⁴⁴ Furthermore, it is stated that the influence of the EU in Mauritania has recently decreased when compared for example with China.¹⁴⁵

Some sources indicate that the Mauritanian society is not in favor of Mauritania maintaining fishery agreements with the EU.¹⁴⁶ As explanation it is argued that agreements do not evoke much visible or tenable effects.¹⁴⁷ It is furthermore stated that Mauritania, along with other West African countries, is now less willing to enter into fishery relationships with the EU as has been the case in the past.¹⁴⁸

Some data offer details on how far the position of the European Commission is influenced by an internal conflict within the EU. This includes a new debate that has evolved in the framework of the Lisbon treaty. The European Parliament is requiring more participants in the negotiations.¹⁴⁹ A review of the European Commission on the outcome of the negotiations to the 1996-2001 Agreement stated that it reflects "*closely the wishes expressed by Community shipowners prior to the negotiations*".¹⁵⁰ This might provide a hint as to how far negotiations have been influenced by the interests of the EU fishing industry. However, there are also indications that shipowners did not see their interests reflected in the Agreements.¹⁵¹ One web article claims that a Spanish delegation has already explored the possibility of negotiating private agreements in the case that the EU-Mauritanian agreement is not renewed in 2012.¹⁵²

¹⁴¹I Interview 1, see citation 2 at 11.3.1

¹⁴²I Interview 1, see citation 5 at 11.3.1; R Gascuel *et al.* (2007), see citation 9 at 11.2.3; I Interview 4, see citation 6 at 11.3.4; WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 4 at 11.2.8

¹⁴³R UNDP (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.20

¹⁴⁴WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 1e at 11.2.27; WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 2f at 11.2.27; WA InshoreIreland (2007), see citation 2 at 11.2.26

¹⁴⁵I Interview 1, see citation 2 at 11.3.1

¹⁴⁶WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 2e at 11.2.27

¹⁴⁷I Interview 1, see citation 2 at 11.3.1

¹⁴⁸I Interview 1, see citation 3 at 11.3.1

¹⁴⁹I Interview 1, see citation 9 at 11.3.1

¹⁵⁰OP Commission of the European Communities (1996d), see citation 1 at 1

¹⁵¹NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 5 at 11.2.21; R Martín (2010), see citation 11 at 11.2.15

¹⁵²Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 2d at 11.2.27

4.11 What has happened in the various fisheries categories?

4.11.1 Octopus

Within the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship octopus plays a multilayered role. For both parties the species is of high financial importance. On the Mauritanian side the octopus fishery bears high potentials for the industrial and artisanal sector which might lead to a better integration of the fishery sector into the national economy. On the European side a fleet specialized in the octopus fishery has developed over time which nowadays depend on the access to Mauritanian resources. At the same time consensus exists about the overexploitation of the stock in the Mauritanian EEZ. Two further parties are deeply involved in the issue; Japan in offering a lucrative market for octopus and China in being part of the industrial cephalopod sector of Mauritania.

Landings of octopus of the artisanal sector are indicated in a range of 4,000 to 9,000 tonnes per year between 1994 and 2007.¹⁵³ As indicated in figures 7 and 8 both the number of pirogues and the total artisanal landings have increased significantly since 1992. Furthermore information exists that about 1,500 pirogues were engaged in octopus fishing in 2001.¹⁵⁴ Those figures suppose a strong decline in artisanal octopus landings although no current data are available. Extrapolating from the data of 1993 a capacity of 23,000 to 28,000 tonnes was estimated for the artisanal fishery for 2001.¹⁵⁵ Artisanal octopus fishing methods are said to be selective¹⁵⁶ and allow the release of juveniles or gravid females. Prices for octopus caught with these methods result in high quality products and accordingly high price (in relation to products from trawlers).¹⁵⁷

Figure 15 (see also table 51 in the appendix) shows that total Industrial landings of octopus from the Mauritanian EEZ started declining in 1987. Landing data from trawlers fishing under Mauritanian flag have been available since 1992 and show a decline from 36,000 tonnes in 1992 to less than 20,000 tonnes after 1996. An influx of Chinese vessels in the early 1990s¹⁵⁸ nowadays makes up for the large part of the Mauritanian cephalopod fleet.¹⁵⁹ However, table 20 in the appendix reveals that a larger part (40 %) of the vessels registered in 2005 originated from EU member countries (mainly from Spain but also from France, Holland and Portugal). In 2005, the cephalopod fleet of Mauritania was composed of 171 trawlers.¹⁶⁰ Out of these, 38 % were registered as Mauritanian vessels,

¹⁵³R CSC (2008) see 60 at 11.2.2 see also: WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 5 at 11.2.6 and: R PNUE, 2006, p. 70, see citation 2 at 11.2.19

¹⁵⁴WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 5 at 11.2.6

¹⁵⁵WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 6 at 11.2.6

¹⁵⁶I Interview 1, see citation 20 at interview1 and WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 1h at 11.2.27

¹⁵⁷WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 2 at 11.2.7

¹⁵⁸R Martín (2010), see citation 8 at 11.2.15

¹⁵⁹WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 4 at 11.2.7

¹⁶⁰R Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005), see figure 62 at 11.2.17

the remaining 62 % were counted as 'on the way of being nationalized'. Of 183 vessels (the 171 cephalopod trawlers plus 12 shrimp trawlers) 20 % were owned by Mauritanian companies, 16 % by Algerian- or European-Mauritanian companies and 64 % by Chinese-Mauritanian companies.¹⁶¹ 115 licenses for cephalopods were used by the Mauritanian fleet in 2005.¹⁶²




Figure 15: Landings of octopus from the EEZ of Mauritania by industrial trawlers from China, Mauritania and the EU since 1992 (Source: IMROP/Gascuel) and total landings of octopus from the EEZ of Mauritania since 1980 (Source: SAU)

At the beginning of the EU-Moroccan Fishery Agreement from 1995 to 1999, 128 cephalopod vessels from the EU were allowed to fish in the EEZ of Morocco. This number was gradually reduced to 86 vessels in 1999.¹⁶³ Already in 1995 when negotiations for the upcoming fishery agreement degenerated, about 700 Spanish and Portuguese vessels were immobilized.¹⁶⁴ It was proposed by the European Commission to support affected vessel owners with 52 million EUR in accordance with the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). The EU was supposed to bear 75 % of these costs.¹⁶⁵ When the EU-Moroccan Agreement was canceled in November 1999 about 400 vessels and 4300 seamen had to cease their activities.¹⁶⁶ At this time additional payments for the reconversion of

¹⁶¹The 183 vessels were run by 41 ship owning companies; 38 vessels by 23 Mauritanian companies, 116 vessels by eight Chinese-Mauritanian companies and 29 by 10 Algerian- or European-Mauritanian companies, see R Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005), see figure 64 at 11.2.17

¹⁶²R Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005), see figure 62 at 11.2.17

¹⁶³WA European Union (1995-2010), see figure 66 at 3 at 11.2.25

¹⁶⁴OP Commission of the European Communities (1995), see citation 1 at 11.2.68

¹⁶⁵OP Commission of the European Communities (1995), see citation 2 at 11.2.68

¹⁶⁶OP Commission of the European Communities (2001a), see citation 1 at 11.2.69

the fleet was considered necessary with costs of 281 million EUR.¹⁶⁷ It was furthermore stated that there existed some opportunities of reemployment in the context of other fishery agreements with third countries.¹⁶⁸ Long-liner as well as cephalopod and shrimp trawlers were the most important categories in the EU-Moroccan Agreement.¹⁶⁹ It is argued that the quest for cephalopod licenses in Mauritania was overall linked to the collapse of the EU-Moroccan agreement.¹⁷⁰ While the number of licenses for cephalopod categories was gradually diminished in Morocco, the number of licenses for cephalopods has steadily increased since 1995 in the EU-Mauritanian agreement (see figure 12).¹⁷¹ On the basis of lost fishing opportunities in Morocco, the European Commission proposed to allot the cephalopod licenses (granted in 1995) entirely to Spanish vessels.¹⁷²

The request of the EU for access to cephalopod licenses in Mauritania was already documented in the 1993-1996 Protocol.¹⁷³ However, CNROP (now IMROP) and the FAO were already concerned about the stock situation when the Chinese vessels obtained access to Mauritania's octopus resources of Mauritania.¹⁷⁴ It is stated that in 1995 the EU by itself was urging a decrease in fishing efforts on octopus and the catch of juveniles as a condition for granting a part of certain funding.¹⁷⁵ A further increase in cephalopod licenses granted to the EU was justified with the departure of Asian vessels in 1999.¹⁷⁶ A strong reduction in cephalopod licenses took place with the 2008-2012 Protocol. Before this official reduction, 20 of the Spanish cephalopod vessels had to stop their activities due to the decline in profitability.¹⁷⁷ Only 65 % of the GT of the allocated Cephalopod licenses were used in the 2006-2008 period (see figure 29).

Earnings from the export of octopus are important for the Mauritanian industry.¹⁷⁸ One source was citing in 2001 that experts estimated the return from a well-managed Mauritanian cephalopod stock to be around 100 million USD (around 112 million EUR at that time).¹⁷⁹ The Société Mauritanienne de Commercialisation du Poisson (SMCP) is the Mauritanian trading company responsible for marketing all frozen fish and cephalopods landed by the national fleet. In 2004, octopus accounted for 51 % of total export in weight

¹⁶⁷Of the 281 million EUR, the EU was supposed to cover directly 70 %. Of these 197 million EUR Spain was supposed to receive 94.6 % and Portugal 5.4%, see OP Commission of the European Communities (2001a), see citation 4 and 5 at 11.2.69

¹⁶⁸OP Commission of the European Communities (2001a), see citation 2 at 11.2.69

¹⁶⁹WA European Union (1995-2010) see figure 66 at 3 at 11.2.25

¹⁷⁰WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 12 at 11.2.6 and NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 5 at 11.2.21

¹⁷¹A similar but less extreme development can be observed for the shrimp sector.

¹⁷²OP Commission of the European Communities (1996e), see citation 1 at 11.2.65

¹⁷³OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1993), see citation 11.2.43 at 11.2.43

¹⁷⁴WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 4 at 11.2.7

¹⁷⁵WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 2 at 11.2.6

¹⁷⁶The vessels were imported from China by Mauritians but had to be returned due to the failure to fulfill their commitments. WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 1 at 11.2.6

¹⁷⁷WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 2 at 11.2.8

¹⁷⁸R Josupeit (2008), see citation 5 at 11.2.14

¹⁷⁹R Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 10 at 11.2.6




Figure 16: Import of octopus from Mauritania (Source: UN Comtrade)

and 82 % of the total turnover of the SMCP.¹⁸⁰ Figure 17 and 16 show the import of Mauritanian octopus by various countries. The main importer of Mauritanian octopus is Japan, for which Mauritania represents the most important supplier.¹⁸¹ Due to the selective methods applied by the artisanal fisher, this sector fetches relatively high prices on the Japanese market.¹⁸² Octopus imports by the EU have increased from 2,400 tonnes in 1990 to 8,900 tonnes in 2009. As regards the EU Spain, Italy and Greece are the main importers of Mauritanian octopus. Main supplier for Spain and Italy is Morocco.¹⁸³ In 2009, Mauritania doubled exports to Japan and Spain and exported four times the quantity of the year before to Italy. It is proposed that these extremely large catches were allowed in order to counterbalance the difficult economic situation of the year before.¹⁸⁴

The exact value of the octopus landed by EU vessels is difficult to derive. It is stated that cephalopod trawlers accounted for 33 % of the turnover achieved by the EU under the fishery agreement in 2004.¹⁸⁵ Regarding the value of octopus landed by the EU, figure 19 shows that from 2000 onwards a share between 20 % and 26 % from total landings can be assumed.¹⁸⁶ However, value data of landings depend highly on the market prices utilized in the calculation. Figure 19 indicates the values of Mauritanian octopus landed by the EU.¹⁸⁷ The price of octopus on the Japanese market is strongly determined by the weight

¹⁸⁰WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 2 at 11.2.7. See also NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), where the turnover was cited to be 89 % somewhere around 2002, see citation 6 at 11.2.21

¹⁸¹WA FAO Gloebefish (2010), see figure 67 at 11.2.25

¹⁸²I Interview 1, see citation 20 at interview1

¹⁸³WA FAO Gloebefish (2010), see figure 69 and 68 at 11.2.25

¹⁸⁴WA FAO Gloebefish (2010), see citation 1 at 11.2.25

¹⁸⁵In comparison to 38 % for small pelagics fishing and 16 % for shrimp fishing, see WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.7

¹⁸⁶The fact that the max series is located under the min series is due to the relatively small range of assumed prices for octopus while the assumed prices for other species have a wide range

¹⁸⁷Values presented with the blue line were calculated using export prices of octopus derived from various




Figure 17: Import of octopus from Mauritania (Source: UN Comtrade)

of the single individual.¹⁸⁸ Values using Japanese prices were included in the figure to show potential values. They might not reflect the values obtained by the EU. It should be emphasized that the numbers represent values of landed octopus reported. They do not represent the turnover of European trawlers. A calculation of turnovers would also have to include running costs as unreported landings. European trawlers are still said to target juvenile octopus to serve the Spanish market which demands especially small octopus.¹⁸⁹




Figure 18: Value of octopus from Mauritania landed by EU vessels

fishery databases. Highest values were estimated for the year 2005 at around 68 million EUR. In addition Japanese prices were used to calculate min and max values for 2004 to 2006. Prices were taken from FAO GlobeFish (2010) (see figure 18 at 11.2.25). The prices of April of the according year were taken.

¹⁸⁸WA FAO GlobeFish (2010), see figure 18 at 11.2.25

¹⁸⁹I Interview 1, see citation 20 at interview1

Various sources including different stakeholder groups confirm the overexploitation of the octopus stock in the EEZ of Mauritania.¹⁹⁰ The maximum sustainable yield of the octopus in the EEZ of Mauritania was in 1998 defined at 35,000 tonnes with the optimum economic yield situated still below this number at around 24,000 tonnes.¹⁹¹ A study concluded in 2001 stated that the effort on octopus should be reduced by at least 25 %.¹⁹² In 2006 IMROP estimated an excessive capacity of 31 % caused by a 20% loss in production.¹⁹³ A report of the Scientific Committee stated in 2008 that the effective fishing efforts on octopus should be reduced by 30 %.¹⁹⁴

Some finings illustrate difficulties that arose due to harmonization efforts and diplomatic issues. Due to a standardization stipulated by CECAF, Mauritania reduced the minimum size of octopus from 500 to 400¹⁹⁵ or 450¹⁹⁶ grams. One report states that in 2008 Mauritanian officials tried to replace the biological recovery period in a way that would admit the artisanal fishery a 15 days exemption.¹⁹⁷ After negotiation in the Joint Committee in March 2010 and with the argument of equal treatment for all involved parties the period had been delayed by one month from October to November. As a result trawlers do not have to leave the fishing ground in September.¹⁹⁸




Figure 19: Share of the value of octopus from total value landed by EU vessels

Involved stakeholders express various opinions about the targeting of Mauritanian octopus by EU trawlers. The trawlers are claimed to represent a direct competition for the Mauri-

¹⁹⁰I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3; R Josupeit (2008), see citation 3 at 11.2.14; WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 6 at 11.2.7; NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 7 at 11.2.21; R Martín (2010), see citation 8 at 11.2.15

¹⁹¹WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 4 at 11.2.6

¹⁹²WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 1b at 11.2.27

¹⁹³WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 5 at 11.2.7

¹⁹⁴R CSC (2008), see citation 1 and 9 at 11.2.2

¹⁹⁵R Martín (2010), see citation 14 at 11.2.15

¹⁹⁶WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 7 at 11.2.7

¹⁹⁷This proposal also includes the recovery periods of shell fish and king crab

¹⁹⁸R Martín (2010), see citation 13 and 14 at 11.2.15

tanian artisanal and industrial fishery. On average cephalopod trawler of the EU are more efficient than those of Mauritanian companies.¹⁹⁹ The competition is twofold including octopus resources and markets.²⁰⁰ One further key argument is the fact that catches are not landed in Mauritania.²⁰¹ The arrival of the EU trawlers was seen as the cause for the crisis in the Mauritanian fishery sector.²⁰² It is also mentioned that the capacities of artisanal fishing for octopus has been constrained since 1998, while the EU efforts have been increased since the 2001-2006 agreement.²⁰³ From a European perspective, the case does not seem to be that clear. It was stated in 2002 that it is not clear who is to blame for the overexploitation.²⁰⁴ Apart from the influence of EU trawler some sources blame the management of the Mauritanian pirogue fleet as one reason for the overexploitation.²⁰⁵ It is stated that the artisanal fishery operates closer to the coast where it might harm the octopus stock more intensely.²⁰⁶

Solutions are seen in the monitoring of the stock, scientific cooperation²⁰⁷ and stronger controls.²⁰⁸ The recent reductions of EU fishing licenses for cephalopods as well as an extended biological recovery period are seen as outcomes of the dispute between the two parties.²⁰⁹ The fishing zone for EU vessels has been moved further from the coast.²¹⁰ One source states that these technical measures result in discriminatory treatment for the EU fleets.²¹¹ Critics claim that scientific advice had in the past minimal influence in the past on the EU octopus fishery in Mauritania.²¹² Within the 2006-2008 Protocol part of the earmarked financial support is put towards a reconstruction of the Mauritanian industrial fleet (see figure 7).²¹³ In Pechecops/CAPE (2006) this measure is interpreted as referring to the conversion of cephalopod trawlers for pelagic fishing. Referring to a study conducted by Mauritania, it is stated that such a conversion is technically and economically impossible.²¹⁴ The demand of the small scale fishery would require the EU to abandon the octopus fishery in Mauritania.²¹⁵

¹⁹⁹WA Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005), see chapter 11.2.17, see figure 58 in the appendix

²⁰⁰I Interview 3, see citation 8 at interview3

²⁰¹I Interview 1, see citation 5 at interview1

²⁰²WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 7 and 9 at 11.2.6 and WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 4 at 11.2.7; NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 6 at 11.2.21

²⁰³WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 13 at 11.2.7

²⁰⁴NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 7 at 11.2.21

²⁰⁵I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3

²⁰⁶NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 8 at 11.2.21

²⁰⁷WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 3 at 11.2.6

²⁰⁸NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 8 at 11.2.21

²⁰⁹I Interview 3, see citation 8 and 9 at interview3

²¹⁰WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 8 at 11.2.6

²¹¹R. Martín (2010), see citation 4 at 11.2.15

²¹²WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 3 at 11.2.6

²¹³OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c), see citation 1 at 11.2.46

²¹⁴WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 8 at 11.2.7

²¹⁵WA Cullberg & Lövin (2009), see citation 2 at 11.2.10; WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 8 at 11.2.6

4.11.2 Other Demersal Species

Figure 20 illustrates demersal landings of EU vessels from the EEZ of Mauritania. Species assigned to the five taxa groups shown in this figure can be seen in table 17 in the Appendix. As was the case for octopus, most landings of other demersal species were also assigned to Spanish vessels (see table 42, 43 and 44 in the appendix). The true impact of the EU's demersal fleet on Mauritania's small-scale fishery is difficult to ascertain. It is stated that a wide variety of fish is caught by the artisanal fishery sector. Nevertheless, mullet (*Mugilidae*), porgies (*Sparidae*), goliath grouper (*Serranidae*) and bass (*Serranidae*) are acknowledged as being of greater importance.²¹⁶ Regarding *Mugilidae* and *Serranidae* no evidence could be found that these species were targeted by EU trawlers.²¹⁷ Figure 21 illustrates landings of porgies as indicated in the IMROP/Gascuel database. Noticeable is the sharp decline of Mauritanian industrial landings of porgies beginning in 1997. Starting in 1996, most recorded EU landings were assigned to trawlers using cephalopods licenses (see table 49). Russian vessels accounted for most of the landings grouped into the category "others".




Figure 20: Landings of EU member countries by taxa others than pelagic originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

The crustaceans sector might show similarities to the octopus case. However, available information is comparably scarce. Spanish trawlers were the first to target crustaceans in the Mauritanian EEZ in the 1960s. In the early 2000s a Mauritanian shrimp fleet developed out of abandoned cephalopod vessels.²¹⁸ In 2005, 13 crustaceans licenses were used from vessels flying the Mauritanian flag. The European crustaceans sector was presented with 150 licenses in the 1995-1999 EU-Moroccan Agreement which were reduced to 113

²¹⁶R PNUE (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.19

²¹⁷However, it is possible that both are part of the group "Diverse Demersal (GRO)" of the IMROP/Gascuel database

²¹⁸R Martín (2010), see citation 5 at 11.2.15

licenses in 1995 before the agreement was canceled²¹⁹ However, licenses for crustacean had already been granted to the EU since 1987 in the framework of the EU-Mauritanian agreements. Figure 22 shows total landings of vessels fishing under crustaceans licenses. The crustaceans sector is divided into coastal and deep water fisheries. The southern pink shrimp (*Penaeus notalis*) and the Caramote prawn (*Penaeus kerathurs*) are part of the coastal shrimp fishery. Species targeted in the deep-water sector are deep-water rose shrimp (*Parapenaeus longirostris*) and the striped red shrimp (*Aristeus varidens*).²²⁰ A report of the Scientific Committee revealed in 2008 that both *Penaeus notalis* and *Parapenaeus longirostris* are fully exploited. It was stated that fishing efforts on these species should not be augmented.²²¹ Licenses granted to EU vessels were increased with the 2006-2008 from 6000 to 9440 GT and to 9570 GT in the current Protocol (see figure 12). Particular problems associated with the shrimp sector are very high by-catches of up to 70 to 80 %.²²² It is stated that the vast share of this by-catch is discarded dead back to sea by Mauritanian and European shrimp trawlers.²²³




Figure 21: Industrial landings of porgies (porgies, seabreams nei) originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

²¹⁹WA European Union (1995-2010) see figure 66 at 3 at 11.2.25

²²⁰R Martín (2010), see citation 5 at 11.2.15

²²¹R CSC (2008), see citation 3 and 4 at 11.2.2

²²²R Gascuel *et al.* (2007), see citation 5 at 11.2.3

²²³WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.7

Category 2 (Black Hake and Bottomlongliner) is strongly dominated by the EU (Spanish) fleet. Reported landings of this category are shown in figure 23. They include mainly hake but also a small amount of other demersal species. Since 1998, Mauritanian trawlers started to fish in this category as well. However, since 2000 landings have again been reduced to almost zero.²²⁴ As suggested by the reduction of licenses granted to the EU (see figure 12), EU landings have been gradually decreased. The Scientific Committee has recommended freezing the targeting of hake to 2006 levels due to the overexploitation of two black hake species.²²⁵




Figure 22: Landings from vessels fishing under licenses for crustaceans originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

4.11.3 The Pelagic Sector

Pelagic licenses were initially granted in the framework of a private fishery agreement between Mauritania and the European (Dutch) PFA in 1995. Following the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s most Soviet vessels gave up their fishing efforts in the Mauritanian EEZ where they had until then targeted pelagic species (see figure 24).²²⁶ Due to the emerging income gap, the Mauritanian government approached the PFA by offering fishing opportunities in its EEZ.²²⁷ The PFA states that the pelagic fish stock was under-utilized at that time.²²⁸ The inclusion of this private agreement in the official EU-Mauritanian agreement in 1996 was initiated by the European Commission.²²⁹ The PFA agreement was included as category 9 (Pelagic Freezer Trawler) with 22 vessels in the 1996-2001 Agreement (see figure 26 in the appendix).

²²⁴R CSC (2008), see citation 6 at 11.2.2

²²⁵R CSC (2008), see citation 6 at 11.2.2

²²⁶WA PFA (2010), see citation 2a at 11.2.28

²²⁷I Interview 3, see citation 1 at 11.3.3

²²⁸OP PFA (2010), see citation 2a at 11.2.28

²²⁹I Interview 3, see citation 2 at 11.3.3




Figure 23: Landings from vessels fishing under licenses for hake originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

In contrast to the demersal sector, Mauritania hardly operates any industrial pelagic fishery.²³⁰ Reasons for this are seen in the high investment and operating costs of pelagic vessels and the infrastructure of the Nouadhibou harbor, that does not allow for the landings of vessels of comparable sizes. The lack of fishery tradition in Mauritania was named as a further possible explanation.²³¹ The EU is not the only foreign actor in the industrial pelagic fishery of Mauritania. In 2005, 12 of 66 and in 2006, 15 of 37 vessels of category 9 were flying the flag of an EU member country.²³² Pelagic landings constitute the main share of EU landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania and were mainly assigned to Dutch vessels. Figure 24 shows the development of pelagic landings originating from the EEZ of Mauritania over time. Overall Latvia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, formally part of the Soviet Union, continued their fishing efforts (see figure 10). Russian landings were slowly replaced by landings of Belize, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Cyprus and Netherlands who all started fishing in the second half of the 1990s. Furthermore, landings were recorded for Germany and France (between 1996 and 1999) and for the UK (between 2000 and 2003). Irish landings were recorded between 2003 and 2005 (see table 48 in the appendix). With the EU expansion in 2004 total landings from pelagic EU licenses overshot those of Russian licenses by incorporating the landings of Latvia, Lithuania and Cyprus. Thereby, the Dutch share of pelagic EU landings under pelagic licenses dropped from 87 % in 2004 to 22 % in 2005 and 13 % in 2006 (see table 9). However, the attribution of landings is in reality more complicated since the PFA has daughter companies in the UK, Ireland, France, Germany and Lithuania.²³³

²³⁰I Interview 3, see citation 4 at 11.3.3

²³¹I Interview 3, see citation 5 at 11.3.3

²³²OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see figures 71 and 72 at 11.2.47

²³³WA PFA (2010), see citation 1a at 11.2.28 and I Interview 3, see citation 11 at 11.3.3 and I Interview 4, see citation 16 at 11.3.4




Figure 24: Landings of pelagic species from the EEZ of Mauritania by industrial pelagic vessels from the Soviet Union/Russia, the EU and others since 1992 (Source: IMROP/Gascuel) and total pelagic landings by industrial pelagic vessels from the EEZ of Mauritania since 1980 (Source: Gascuel *et al.* (2007))

Sardinella (*Sardinella spp.*) has been identified as one group of pelagic species important for the artisanal fishery of Mauritania.²³⁴ Due to the migratory nature of pelagic stocks, EU fishing efforts in the EEZ of Mauritania might also have an impact on fisheries of neighboring countries. This might for example be the case for the small scale pelagic fishery of Senegal where sardinella is said to be the "fish of the poor".²³⁵ Figures 32 to 38 illustrate the landings of the pelagic EU fleet of this species group as well as of other pelagic species. The share of EU landings of tonnes of sardinella from total landings in Mauritania of this species group ranged between 32% and 57% (see table 10). Total industrial landings of sardinella have experienced a continuous decline since 1996. A report of the Scientific Committee revealed in 2008 an overexploitation of the stocks of Round Sardinella. It was recommended that fishing efforts on this species should not exceed 220,000 tonnes for the north east African zone while they were estimated around 351,500 tonnes. Landings of the EU reached 102,000 tonnes in 2007.²³⁶ It was stated that in 2010 the stock is said to be in "a rather ok state".²³⁷

Fishing efforts on Atlantic Horse Mackerel (*Trachurus trachurus*) were found to overshoot the capacity of the stock by 31 %. The stock of Senegalese Horse Mackerel (*Trachurus treceae*)

²³⁴R PNUE (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.19

²³⁵WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 10 and 12 at 11.2.7

²³⁶R CSC (2008), see figure 61 at 11.2.2

²³⁷I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3 and I Interview 4, see citation 16 at 11.3.4

Table 9: Share of Dutch pelagic landings from total EU pelagic landings under pelagic license in % of tonnes in the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Share of Dutch landings (%)	80.9	41.0	53.8	68.4	81.7	74.5	76.1	91.2	87.0	22.1	12.7

was said to be fully exploited.²³⁸ Jack and Horse Mackerel are mostly targeted by vessels under Cyprian and Lithuanian flags which have increased the EU efforts on these species since 2004. EU landings for 2007 were indicated at around 12,000 tonnes while total landings for the north east African zone were estimated at around 108,000 tonnes. Efforts on Chub Mackerel (*Scomber japonicas*) should not exceed 200,000 tonnes within the north east African zone. At around 170,000 tonnes the stock was modestly exploited. EU efforts in 2007 were estimated at 15,000 tonnes. An increase of fishing efforts was admitted for a sardine stock between Sahara and Mauritania (Sardine C).²³⁹

Fish caught by PFA vessels of the is almost entirely exported to other African countries south of Mauritania (Nigeria, Togo)²⁴⁰

Within the 2006-2012 Agreement, Category 9 licenses of were first increased from 15 to 22 vessels. However, the newly credited licenses also had to cover vessels from Lithuania, Latvia Cyprus that were already previously fishing in the EEZ.²⁴¹ It was stated in interview 3 that the 22 vessels were calculated for catches of 440,000 tonnes. However, the pelagic industry asked for 350,000 tonnes or less. With the renegotiation of the protocol in 2008, licenses were reduced to 17 vessels which included a reduction in payment offered to Mauritania (see figures 26 (in the appendix) and 13). Renegotiations took place based on the argument that granted licenses were not fully utilized.²⁴² It was suggested that the European Commission intentionally negotiated higher licenses to justify payments that were comparably high in light of the fact that most demersal licenses apart from Categories 1 were strongly decreased.²⁴³ In the end, the newly agreed pelagic licenses were regarded as too low. As a result, Category 9 is currently utilized at 100 %. In some cases, Category 11 licenses are also used for Pelagic Freezer Trawler. Moreover, the current protocol allows for an overshoot of the scheduled 250,000 tonnes by additional 50,000 tonnes.²⁴⁴

The PFA maintains scientific programs in cooperation with Mauritania. The main motivation for this cooperation is seen in the support of long-term management goals and a positive influence on the public reputation of the company. The scientific projects are said to be predominantly financed by the company itself and partly by the Dutch govern-

²³⁸R CSC (2008), see citation 11 at 61 at 11.2.2

²³⁹R CSC (2008), see figure 61 at 11.2.2

²⁴⁰I Interview 3, see citation 6 at 11.3.3

²⁴¹WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 11 at 11.2.7

²⁴²OP Commission of the European Communities (2007), see citation 1

²⁴³I Interview 3, see citation 10 at 11.3.3

²⁴⁴I Interview 4, see citation 16 at 11.3.4

Table 10: Share of EU landings in % of tonnes from total industrial landings in the EEZ of Mauritania for species important for the artisanal fishery sector (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Species / Species groups	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Porgies, seabreams nei	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	6.9	28.9	26.8	36.1	27.8	34.2	40.0	22.0	43.1	46.4	68.8
<i>Sardinella spp.</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	21.0	37.6	45.5	42.0	47.4	31.8	34.3	54.4	50.4	57.0	49.5
<i>Octopus vulgaris</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	11.1	24.0	35.8	42.7	52.1	49.0	45.4	43.5	37.1	42.0	41.4

ment. The main objectives are scientific observations and data collection.²⁴⁵ The Dutch government had plans to support the extension of the harbor in Nouadhibou to allow for the landings of large vessels. However, this plan seems to have been abandoned after a change of government in Den Haag.²⁴⁶

No data was available considering the landings of tuna vessels.

4.12 Value of landed fish

Figure 25 shows an estimation of the value of fish from the Mauritanian EEZ landed by EU vessels between 1992 and 2006. The method used to derive these values as well as restrictions of the applied method are described in chapter 3.5.4. The strong increase in landed value starting in 2003 is mainly due to octopus landings by Spain, landings of Jack- and Horse Mackerel by Lithuania (since 2005) and estimated prices linked to products of these species (see figures 40 and 56 in the appendix). In addition, it should be mentioned that the calculated values of fish landed by EU vessels do neither represent the turnover of European vessels (a turnover calculation would need to include costs of the single operators) nor the real value of the landed fish for the EU (a real value calculation would need to include the value addition done in the EU). It has been estimated that each EUR invested by the EU through fishery agreements with ACP countries achieved a turnover of three EUR in 1999.²⁴⁷ The statement is of course difficult to revise.

4.13 IUU and control mechanisms

Officially available data provided from public databases (FAO Fishstat plus, Eurostat and the SAU data base) tends to underestimate legal landings from West African EEZs (see chapter 3.5.3). Stakeholders are also skeptical regarding data produced by IMROP. In interview 3 it was for example stated that landing data reported by the Dutch Pelagic

²⁴⁵I Interview 3, see citation 17 at 11.3.3

²⁴⁶I Interview 4, see citation 9 at 11.3.4

²⁴⁷R CTA (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.9




Figure 25: Comparing EU payments for fishing rights in the EEZ of Mauritania with the value of fish originating from this EEZ landed by EU vessels

Sector to the European Commission were absent from official IMROP statistics. Referring to a similar or the same case, (Gascuel *et al.*, 2007) stated that Duch vessels might report more catches to their government than to the Mauritanian statistical system.²⁴⁸

Taking this as starting point it becomes obvious that IUU are difficult to assess. Based on observer data, Gascuel *et al.* (2007) estimated that around 50,000 tonnes of by-catch are caught but not reported by industrial trawlers each year within the EEZ of Mauritania. This figure includes almost 40,000 tonnes of unreported demersal fish per year. Therefore, Gascuel *et al.* suggests that catch reports of the demersal industrial fishery must be multiplied by a factor of 1.7 to derive numbers that include IUU.²⁴⁹ Table 11 offers a breakdown of these data. The highest unreported by-catches have been estimated for the shrimp and hake license. Both categories are strongly dominated by landings of EU vessels (see figures 23 and 22). Unreported by-catch of pelagic vessels is relatively small when referring to the share from the total landings of this category.²⁵⁰ However, due to the large quantities caught by this sector the total amount illegally fished by pelagic EU vessels is estimated at around 20,000 tonnes a year.²⁵¹

IUU fishing itself is only briefly mentioned in the current agreement and protocol. Basically it is stated that the parties will exchange information on illegal fishing activities or consult

²⁴⁸R Gascuel *et al.* (2007), see citation 5 at 11.2.3

²⁴⁹R Gascuel *et al.* (2007), see citation 7 at 11.2.3

²⁵⁰R Gascuel *et al.* (2007), see citation 7 at 11.2.3

²⁵¹WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 10 at 11.2.7

Table 11: Unreported by-catch in tonne per year per license type (Source: Gascuel *et al.* , 2007, p. 112)

Taxa	License type						% of total industrial catch
	Cephalopod	Fish	Hake	Shrimp	Pelagic	Total	
Octopus	0	1,461	6,291	1,169	3	8,924	30.0
Other mollusks	0	1,209	1,162	846	57	3,274	29.0
Demersal fish	550	0	9,782	4,985	6,056	21,373	48.0
Hake	1,010	0	0	2,959	581	4,520	29.0
Crustacean	167	30	253	0	77	527	11.0
Pelagic fish	6,180	589	2,665	1,699	0	11,132	2.1
Total	7,907	3,257	20,152	11,658	6,774	-	-
% of catches	17	49	66	72	1.2	-	-

one another on joint or individual action.²⁵² As regards by-catch it is stated in the current protocol that percentages shall be calculated at any time during fishing according to the live weight of the catch on board. The amount of allowed and prohibited by-catch shall be treated in accordance with Mauritanian legislation.²⁵³ The relevant species and according percentage are illustrated in figure 73 in the appendix. It is stated that debates on by-catch play a minor role in negotiations.²⁵⁴ Stricter quotas introduce within the framework of the fishery agreement are said to be weak due to inefficient control measures.²⁵⁵ Stakeholder complain that little information is made available on progress regarding this topic.²⁵⁶

It is stated that the Las Palmas harbor is used as the entry port for illegal fishing from the West African zone.²⁵⁷ Due to its size the port is difficult to control.²⁵⁸

However, several methods for monitoring and surveillance have been introduced during the existence of the relationship. Since 1987, vessels (larger than 150 GRT) should inform the Nouadhibou radio station when entering or leaving the EEZ. Pole-and-line tuna vessels were obliged to communicate the information 24 hours in advance. In 1996, two points were established in the northern and southern zone that had to be passed when entering or leaving the EEZ. The points were observed by the surveillance authority. Currently, EU vessels are monitored by a satellite Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Furthermore, it is clarified that trans-shipments should be carried out within Mauritanian ports and reported to the surveillance authorities.²⁵⁹

²⁵²OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 18 at 11.2.47; OP European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b), see citation 1 and 3 at 11.2.41

²⁵³OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 9 at 11.2.47

²⁵⁴R UNDP (2006), see citation 4 at 11.2.20; R UNDP (2006), see citation 5 at 11.2.20

²⁵⁵R UNDP (2006), see citation 5 at 11.2.20

²⁵⁶I Interview 1, see citation 14 at 11.3.1

²⁵⁷WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 16 at 11.2.7

²⁵⁸I Interview 1, see citation 16 at 11.3.1

²⁵⁹R Martín (2010), see citation 12 at 11.2.15

In addition various technical measures have been defined within the fishery agreements. These include authorized gears, various prohibited fishing techniques and biological recovery periods. An overview about these measures, as agreed in the 2008-2012 protocol is provided in Martín (2010) (see figure 57 in the appendix)

In the 2008 Protocol it is stated that infringements shall be penalized in accordance with Mauritanian law. These penalties might range from fines defined by maximum and minimum limits to the prohibition of vessels, skippers and ship owners from fishing activities in Mauritanian waters.²⁶⁰ Skippers of EU vessels are required to facilitate controls through boardings by Mauritanian inspectors.²⁶¹

A concern of the European fishing industry is that Mauritanian authorities currently request high fees for infringements that do not demonstrate a direct connection with the protection of the fish stock.²⁶² Based on an increasing number of boardings and the shift towards minor administrative offences being met with high fines, Martín (2010) concludes that boardings by Mauritanian authorities are currently carried out on pretexts, rather than for the conservation of resources.²⁶³ It is stated that the number of boardings has increased from 34 in 2002, 42 in 2003, 29 in 2004 to 70 in the first nine months of 2010. While in the years 2002-2004 69 % of all boardings involved fishing for juveniles, in 2010 (till September) around 59 % of the cases were based on documentation or procedural issues.²⁶⁴

The DSPCM is the Mauritanian institution responsible for the boardings. Martín (2010) identifies the funding structure of the DSPCM²⁶⁵, the political influence of the head of DSPCM and the fact that involved officials receive a percentage cut of the fees as major causes for the issue. The bonus received by involved officials increased from 7 % of the fines in 1989 to 18 % in 2009. Martín states that for a revealed minor offence the involved officials would receive around 2,500 EUR.²⁶⁶

Martín (2010) argues that ship owners are forced to pay fines without having the opportunity to appeal. To object to the payment would often result in a detention of their ship and a further increase of the fine demanded.²⁶⁷ Due to administrative issues the defen-

²⁶⁰OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 15 and 16 at 11.2.47

²⁶¹OP European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), see citation 8 at 11.2.47

²⁶²I Interview 3, see citation 23 at 11.3.3; see also: WA Pechecops/CAPE (2006), see citation 17 at 11.2.7

²⁶³R Martín (2010), see citation 23 and 22 at 11.2.15

²⁶⁴Of these 59 %, 25% were categorized as *errors in transmission of the vessel's position*, 14 % as *errors in the daily fishing log* and 20 % as *fishing in a prohibited zone*. The author argues that boardings legitimated with *fishing in a prohibited zone* are often based on the fact that Mauritanian authorities still rely on former tracking systems instead of using VMS (see R Martín (2010), citation 22 and 23 at 11.2.15)

²⁶⁵The DSPCM receives 33 % of the earmarked EU payments and part of the money obtained from the fees is absorbed by the Maritime Surveillance and Promotion Fund (see table 30 in the appendix and citation 17 at 11.2.15)

²⁶⁶R Martín (2010), see citation 18 and 19 at 11.2.15

²⁶⁷R Martín (2010), see citation 20 at 11.2.15

dant vessels are detained in port for around two days which results in additional economic losses.²⁶⁸

4.14 Subsidies

Subsidies to EU vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania have been granted through funding coming from both the EU and single member countries. Milazzo (1998) states that government-to-government payment is the most important type of assistance provided to facilitate fishing operations in the waters of other coastal states.²⁶⁹ Therefore, access due and earmarked financial support as indicated in figure 13 have to be considered as subsidies from the EU to EU operators. Further, important subsidies were granted to EU operators to support the construction or modernizations of vessels. By combining information coming from <http://www.fishsubsidy.org/> and a report published by Greenpeace International in 2010²⁷⁰ several direct subsidies granted to EU vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania could be traced. A breakdown of these data is shown in tables 53, 52 and 54 in the appendix. The data disclose that since 1997, 23 million EUR have been granted to vessels fishing under Spanish, Portuguese and Italian (but mainly Spanish) flag in the EEZ of Mauritania. These values are minimum estimations since they include only those vessels that are known of having operated in the EEZ of Mauritania. Another 10 million EUR have been granted since 1996 to vessels belonging to the PFA. These values refer to traced subsidies granted to vessels belonging to the PFA. It is not known if all of these vessels have actually operated in Mauritanian waters (The method used to derive these data is described in chapter 3.5.5) In addition it was stated that fuel in Las Palmas is also highly subsidies.²⁷¹

EU subsidies are said to provoke a competitive advantage of EU operators over Mauritanian stakeholders.²⁷² Thereby, a fleet can be maintained that would otherwise not be profitable.²⁷³

It was stated that with the CFP reform in 2002 various subsidies have been faced out.²⁷⁴ A new fisheries fund was established in 2006 with the Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006.²⁷⁵

²⁶⁸R Martín (2010), see citation 21 at 11.2.15

²⁶⁹R Milazzo (1998), see citation 3 at 11.2.16

²⁷⁰R Obaidullah & Osinga (2010) at 11.2.18

²⁷¹I Interview 1, see citation 5 at 11.3.1

²⁷²WA Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010), see citation 1g at 11.2.27

²⁷³WA Pechecops/CAPE (2001), see citation 11 at 11.2.6; I Interview 1, see citation 5 at 11.3.1

²⁷⁴R Cullberg & Lövin (2009), see citation 3 at 11.2.10

²⁷⁵OWP European Union (1995-2010), see 4a at 11.2.25

4.15 Mauritania's access to the EU market of fish products

Once Mauritania decides to join the ECOWAS it will keep its preference of free entry to European markets on a reciprocal basis till 2020.²⁷⁶ However, the scope and requirements of food safety measures are said to replace tariff barriers to the European markets.²⁷⁷

The sanitary rules for the import of fishery product from third countries to the EU are laid out in Article 11 of the Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991.²⁷⁸ As stated in the preamble, an important aim of the Directive is to eliminate disparities existing in the Member States concerning health requirements, as well as to harmonize production and marketing of fish products.²⁷⁹ In Article 2, it is stated that fish products from third countries exported to the EU must not qualify for more favorable arrangements than those required for trading within the EU. However, to guarantee conditions of equivalence inspections should take place in those countries that have an interest in importing fish products to the EU.²⁸⁰ The Council Directive 91/493/EEC has been complemented by several Council Regulations. Table 12 shows some of the important additional regulations. The responsible institution for food safety in the EU is the European Commission's Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) with the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) as its executive arm.²⁸¹ For a company to export fish products to the EU it is required that the company itself, as well as the country where the company is resident, are certified.²⁸² An essential precondition for the certification of a country is the existence of a Competent Authority (CA), a central authority within the partner State which has the competence to carry out veterinary checks.²⁸³ Currently, Mauritania is on the list of countries from which the import of fish products to the EU is authorized.²⁸⁴ The Département de Valorisation et de l'Inspection Sanitaire (DVIS) is the institution in Mauritania that corresponds to the required CA. It is currently under the wardship of IMROP²⁸⁵ The number of processing companies allowed to export fish products to the EU increased from eight companies in 1996 to 44 companies in 2008 (see table 18 in the appendix).²⁸⁶ In another source published in 2010 it is stated that 66 out of a total of 80 processing facilities are recognized by the EU as complying with the SPS standards. The number of those actually running is estimated around 50. They are mainly involved in

²⁷⁶R UNDP (2006), see citation 8 at UNDP2006

²⁷⁷R (Doherty, 2010), see citation 1 at 11.2.11; R CTA (2006), see citation 4 at 4

²⁷⁸OP Council of the European Communities (1991), see citation 1 at 11.2.36

²⁷⁹OP Council of the European Communities (1991), see citation 2 at 11.2.36

²⁸⁰OP Council of the European Communities (1991), see citation 3 at 11.2.36

²⁸¹R Doherty (2010), see citation 4 at 11.2.11

²⁸²R Doherty (2010), see citation 6 at 11.2.11

²⁸³OP Council of the European Communities (1991), see citation 3 at 11.2.36

²⁸⁴R Lesourd (2009), see citation 1 at 11.2.14. The list of countries from which the import of fish products is authorized can be consulted at DG SANCO (2010), Third Country Establishments, available at https://sanco.ec.europa.eu/traces/output/listsPerCountry_en.htm, last access 20.09.2010

²⁸⁵R Blanc (2007), see citation 1 at 11.2.5

²⁸⁶Of those companies allowed to export to the EU in 2008, 13 were based in Nouakchott and 31 in Nouadhibou

Table 12: European Council Regulations relevant for SPS Regulations of the EU that complement the Council Directive 91/493/EEC

Regulation	Reference to	Content (Examples)	Database Reference
(EC) 852/2004	Primary producers	Adequate measures and hygiene provisions	OP-CouR-No-852-SPS-2004
(EC) 853/2004	Food business operators making or handling products of animal origin	Microbiological criteria Temperature control Cold chain Sampling and Analysis	OP-CouR-No-853-SPS-2004
(EC) 854/2004	Official controls on products of animal origin principles	Details of the controls audits of good hygiene practices and HACCP	OP-CouR-No-854-SPS-2004
(EC) 178/2002	European Food Safety Authority	Risk analysis, Precautionary principle Traceability system	OP-CouR-No-187-SPS-2002

storing and freezing. The total freezing capacity is estimated around 700 tonnes per day but is said to be underused by 30 %.²⁸⁷ In 1996, 38 freezing vessels were allowed to export to the EU. This number increased till 2008 to 88 vessels. Some information about those vessels authorized in 2008 could be derived by comparing a list provided by DG SANCO²⁸⁸ with a study on Mauritanian cephalopod trawlers provided by Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005). The outcome can be seen in tables 26 and 28 in the appendix). 85 of these vessels could be identified as cephalopod trawlers. (As already mentioned in chapter 4.11.1 in 2005 the Mauritanian fleet consisted of 171 cephalopod and 12 shrimp trawlers while 115 licenses were used for cephalopods and 13 for crustaceans. Also noted were the ownership arrangements of this fleet of 183 vessels in total: 38 Mauritanian vessels, 29 vessels owned by Algerian- or European-Mauritanian companies and 116 vessels owned by Chinese-Mauritanian companies). Of the 88 vessels authorized to export to the EU, 48 are assigned to three bigger groups AON, MAOA and MCP. The affiliation of the remaining 40 vessels could not be clearly identified. Sté Mauritano Chinoise de Pêche (MCP), a Chinese-Mauritanian group, owns 25 of the export authorized vessels, Abdellahi Ould Nougueit (AON) 11 and Med Abdellahi Ould Abdellahi (MAOA) 12. The structure of both AON and MAOA could not be clearly identified.

Bivalve mollusks, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods were excluded from the import authorization given by Commission Decision 96/425/EC in 1996 to the eight processing plants and 38 freezing vessels located in Mauritania.²⁸⁹ Based on the sanitary control of an expert the Commission Decision 96/293/EC of April 1996 prohibited the im-

²⁸⁷R Martín (2010), see citation 7 at 11.2.15

²⁸⁸OWP DG SANCO (2010), see 1

²⁸⁹OP Commission of the European Communities (1996b), see citation 1 at 11.2.35

port of these products from Mauritania.²⁹⁰ The Decision required a second visit of experts before the 13th of July²⁹¹ which resulted in the maintenance of the import ban arranged in the Commission Decision 96/426/EC on the 28th of June 1996.²⁹² In December 1996 a list of countries allowed to export bivalve mollusks, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods to the EU was established with the Commission Decision (97/20/EC). This list was continuously amended by successive Decisions.²⁹³ Finally, Mauritania was placed on this list and the Commission Decision 2004/98/EC repealed Decision 96/293/EC the 29th of January 2004.²⁹⁴

Visits of the FVO to Mauritania took place in 2004 and 2006.²⁹⁵ A reported following the inspection of the FVO in Mauritania in 2006 concluded that:

"it is unlikely that the fishery products exported from Mauritania present an immediate and grave risk for the health of European consumers. However, there is a medium and long-term public health risk as a result of the shortcomings observed during the inspection and, in particular, the absence of monitoring of environmental contaminants in fishery products combined with the large quantities of cephalopods Mauritania exports to the EU" (p. 2)²⁹⁶

Discussion about the impacts and functions of SPS requirements include several arguments. To be able to comply with the EU SPS requirements bears high cost for the third country. Costs arise on public and private level and appear as punctual costs for the establishment and permanent costs for management.²⁹⁷ In addition it is argued that fishery exporters in West African countries have difficulties to cope with SPS regulation due to their complexity.²⁹⁸ A further critique is that some inspectors of the FVO are said to expect systems that reflect the practices used in the EU and do not accept different systems that might achieve the same output.²⁹⁹ Often foreign consultancies have to be employed during the implementation and for the basic design.³⁰⁰

To support African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) countries in complying with SPS requirement the European Commission established a program called

²⁹⁰OP Commission of the European Communities (1996a), see citation 1 and 2 at 11.2.31 (The available version of the Commission Decision contained a disclaimer saying that the document was meant purely as a documentation and that the institutions would not assume any liability for its contents)

²⁹¹OP Commission of the European Communities (1996a), see citation 3 at 11.2.31

²⁹²OP Commission of the European Communities (1996c), see citation 1 and 2 at 11.2.32

²⁹³OP Commission of the European Communities (1997), see citation 1 at 11.2.33 (The available version of the Commission Decision contained a disclaimer saying that the document was meant purely as a documentation and that the institutions would not assume any liability for its contents)

²⁹⁴OP Commission of the European Communities (2004), see citation 1 at 11.2.34

²⁹⁵R Lesourd (2009), see citation 1 at 11.2.14

²⁹⁶R FoodandVeterinaryOffice (2006), see citation 1 at 11.2.12

²⁹⁷R Doherty (2010), see citation 7 at 11.2.11

²⁹⁸R CTA (2006), p. 16, see citation 4 at 11.2.9

²⁹⁹R Doherty (2010), see citation 5 at 11.2.11

³⁰⁰R Doherty (2010), see citation 3 at 11.2.11

Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries (SFP). The program started in 2002 and was in 2007 after a period of 5 years extended until November 2010. Funded with 44,860,000 EUR, SPS shall provide support to those parties involved in the health control of fishery products. This includes CAs testing laboratories, processing and export companies and the small scale fishery sector.³⁰¹ Part of the earmarked payments within the 1996-2001 and again in the 2006-2012 Agreement were purposed for measures concerning SPS (see table 7).

Regarding Mauritania it was stated that often only the amelioration of landing infrastructure, freezing facilities, and transport is supported by developments support.³⁰²

With reference to the Ivory Coast suspicion was expressed in interview 1 that SPS measures might be used by the EU to provoke pressure in negotiations for fishery agreements. However, no concrete case could be named for Mauritania. It was stated that sanitary problems certainly exist. However, whether or not they are detected depends on how hardly they are traced, as well in Africa as also in Europe.³⁰³ Milazzo (1998) states:

”A good, recent example of how these agreements work is the fisheries access arrangement that the EU has negotiated with Mauritania. In June 1996, the EU signed a five-year fisheries access-for-trade agreement with Mauritania that lifted and EU embargo on fishery imports from that African nation in return of almost \$350 million, or \$70 million per year.” (p. 36-37)³⁰⁴

In reference to the Conotnou Agreement it was argued that Europe’s seeking for supply with primary products creates a situation of dependency for the Mauritanian fishery sector.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹WA SFP (2010), see citation 1 at 11.2.26

³⁰²R UNDP (2006), see citation 6 at 11.2.20

³⁰³I Interview 1, see citation 11 at 11.3.1

³⁰⁴R Milazzo (1998), see citation 3 at 11.2.16

³⁰⁵R UNDP (2006), see citation 9 at 11.2.20

4.16 General Discourse on the Agreements

Some authors frame the EU-West African fishery agreements as a straightforward progression from pure money for access to partnership agreements. Likeewise Martín (2010) argues that the EU-Mauritanian Agreement has developed "*through the 1996 Cooperation Agreement, to the 2006 Fisheries Partnership Agreement*", thereby reinforcing the conversation of resource, development, scientific and technical assistance and business cooperation.³⁰⁶ This perception is not shared by all stakeholders. It was for example emphasized that the EU fishing agreements are not development partnerships but rather trade agreements.³⁰⁷ In interview 1 the position was defended that the change over time was rather caused by the fact that fisheries resources of Mauritania became more and more overexploited. Meaning that not much has changed regarding the general attitude of the EU towards the exploitation of Mauritania's resources.³⁰⁸

A study published by UNDP (2006) concludes that the EU fishery Agreement had a mixed impact on Mauritania's economy. On the one side, Mauritania had benefits through the EU payments and could reduce its national debt. On the other side, negative effects on national food consumption and poverty reduction as well as Mauritania's increased dependency on foreign financial investment have been diagnosed.³⁰⁹ The author argued that the fishery sector of Mauritania was locked "*into a position of raw material supplier rather than fish processor*" (p. 4). This is said to have several negative effects:

"First, it leads to a real disconnection between the production system under access agreements and the Mauritanian system. Second, there is no investment in Mauritania's processing facilities, remaining uncompetitive. Third, increasing exports lead to a lack of local market supply in fish, particularly in high value fish. [...] Fourth, traditional fish species are substituted by new species that are of lower value and quality. Thus, in addition to fierce competition over fish catches, the European fisheries sector also outcompetes Mauritania in the processing sector." (p. 4)³¹⁰

It was further argued that the international pressure leads to the sale of Mauritania's fish resources as opposed to enforcement of than it enforces national capacities. Nor would improvements stimulated by access agreements bring benefits to the fishery sector or to the country itself in terms of overall impact.³¹¹ It is stated that the EU fleet "*surely but slowly outcompetes Mauritanian fleets*" (p. 9).³¹²

³⁰⁶R Martín (2010), see citation 3 and 10 at 11.2.15

³⁰⁷NP the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002), see citation 11 at 11.2.21

³⁰⁸I Interview 1, see citation 6 at interview1

³⁰⁹R UNDP (2006), see citation 2 at 11.2.20

³¹⁰R UNDP (2006), see citation 3 at 11.2.20

³¹¹R UNDP (2006), see citation 7 at 11.2.20

³¹²R UNDP (2006), see citation 10 at 11.2.20

In Interview 4, one representative of the European Commission, agreed with some of the critique from NGOs regarding the exploitation of resources of the third country. However, the reproach of despoilment is seen as exaggerated. In comparison with industrial vessels of other nations operating in the EEZ of Mauritania (China, South Korea, Russia, Japan) as well as with the Senegalese small-scale fishery operating in Mauritania's waters, the management of the European fleet is regarded as exemplary in terms of surveillance and transparency. The right of access for the EU fleet is justified with the statement that Mauritania is not fully utilising its fishery resources. Responsibility is also given to the Mauritanian government. In the present case where Mauritania is delivering licenses to foreign vessels without limit, all intention by the EU to guarantee sustainable management is hindered.³¹³ Also in Interview 1, with a representative of an European NGO that collaborates with the small-scale sector in Mauritania, accountability was given to authorities from both the EU and Mauritania.³¹⁴

By representatives of the Mauritanian small-scale fishery, the increasing financial dependency on a single partner (EU), the ongoing overexploitation and the erosion of Mauritania's fleet capacity are seen as a threats and risks.³¹⁵ It is stated that the EU is receiving access to already overexploited resources.³¹⁶ By (UNDP, 2006) it was stated that the development of Mauritania's artisanal and small-scale sector is considered in negotiations but they are not seen as final determinants of the agreements.³¹⁷ At the same time it is stated that the artisanal fishery sector has not suffered under the agreements. It is argued that the artisanal sector has developed in what could be described as a *niche* due to specific and cost-effective fishing methods.³¹⁸

³¹³I Interview 4, see citation 4 and 16 at interview4

³¹⁴I Interview 1, see citation 1 at 11.3.1

³¹⁵WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 5 at 11.2.8 WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 4 at 11.2.8

³¹⁶WA Pechecops/CAPE (2008), see citation 6 at 11.2.8

³¹⁷R UNDP (2006), see citation 11 at 11.2.20

³¹⁸R UNDP (2006), see citation 10 at 11.2.20

4.17 Recommendations and Demands

Recommendations and demands of stakeholders shall be considered as they are regarded as mirroring key issues of the fishery relationship between the EU and Mauritania.

It is stated that the Mauritanian small-scale fishery sector makes demands that compensation payments be invested in research, surveillance, training, infrastructure, artisanal coastal fisheries development and the processing of fisheries products in Mauritania.³¹⁹ (UNDP, 2006) suggests the disconnection between the budget of the Fisheries Ministry and the payments received under the fishery agreement. Several sources recommend the separation of EU payments and access of the EU fleet. However, details of implementations and impacts diverge. In Interview 1 emphasis was placed on the requirement that the earmarked payments can be retained separately from the access payments. In this way pressure could be put on the Mauritanian government to make use of the earmarked payments as determined in the agreements. At the same time such a partition would not risk the access of EU vessels to Mauritanian resources.³²⁰ In interview 1 a general separation of payments from access was recommended. Positive effects of this disconnection are seen in an increase of planning reliability for investment in the Mauritanian fishery sector.³²¹ A further demand of the European Commission is to take information about fishing efforts of other nations into consideration when negotiating on the agreements. Thereby, catch quota shall be determined for all vessels operating in the EEZ of Mauritania.³²²

³¹⁹WA InshoreIreland (2007), see citation 4 at 11.2.26

³²⁰I Interview 4, see citation 4 and 5 at 11.3.4

³²¹I Interview 1, see citation 7 at 11.3.1

³²²I Interview 4, see citation 4 at 11.3.4

5 The Mauritanian Case in Comparison

In the West African region the EU maintains currently fishery agreements with four countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Cap Verde and Mauritania. Formally maintained fishery agreements with Senegal, Gambia and Guinea are currently not in force. In addition the EU maintains a fishery relationship with Morocco. This agreement is important in relation to the Mauritanian agreement due to its proximity and the occurrence of octopus. Ghana has never entered into a formal relationship with the EU. However, the country was regarded as one of the most important fishing nations of the region. The aim of this chapter is to emphasize the differences of the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship compared to the EU fishery relations with the above named countries. The particularity of the EU-Mauritanian relationship is determined by three important conditions:

- its proximity to the EU and over all the harbor of Las Palmas
- particularly rich fish resources
- the cultural aspect that fishing was traditionally not practiced by the majority of people living in Mauritania³²³

Mauritania is regarded as the most important external fishery agreement of the EU. The yearly amount directly paid by the EU was 86 million EUR per year in 2008-09 and will be diminished to 70 million in 2011-12. In comparison, 36.1 million EUR are paid by the EU per year for fishing access to Morocco and 7.5 million to Guinea-Bissau. Côte d'Ivoire receives 595,000 EUR and Cap Verde 385,000 EUR per year. Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and Morocco are mixed agreements, meaning that they provide access to various fishing category. Côte d'Ivoire as well as all other fishery agreements (apart from Greenland) are restricted to the targeting of tuna.³²⁴

The Agreement with Morocco is linked to the one with Mauritanian regarding the fact that licenses for similar species have been granted in the past (see above). However, in the Moroccan case the political dimension regarding the conflict about West Saharan resources might play an essential role.³²⁵

As regards Guinea (Conakry) the European Commission withdraw from the agreement after a violent military putsch in September 2009.³²⁶ In contrast the military putsch in Mauritania did not lead to a withdraw from the agreement. Reasons for the different reaction in the two cases are seen in the tragedy of the Guinea coupe d'état that resulted

³²³I Interview 4, see citation 14 at 11.3.4; I Interview 1, see citation 1 at 11.3.1

³²⁴OW European Union (1995-2010), see reference 1

³²⁵I Interview 4, see citation 14 at 11.3.4

³²⁶OP Council of the European Union (2009b), see citation 11.2.48 at 11.2.48

in 150 death after government forces opened the fire against demonstrators. However, it is also stated that losing fishing opportunities in Guinea is not that painful for the EU. In the case of Mauritania protest from the beneficiary countries would be expected.³²⁷

An essential difference to the fishery agreement of Guinea-Bissau is that the EU agreement provides for a retention of the earmarked payments in the case that Guinea-Bissau does not comply with the imposed requirements. It is stated that due to this provision the EU did not pay the earmarked amount for a long time.³²⁸

Ghana has been recognized as important fishing country in the region of West Africa.³²⁹ However, the status of the Ghana as distant water fishing country has been affected the expansion of foreign fleets from Western Europe, Russia and China.³³⁰ Therefore, emphasize might be put on the competition between Ghanaian and EU fleets.

³²⁷I Interview 4, see citation 14 at 11.3.4

³²⁸I Interview 4, see citation 14 at 11.3.4

³²⁹AR (Atta-Mills *et al.* , 2004, Adjetei, 1973 cited in), see citation 1 at 11.2.1

³³⁰AR (Atta-Mills *et al.* , 2004, Acquay, 1992 and Adjetei, 1937 cited in), see citation 1 and 2 at 11.2.1

6 Limitations of the Study

Before the results of the presented case study are discussed it is important to give notion to various limitations of the study. First of all, the analysis of the case has been restricted due to limitations in data availability. Landing and trading data stored in databases of FAO fishstat plus, UN Comtrade and Eurostat is depended on the transfer of information from the various countries to these databases. A comparison of information coming from the above named sources with the SAU database and landing data provided by IMROP/Gascuel revealed the high discrepancy of the information. Finally, statistical data presented in the results part were mainly based on data from IMROP/Gascuel. The decision to utilize these data was based on two considerations: (a) they provided landing data in most detail and allowed for a breakdown of the data in species, countries and license typ. (b) They seemed to be the most reliable data. Furthermore, short coming of information represented a problem when analyzing data on subsidies. Estimations on the value of landed species by the EU were based on two uncertain data sets, landing data and very rough estimations of time series of prices. Thus, these restrictions should be kept in mind when drawing conclusions from these data.

The number of interviews has been restricted to a number of three due to time constrains. Interviews included stakeholder from the European Commission, the EU fishing industry and an European NGO. Unfortunately, now interviews could be conducted with representatives from Mauritania. Therefore, perspectives from representatives of Mauritanian stakeholders have only been included by using secondary information.

Five of 18 units of analysis have not been analyzed (see chapter 3.4). These units of analysis seem to be of less importance to answer the research questions as compared to those that have been analyzed. Nevertheless, they might contain further relevant information on the case study that has not been analyzed.

The theories used to analyze the results of the case study have been recapped to their core statements. Therefore, more detailed considerations on these theories might have been ignored.

7 Discussion

7.1 Coercion theories

Wallerstein's World System's theory is strongly supported by the overall outcome of Mauritania's fishery history. Mauritanian maritime resources have increasingly been exploited by vessels from the EU, China, Russia and others. According to Wallerstein's relative categorical system, these nations 'qualify' as either core or semi-periphery states. If Mauritania is considered a periphery and the EU as a core state, the main resource flows of fish products have been directed as predicted by Wallerstein. Mauritania's function in this system is that of a resource supplier while value adding takes place in Europe by taking advantage of more complex processing facilities. Landings of EU vessels usually take place in European harbors. Catches are generally not landed in Mauritania. The case of the Dutch Pelagic Freezer Trawlers represents an exception, but only in organizational terms. Resources are caught in the Mauritanian EEZ, processed in "Offshore Europe" (the trawlers) and sold in other countries (e.g. Nigeria) that, in accordance with the theory, are also considered as being periphery states. The question of whether these countries have to buy these products at a relatively high price has not been analyzed in this work. The largest volume of products with potentially high value (e.g. octopus and shrimps) landed by vessels under the Mauritanian flag are exported to the EU or Japan. However, the value added to these products in Mauritania is comparably low. Those Mauritanian facilities engaged in the export of fish products to the EU are mainly storing and freezing the products. Processes within the EU engaged in adding value to these products have not been covered by the research.

As predicted by Nkrumah (1965), it could be demonstrated that the EU's interest in obtaining access to the Mauritanian EEZ has been driven strongly by internal crises of the fishing industries in its member states. First it is known that resources in European waters are highly overexploited. Furthermore, tangible evidence has been provided by making a digression to the EU-Moroccan agreement. Slowly diminishing EU access to Moroccan resources and the abrupt break in 1999 resulted in high cost for the EU as well as unemployment of Spanish and Portuguese seamen, and must be considered as one of the main driving factors for the strong interest in Mauritanian cephalopod resources.

The EU is in the possession of more sophisticated technical machinery. Vessels, landing and processing facilities in Mauritania are considered as being on a comparably low technical level (pirogues) or obsolete (processing facilities). In addition, it could be demonstrated that the larger share of industrial vessels (80 % of industrial trawlers in 2005) do not operate under the full ownership of Mauritanian stakeholders but are run in the form of joint ventures with Chinese, Algerian and European companies.

The fact that a large part of Mauritania's budget is provided by the EU through its payments in the scope of the fishery agreements raises doubts about the true sovereignty of the government of Mauritania (The absence of this sovereignty has been suggested by Nkrumah, 1965). Here an important differentiation has to be made. In reference to the utilization of EU payments, the word sovereignty has been used as a formulation in agreements and protocols. It was also used by the Mauritanian authorities to clarify that the Mauritanian government can decide by itself how and where to use the transferred money. Despite the fact that this 'utilization sovereignty' has recently been challenged by the attempt of the European Commission to earmark the money provided, sovereignty over the utilization of payments coming from the EU is fundamentally different from the idea of general 'sovereignty of the government'. This sovereignty is limited due to the fact that the availability of around 20 % to 33 % of the budget is directly linked to the granting of resources to the EU.

High amounts of subsidies have been granted by the EU and single member states. Although many EU subsidies have been faced out they continue to create a comparative advantage over Mauritanian operators. Many vessels subsidised by the EU in the past are still operating in the EEZ.

Furthermore, it could be demonstrated that the capital invested by EU stakeholders was predominantly dedicated to securing long-term exploitation of Mauritania's resources by the EU. Significant investments have, for example, been directed towards surveillance and research. The impact of these investments for the Mauritanian economy is currently perceived as relatively small or even negligible. The incentives to land fish in Mauritania are not working. EU payments are in general too short to function as capital for investment. In addition, Mauritania is not perceived as attractive for foreign investment. No concrete statement can be made regarding the tangible impact of development aid granted to Mauritania through means other than the fishery agreements, since this factor has been excluded from the research. However, according to the conclusion of various studies cited in this work the impact seems to be rather small. On the other side, the EU engaged in raising the quality of Mauritania's processing facilities to a sanitary level that is considered as sufficient for EU standards. In this way, capital was again invested to guarantee the supply for EU markets.

7.2 Critique of the coercion theories

Through the application of the coercion theories it is possible to explain the fishery relationship between the EU and Mauritania in a comprehensive and coherent manner. However, the explanatory power of these theories is based strongly on the holistic nature of their underlying concepts. This enables the arguer to challenge evidences that might,

at first glance, contradict the core idea of the theories: The exploitation of the periphery for the benefit of core states. In the case of the fishery relationship this means that any benefits for Mauritania can be viewed as serving a superior function; the enrichment of Europe. EU support for companies based in Mauritania serves the EU supply of products (e.g. octopus). Investment in fishery research serves the maintenance of the "outsourced" EU fish basket, Mauritania.

Another shortcoming of the coercion theories is the fact that Mauritania is placed in a rather passive role and that little accountability is given to the Mauritanian state and other stakeholders. The concept mentally expropriates Mauritanian stakeholders by neglecting both their sovereignty and responsibility. In theory, the system-like approach of World System (in the form presented in chapter 2.1) does judge or take into consideration the intention of any stakeholder. However, this objectivity is difficult to maintain in discussions. Related to this is the difficulty of identifying the role of the Senegalese fishermen active in Mauritanian waters. The coercion theories provide a simple answer to the question of why Mauritania's resources are exploited for European benefits: Because Mauritania currently belongs to the periphery while the EU is part of the core countries. However, with the exception of short-term financial incentives, they do not offer an explanation of which factors prompt Mauritania to offer its resources to the EU.

7.3 Theory of power

According to Morgenthau (2006) power is the decisive factor in political intervention. Therefore, absence of the quest for power in the EU-Mauritanian fishery agreement would declare the agreement as non-political and non-imperialistic. When in 1987 the EU-Mauritanian fishery agreement was concluded, reported landings of EU countries were few compared to both total landings from the EEZ and subsequent landings of the EU (see figure 9). Spain and Portugal continued to extract fish from the EEZ. A larger component of access dues was paid directly to Mauritania by the EU. From this amount, a smaller part was dedicated to the improvement of information on fishery resources. In light of these facts, the relationship as it was at this time should be considered as non-political. No evidence was found that the EU had control over Mauritania's affairs. Mauritania's fishery policy was focused on various interested foreign parties.

Negotiations on the 1996 Agreement seemed to be of importance for both parties. Finally payments to Mauritania were significantly increased and licenses for cephalopods were granted (already since 1995) to the EU. Not enough information could be found to make a clear statement as to what extent SPS requirements had an influence on Mauritania's position in the negotiations. Although octopus exports to the EU increased over time, Japan offered a more important alternative market for products of this species. It is

important to note that from 1996 onwards and even more with the financial up-rating in 2001, payments coming from the EU started to represent an essential source of income for the Mauritanian government. Until then, comparably high sums were paid by the EU over a period of 13 years. Starting in 2001, the European Commission became more and more interested in co-deciding how these payments were to be utilized. The share of earmarked to total EU payments was further increased in 2006. Currently this amount represents about 19.4 % of the total payments. When referring to the statements that 20 % to 33 % of Mauritania's budget is sourced from EU fishery payments, this means that the European Commission has an interest in co-deciding over 3.9 to 6.4 % of Mauritania budget.

Therefore, in reference to Morgenthau's theory of power, the following conclusions can be drawn. While the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationships started as non-political arrangements, they took on a more political nature over time. In this way, they started to represent an imperialistic policy of the EU over Mauritania. This policy is mainly characterized by an increasing interest of EU officials to control at least a part of Mauritania's maritime policy.

However, this statement needs to be clarified further. Unclear is whether the attempt to obtain power has resulted in real power. It has been demonstrated that the Mauritanian authorities' utilization of most of the earmarked funds has not been consistent with the conditions stipulated in the agreements. As a result, the European Commission is planning to uncouple earmarked payments from the access due. By this means the EU could retain earmarked payments in case the money is not utilized in the manner stipulated. This measure might be interpreted as the intention to facilitate or further increase political power over Mauritania's fishery policy. On the other side, market developments such as the increasing relevance of oil for the state budget might result in increasing independence of Mauritania's government in the future.

Possible driving factors for the described policy of the European Commission become clearer if we look at two interests that have been pursued by the Commission: The increase of fishing opportunities and the decrease of impact on both resources and local fishers.

It could be demonstrated that licenses for some fishing categories of high importance for the EU (Cephalopods, Crustaceans) have been steadily increased since 1996. This increase took place despite the well-known risk of overexploitation of the affected stocks. It has already been mentioned that this development was closely linked to the closure of fishing opportunities in Morocco in 1999. A more recent withdrawal of cephalopod licenses was linked instead to the fact that the exploitation of this category was no longer worthwhile from an economic point of view.

It was stated that the external fishery policy of the EU has evolved from money-for-access-

agreements to so-called Fisheries Partnership Agreements. Although critics argue that the transition has not changed much in reality, the attempt to achieve change should be recognized. The question of exactly what motivations have induced the European Commission to reform their external fishery strategy has not been analyzed in this work. However, a more vigilant and critical society represented in the form of social and environmental NGOs might be regarded as one driving factor. External fishery agreements of the EU have been and are still criticized for failing to respond to the needs of the citizens of the partner country. In the case of Mauritania, NGOs refer predominantly to the demands of the small-scale fishery sector. This and the EUs interest in the Mauritanian EEZ as an enduring fishing resource might be considered as important reasons to reduce the impact on resources and local fishers. Having established these two interests it becomes obvious that they have to be considered as hardly compatible or even mutually exclusive. The interest in increasing fishing opportunities has consistently been pursued by the European Commission and is only currently challenged by a reduction in productivity of the cephalopod stock. One possibility for pursuing the second interest (decrease of impact) would have been to reduce the licenses granted to EU vessels. However, this would only have been possible by neglecting the first interest.³³¹ Therefore a different channel was chosen: Technical implementations within the Mauritanian fishery policy. These implementations include measures to increase the productivity of the EEZ, some protection for the small-scale fishery, and alternatives for income generation of the local population. However, the European Commission was confronted with another issue. According to UNCLOS, the EEZ is under the jurisdiction of the Mauritanian government. Mauritania is only bound to sell the surplus of fisheries resources to other interested countries. The Mauritanian government on its side has not been very open to the interests of the European Commission as has been demonstrated by the evidence that few of the requirements have been fulfilled.

However, opportunities for the European Commission to exert power over Mauritania's fishery policy have increased over time. One reason has been the increasing financial dependency of Mauritania's government. In addition it should be considered that the European Commission is defending its requirements with the notion of sustainability. Due to the international reputation of this term (e.g. enhanced by the Rio Convention in 1992) the potential power of the European Commission has also increased on the basis of the apparent moral? legitimacy of its arguments.

Critique of the theory of power It should be noted that Morgenthau's theory, in the manner in which it is applied here, allows a relatively comprehensive analysis of the interplay between political parties. Therefore, the main focus lies on the European Commission and the Mauritanian government. The interests of other parties can only be perceived through these channels. Referring only to political power interplays bears the risk of

³³¹In addition doubts existed about the impact of a reduction in EU catches. This issue is discussed with reference to the theory of common pool resources in chapter 7.4

overlooking the relevance of these power relations for the socio-economic factors of a relationship. Surprisingly, despite Morgenthau's critique, none of the outcomes derived from the discussion of the coercion theories could be refuted through the application of his concept.

7.4 Theory of the Commons

According to the theory of the commons, Mauritania's EEZ is considered a CPR. It has already been demonstrated that it clearly displays the characteristics of this kind of resource system. The exclusion of beneficiaries is extremely costly as demonstrated overall by the issue of IUU. The fact that the exploitation of fish resources by one user reduces the resource availability for others is an essential reason for the conflict between the EU and Mauritania. In accordance with UNCLOS the property rights of the EEZ are assigned to the Mauritanian government. However, it has been demonstrated that the sovereignty of the Mauritanian government to restrict access to the CPR and design rules for management of the resource is currently challenged by the political intervention of the European Commission.

There exists a large number and variety of resource users. These users do not target only one type of resource unit but various. For example, in the case of the pelagic fishery, mackerel, sardinella, sardine and tuna are all targeted by industrial vessels of the EU (Netherlands, Lithuanian, Latvian, etc.), Russia, Belize and St. Vincent and the Grenadines and others. A large variety of pelagic fish is also caught by the Mauritanian small-scale fishery. Some of the pelagic stocks are overexploited, while others still bear some potential for further exploitation. The pelagic stocks are migratory. Therefore, not only should Mauritania's EEZ be taken in to consideration, but also the waters of South Sahara (Morocco) and Senegal and the open ocean. In the case of the demersal fishery, cephalopods, crustaceans, black hake and other ground fish are targeted. Vessels of the Mauritanian industrial fleet are partly considered as joint ventures with Chinese, Algerian and European companies. A smaller part is owned solely by Mauritanian stakeholders. Vessels are often owned by larger fishing nations. A small-scale sector has evolved over time that targets mainly octopus for commercial purposes. The foreign demersal fleet operating in Mauritania is mainly represented by Spanish vessels. Octopus is the species of main commercial interest. Most of the demersal stocks are currently overexploited, others are considered as fully exploited. In addition, general data on both stocks and catches are relatively uncertain.

In light of this information it becomes obvious that the situation reflects a rather complex scenario. Around 4500 vessels (4000 pirogues and 483 industrial trawlers) were estimated to operate on and under the surface of around 160,000 square kilometers in 2005. Due to

the nature of the users of the CPR (different nationalities, big vessels, small pirogues, rare foreign landings in Mauritania), direct interaction or cooperation seems rather unlikely. Moreover, evidence suggests that the small-scale fishery sector and foreign industrial vessels have come to perceive each other as enemies. Consequently, the possibility that the group of users will overcome the CPR dilemma by itself must be precluded. Not much is known about the characteristics of single users. However, analysis of IUU data suggests that a large proportion of users (including many skippers of EU vessels) should be considered as free-riders. One company is known to have invested in data collection while the investment of others has not been analyzed.

The European Commission has tried to arrange that some of the EU payments are used for the maintenance of the resource. Here a fundamental question arises as to whether the money paid from the EU to Mauritania should be understood as payment for the product "fish" that originally belonged to Mauritania, or rather as investment to guarantee the maintenance of the resource. The answer to this question has considerable consequences: Applying the first interpretation to the EU-Mauritanian agreements would mean that in the period 2009-2010, 60 million EUR were paid for fish whose value was estimated by the Mauritanian government to be around 150 million EUR.³³² An additional 16 million were paid for the maintenance of the CPR.³³³

Applying the second interpretation would mean that the EU is actually contributing an amount of e.g. 76 million EUR in 2009-2010 (+ license fees) to the maintenance of the CPR. However, due to the structure of the agreement the financial contribution is not used to maintain the resource. This is the case because the money is paid to the Mauritanian government and not transferred to an agency that is commissioned with the maintenance of the CPR (e.g. Mauritanian Fishery Ministry).

The structure of the EU-Mauritanian agreements does fully support either of the two concepts. Regarding the first case, money paid by the EU seems to be far too small compared to the value of the fish it receives. Referring to the second case, it does not make sense that the amount paid by the EU is bound to the quantity of fish it receives. When the EU reduced its payments in 2006 the reason provided was:

"Optimum use is not being made of these fishing categories, most of which are under-utilised, thus jeopardising the economic and financial viability of this Protocol." (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 2)³³⁴

³³²In this research the value of fish landed by the EU has been estimated at between 340 and 420 million EUR for the year 2005

³³³Some items listed as the intended destination of the earmarked payments do not seem to be directly linked to the maintenance of the EEZ. These include "*promoting private investment*" and "*hygiene and health conditions*"

³³⁴OP Commission of the European Communities (2007), see citation 1 at 1

The question was: How much is the fish we obtained worth as opposed to how much do we have to invest in the CPR to guarantee a sustainable exploitation. Thus, the agreement is considered as a commercial relationship.

Another conclusion that can be derived from the CPR scenario is that, by referring to the "*non-discriminatory treatment*", the European Commission holds the position of a cooperator that is only willing to collaborate in the case that the risk of free-riders (e.g. other nations) profiting from its restrictions is eliminated.

The CPR theory makes clear that the dilemma of the Mauritanian EEZ is not necessarily bound to the EU involvement. The scenario demonstrates that the exit of the EU from the fishery relationship with Mauritania would not necessarily lead to positive benefits for the local population in Mauritania. It is more likely that other players would step into the space left. Those might be other nations like Russia or China. Alternatively, there may be an increasing national fleet, with or without foreign influence, producing for the European or Japanese market or even for an African market in near future. It is furthermore possible that European countries like Spain or the Netherlands could continue to establish bilateral agreements with Mauritania.

Thus, the question is not only about who has access but, moreover, about how to cooperate. The current situation including the EU Partnership Agreement does not seem to offer a sound solution to this question.

7.5 Discussion of the applied theories

It is important to state at the outset that the following discussion addresses only certain parts of the theories introduced in chapter 2. This case study does claim to discuss the entire underlying philosophy of Wallerstein, Morgenthau or Ostrom. In fact, emphasis has been placed on the analysis of the fishery relationship between the EU and Mauritania. The extracted parts of the theories have been used as tools to analyze the relationship, not vice versa. Nevertheless, it is argued here that key principles of the theories have been extracted and utilized in this study.

Referring to the validity of the theories it can be stated that none of them alone was able to offer a satisfying explanation of the case. However, in demonstrating the weaknesses of the "competing" theories and adding new possibilities for explanations each theory helped to increase the quality of the analysis.

To give some examples: Morgenthau's strong focus on power interrelations was justified with his rejection of the coercion version of the economic imperialism as proposed by Marx and others. To recall his main arguments: (a) In general, capitalists do not impose their

interests on politicians. (b) A capitalist system requires peace not war. (c) The main age of imperialism preceded full-grown capitalism. Concerning a: In the EU-Mauritanian case study evidence was found that interests of the European fishing industry had a direct impact on the bargaining position of the European Commission. One of the main achievements of the negotiations on the 2001-2006 agreement was seen in the fact that the interests of the European fishing industry were reflected in the agreement. Concerning b: It is questionable whether an imperialistic policy of the acsEU over Mauritania bears the threat of causing war. In addition, Morgenthau argued himself that the actual policy of a country is not necessarily the conscious strategy of involved politicians. Thus, why should it be the conscious strategy of capitalist? Concerning c: The fact that the main age of imperialism preceded full-grown capitalism explains that imperialism might be caused by other factors. However, it does not prove that capitalism can never be a main cause for imperialism.

Thus, none of the arguments used by Morgenthau to reject the coercion model stand up against today's evidence. In addition, for Morgenthau one important explanation for the emergence of the coercion version of economic imperialism was its overall explanation for everything. The counter question is: Does the fact that a theory can explain everything prove the theory wrong? However, his statement appears valid when interpreted as: The coercion theories are too broad (too holistic) to offer an analytical tool for analyzing international relations in detail. In fact, as has been shown above, nor can they be used to derive concrete explanations or offer any viable solutions. While Morgenthau aimed to design a counter theory to economic imperialism, what he in fact did was to introduce a supplement. Therefore, it is proposed here to regard inferences emerging from the coercion theories as a brought but veritable background in front of which evidences coming from the other two theories (common pool and power) should be placed.

8 Conclusion

Through the application of Wallerstein's "World System" and Nkrumah's critiques on Neo-Colonialism it was demonstrated that the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship can be regarded as contribution to a world economy under unequal terms. Evidence from the fishery agreements demonstrates that this relationship has brought many benefits for the EU whereas a positive impact on the Mauritanian fishery or economy appears to be either very small or absent. It is important to recognize that Mauritania's dependency on the EU has increased considerably and that a large proportion of the few fisheries products processed in Mauritania is processed for the European or Japanese market. EU investments are often directly linked to benefits accrued in European markets. It is important to note that overall in the pelagic sector EU vessels are by no means the only vessels that exploit Mauritania's resources. Morgenthau's theory should have functioned as contra theory to the coercion theories. However, it appears to operate on a purely political level whereas the coercion theories might be categorized as socio-economic. Therefore, none of the alternative theories applied in this study could be considered as adequately competing with the coercion theories. It was also stated that the coercion theories are difficult to disprove due to their holistic nature. The results of the case study should be considered in light of this notion.

It is suggested that the dilemma of Mauritania's EEZ cannot be solved under current jurisdictions. Two important findings have to be considered to understand this criticism. First, with UNCLOS the jurisdiction of the 200 sea miles zone has been granted to coastal states since 1982. In this way, governments obtained several rights pertaining to these maritime resources, including access, withdrawal, management and exclusion rights. These rights entail some specific requirements: The obligation to manage the resource in a sustainable way and the requirement that only surplus which is not harvested by the country itself should be offered to interested foreign fleets. However, evidence from the case study shows that these requirements have not been fulfilled by the Mauritanian government. Due to high uncertainties about stocks and withdrawal they are difficult to implement and even more difficult to control by an international community. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that the Mauritanian government appears to be the main beneficiary of the resources. By selling licenses to the EU fleet the Mauritanian government currently finances 20-33 % of the state budget. In this way, the government appears to be an indirect but primary user of the EEZ resources. It was stated by Ostrom *et al.* (1999) that users of highly complex CPRs are unlikely to solve the dilemma through their own efforts. Therefore, management provisions need to be initiated by an external body to which property rights should be transferred. The list of possible property right holders of Ostrom *et al.* (1999) ends with the government as right holder. But what if the government is simultaneously the primary user? In the case of Mauritania, UNCLOS has granted the property right of Mauritania's maritime CPR to a party that is ultimately part of the user group. Moreover, evidence

demonstrated that within the user group the Mauritanian government must be considered as a free-rider. It is granting licenses to overexploited stocks within the CPR for the sake of financial gain.

The European Commission on the other side appeared to be the representative of the second biggest user group, the EU's industrial demersal and pelagic fleet that fishes in Mauritania's waters. The European Commission, in contrast to the Mauritanian government, has demonstrated an increasing interest in investing in the maintenance of the resources of the Mauritanian EEZ. This is actually not surprising given that, as predicted by Ostrom *et al.* (1999), users tend to be more interested in the maintenance of a CPR if their benefits from the resources are relative high. Evidence from this case study demonstrated that the EU appeared to benefit from the resources of Mauritania's EEZ even more than the Mauritanian government.

The European Commission has understood that it is necessary to invest in the management of Mauritania's EEZ to guarantee the maintenance of the resource and EU benefits in the long-term. However, the EU's ability to fundamentally engage in the management of the EEZ has been restricted by Mauritania's power over the fishery policy applied in the EEZ. It was nevertheless able to detect a window. During several years of fishery agreements with the EU and several financial upratings, Mauritania's government had made it self-dependent on the payments of the EU (or the EU had made Mauritania's government dependent on its payments). Equipped with powerful arguments of sustainability this dependency was used by the European Commission to increase its power over the maritime policy of the Mauritanian EEZ. Arguing that this strategy would (when effective) result in an increase of the EU's power and in a decrease of the power Mauritania has received from UNCLOS, this strategy must be considered as imperialistic. Until now, the Mauritanian government has been able to resist the imperialistic strategy of the European Commission. In the case that the EU will be able to decouple earmarked from general payments it will have a further opportunity to achieve its objectives. Two important factors might increase Mauritania's ability to resist: Increasing financial independence (e.g. through increasing income from the oil sector) and the reduced financial resources available to the European Commission for investment in the Mauritanian agreement. It could be demonstrated that the policy of the European Commission is highly dissonant. As such, the European Commission as representative of the EU fleet must be considered as a free-rider and unsuccessful cooperator. On one side the Commission is trying to provide means for the maintenance of the resources of the EEZ using a flawed imperialistic strategy, on the other side it negotiates licenses that exceed the capacity of the EEZ, increase the benefits of the EU fleet in the short term and thereby reduce the availability of resources for other users in the short-term and for all users in the long-term.

In summery, it can be stated that the management of Mauritania's CPR EEZ is currently in the hands of two major free-rider users of the resource: the Mauritanian government and the European Commission. Other users (e.g. Russia and China) might also be involved. However, their influence on the management policy and the question of whether they should be considered as free-riders or not has not been addressed in this research. Apart from this, IUU data provide evidence that a big a group of further free-riders is operating in Mauritania's EEZ. Whether a group of cooperators, initiators or genuine altruists exists cannot be concluded on the basis of this research. However, on the basis of the overall result, it might be concluded that users of these groups are presumably relatively rare or excluded from decisions on management strategies. Thus, the case of Mauritania provides evidence that UNCLOS resulted in the allocation of access rights that have been inappropriate for dealing with a highly complex CPR as is the case for the Mauritanian EEZ. Furthermore, a hypothesis can be stated (that requires confirmation or negation by subsequent case studies): The worldwide fisheries crisis provides evidence that the case of Mauritania is not the only one for which the framework of UNCLOS is inappropriate. Further cases for which this statement might be true include other external fishery agreements between countries privileged by and countries struggling within the current global economic system, as well as the agreements between highly industrialized countries (e.g. the EUs northern agreements).

9 Recommendations

Having stated such a critique it seems appropriate to also provide some suggestions towards possible solutions. These will be restricted to the case of Mauritania. However, their implementation appears to be feasible only within an international regime applicable to all EEZ. It has been stated that government property is not a sound property rights regime for the EEZ due to the fact that Mauritania's government appeared to be one of the main beneficiaries by "selling" fish originating from the EEZ. Now we are confronted with the problem of finding neutral institutions that are able to coordinate sound management. Important characteristics could be:

- jurisdiction over a surface larger than the current EEZs in order to take into account the migratory nature of various species
- inclusion of representatives of various user groups (governments of countries whose EEZs are included in the catchment area of the institution, the local industrial fishery, the local small-scale fishery, others)
- equal and appropriate decision rights for all user groups
- management and exclusion rights for the institution
- (a closed financial circle) money obtained from license payments should only be invested for the maintenance of the resource.

This list should be considered as preliminary and open for discussion. An important measure is to uncouple the financial income of the managing institution from economic activities. This means that the institution should not have the right to use money received from licenses for purposes other than the maintenance of the resource. Therefore, granting fewer licenses would mean lower income for the institution but also lower maintenance costs. There is no incentive to grant licenses that would surpass the carrying capacity of the EEZs. The economic benefits for the countries are then derived through their own fishery sectors. Licenses might be granted to foreign vessels but only in the case that real surpluses are available. Due to the fact that benefits for the countries are derived through the local fishery sectors there is a high incentive to grant licenses to local fisheries first. The high financial power of the EU and highly industrialized countries is thereby obsolete.

Several problems might arise through the implementation of the suggested rearrangements. One is the heavy financial dependency of Mauritania. However, these might be overcome through a true strengthening of the national fishery sector. In any case, as has been stated above, the EU might not be willing to provide a similar amount of money in future.

Another question is whether the proposed institution can derive enough financial means to cope with problems like IUU. However, one might expect that by integrating users into the decision making process and by restricting the user groups to a greater extent to the local level, the number of free-riders might decrease.

It should be considered that the proposed solutions are intended to address the dilemma of Mauritania's EEZ. Whether the dilemmas of other EEZ are caused by similar factors has not been analyzed by this work. In this context further research will be necessary. Furthermore, many other problems within the EU-Mauritanian fishery relationship have been addressed in this report. These include first and foremost the market orientation of Mauritania as resource provider of e.g. octopus for the EU and Japan, that is to say, Mauritania's role as a periphery state providing resources to the core states of the world. The ideas described above do not provide any solution for this situation. As has been made clear they are embedded in a more complex environment and cannot be captured within this case study.

10 Epilogue

This study offers an insight into the current situation of the EU Mauritanian fishery relationship. It does not claim to incorporate all points of view that exist on this relationship, but rather those that I was able to trace in the limited six month period available. I have named those limitations of the study that were apparent to me. Others will find more. This work is written as my Masters thesis. I have heard that an inherent feature of master theses is their destiny to accumulate dust on University shelves. I hope that some people will nevertheless read my report. The suggestions I made require further consideration. Some might judge them as utopian; I hope others will consider them as opportunities to make changes in a complex world for the better. I hope people will continue trying to find solutions and not resign to accepting that the "World System" is like it is.

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11 Appendix

11.1 Tables and Figures

Table 13: Reviewed literature to identify the units of analysis

Source Category	Title or citation	Data base reference or url
Official	FPA Mauritania 2006	OP-FPA-Mauritania-2008-2012
Agreements	Protocol Mauritania 2008	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2008-2012
	FPA Guinea	
Scientific	Atta-Mills <i>et al.</i> (2004)	
Articles	Clover (2005)	
	Cullberg & Lövin (2009)	
	Iheduru (1995)	
	Kaczynski & Fluharty (2002)	
Reports & Gray Literature	A new EU-Mauritania fishing agreement is concluded	NP-2002-CourirACP-Mauritanian
Webpages	European Commission Fisheries	http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/
	FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department	http://www.fao.org/fishery/en
	CFFA	http://www.cape-cffa.org/?lang=en
Web article	www.nationsencyclopedia.com	WA-nationsencyclopedia

Table 14: Official documents from EUR-Lex for the case of Mauritania (1:2)

Type	Concern	Date of publishing	Data base reference
Agreement	FA 1987-1990	24.10.1987	OP-FA-Mauritania-1987
	FA 1997	04.12.1997	OP-FA-Mauritania-1996
	Fishery Cooperation	23.12.1996	OP-CoopAgreem-Mauritania-1996
	FA 2001-2006	18.02.2006	OP-FA-letter-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2008	08.12.2006	OP-FPA-Mauritania-2008-2012
Protocol	FA 1990-1993	10.05.1991	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-1991
	FA 1993-1996	24.11.1993	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-1993-1996
	FA 2001-2006	22.12.2001	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2001-2006
	FPA 2006-2008	08.12.2006	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2008-2012	31.07.2008	OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2008-2012
Supplement to the Protocol	FA 1995-1996	26.03.1996	OP-Supplement-Mauritania-1996
Council Regulation	FA 1993-1996	23.07.1993	OP-CR-Proposal-Mauritania-1993
	FA 1995-1996	02.07.1996	OP-CR-No1258-Mauritania-1996
	Fishery Cooperation	22.11.1996	OP-CR-Prop-Mauritania-1996
	FA 2001-2006 Prop.	17.10.2001	OP-CR-Prop-Mauritania-2001
	FA 2001-2006	05.09.2006	OP-CR-No1316-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2012	18.09.2006	OP-CR-Proposal-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2008	08.12.2006	OP-CR-No1801-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2008	31.07.2008	OP-CR-No704-Mauritania-2008
Council Decision	FA 1995-1996 Prop.	10.01.1996	OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-1996
	FA 1995-1996 Prop.	09.09.1996	OP-CouD-Prop2-Mauritania-1996
	FA 2001-2006	22.12.2001	OP-CouD-926-Mauritania-2001
	FA 2001-2006	18.02.2006	OP-CouD-113-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2008 Prop.	18.09.2006	OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2006
	FPA 2006-2012 Prop.	13.12.2007	OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2007
	Cotounou	19.06.2009	OP-CouD-472-Mauritania-2009
	FPA repealing Prop.	07.12.2009	OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2009
	FPA repealing	10.02.2010	OP-CouD-472-Mauritania-2010
Commission Decision	SPS	19.01.1993	OP-CD-140-SPS-1993
	SPS	04.05.1996	OP-CD-293-SPS-1996
	SPS	13.07.1996	OP-CD-425-SPS-1996
	SPS	13.07.1996	OP-CD-425-SPS-1996-B
	SPS	13.07.1996	OP-CD-426-SPS-1996
	SPS	03.02.2004	OP-CD-293-SPS-2004
Council Directive	SPS	24.09.1991	OP-CD-493-SPS-1991

Table 15: Official documents from EUR-Lex for the case of Mauritania (2:2)

Type	Concern	Date of publishing	Data base Reference
European Parliament Resolution	Coup 2008	04.12.2009	OP-EPR-Coup-Mauritania-2009
	FPA 2008-2009	03.12.2009	OP-EPR-Mauritania-2009
Judgement of the Court	FA 1996-2001	08.07.1999	OP-JC-C-189-Mauritania-1999
Written Question	FA -2001	18.10.1997	OP-WQ-926-Compensation-1997
	FA -2001	06.11.1999	OP-WQ-3761-CatchesPortugal-1998
	IUU	04.04.2002	OP-WQ-1463-IUU-2001
	FA 2001-2006	18.04.2002	OP-WQ-2025-Agreement-2001
	FA and DC	14.08.2003	OP-WQ-0150-DC-2003

Table 16: Comparing data from the data bases IMROP/Gascuel, the data set *Catches-East-central Atlantic* of Eurostat and data provided in the Protocol of the FPA Mauritania-EU 2008

Reference (Source)	2004	2005	2006
Landings from subdivisions 1.32 and 3.11 (Eurostat)	198,761	146,713	136,243
Landings from the EEZ of Mauritania (IMROP/Gascuel)	865,569	639,826	487,416
Landings from the EEZ of Mauritania (FPA Protocol EU-Mauritania 2008)		639,833	590,528

Table 17: Taxa-Groups used to analyze data from the IMROP/Gascuel data base

Taxa-Group	FAO-Code	FAO-Name	Frensh-Name	Scientific-Name	FAOSTAT-group
Crustaceans	ARI		Alistado	Aristeus varidens	
	GER		Gerion	Geryon maritae	
	PSL		Langouste Roes	Palinurus mauritanicus	
	VLO		Divers Langoustes	Palinurus mauritanicus,Panulirus regius	
	CRU	Marine crustaceans nei	Crustacés marine nca	Crustacea	Crustaceans Fresh
	CRU	Marine crustaceans nei	Crustacés marine nca	Crustacea	Crustaceans Fresh
	DPS	Deep-water rose shrimp	Crevette rose du large	Parapenaeus longirostris	Crustaceans Fresh
	PEN	Penaeus shrimps nei	Crevette Penaeus nca	Penaeus spp	Crustaceans Fresh
	SSH	Scarlet shrimp	Gambon écarlate	Plesiopenaeus edwardsianus	Crustaceans Fresh
Demersal fish	GRO		Divers Demersaux		
	MNZ	Monkfishes nei	Baudroies nca	Lophius spp	Demersal Marine Fish Frsh
	SBX	Porgies, seabreams nei	Dentés, spares nca	Sparidae	Demersal Marine Fish Frsh
Hake	HKX	Hake nei	Merlus nca	Merluccius spp	Demersal Marine Fish Frsh
Mollusks	MOL	Marine molluscs nei	Mollusques marins nca	Mollusca	Molluscs Excl Cephlp Fresh
	SQX		Calamar		
	CEP	Cephalopods nei	Céphalopodes nca	Cephalopoda	Cephalopods Fresh
	CTL	Cuttlefish, bobtail squids nei	Seiches, sépioles nca	Sepiidae, Sepiolidae	Cephalopods Fresh
Octopus	OCC	Common Octopus	Pieuvre	Octopus vulgaris	Cephalopods Fresh
Pelagic	ANE	European anchovy	Anchois	Engraulis encrasicolus	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	JAX	Jack and horse mackerels nei	Chinchards noirs nca	Trachurus spp	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	MAS	Chub mackerel	Maquereau espagnol	Scomber japonicus	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	PIL	European pilchard(=Sardine)	Sardine commune	Sardina pilchardus	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	SIX	Sardinellas nei	Sardinella nca	Sardinella ssp	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	TUX	Tuna-like fishes nei	Poissons type thon nca	Scombroides	Pelagic Marine Fish Frsh
	LHT	Largehead hairtail	Poisson-sabre commun	Trichiurus lepturus	Demersal Marine Fish Frsh

Table 18: Processing Plants based in Mauritania that were allowed to export fish products to the EU in 1996 and/or 2008

Approval number	Name	City	Regions	1996	2008
01 001	MAURAL	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	Yes
01 002	SPPAM	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	
01 003	SOCIMAR	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	
01 004	SODIAP	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	
01 005	Éts KALDE FRÈRES	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	
01 006	MAURIEX	Nouakchott	Trarza	Yes	Yes
01 008	Propêche	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 009	Socopêche	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 011	PCM	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 018	Afri Fish	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 020	Mayo Fish	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 021	Pargo-SA	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 023	IGP Sarl	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 026	MIP-Frigo	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 028	Iwik Industries	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 029	Octopus Sea	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
01 031	Sidi K	Nouakchott	Trarza		Yes
02 001	SOPAC	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou	Yes	Yes
02 002	SMEF	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou	Yes	Yes
02 003	MCP	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 005	CPAA	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 006	Areca Frigo	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 007	Namia Fisheries	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 008	Somascir Frigo	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 009	Ets Mokamed Ould Batta	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 010	Sipeco	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 011	Cofrima	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 012	PCA	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 014	SMCI Pêche Frigo	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 018	P.P.A	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 021	Snep	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 022	Ahmada Ould Dahi	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 023	ETS Frigocam	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 024	Friad	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 025	P.M.M-Frigo	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 028	May-Pêche	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 029	Maurispan	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 033	Ets El Mamy	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 034	Comauripeche Sarl	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 036	Esymex Sarl	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 037	Santamar Peche	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 038	S.E.P.H sa	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 040	Elabore Cap Blanc	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 041	Valor Fish	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 042	Amico-Frigo	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 043	I.N.K. Sarl	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 044	Star-Fish	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
02 045	Diawara Et Frères	Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou		Yes
Number of companies		Nouakchott	Trarza	6	13
Number of companies		Nouadhibou	Dakhlet Noadhibou	2	31
Number of companies		TOTAL		8	44

Table 20: List of Mauritanian Trawlers (1 of 3)

Nr	Vessel Name	Nom Cons	Flag	Origin	No	Year of construction
1	ADRAR PECHE	Ets Med BOUYA Ould MOMA	MAURITANIEN	MAURITANIEN	646	1998
2	AIN RIDHA 1	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	885	1997
3	AIN RIDHA 2	SOMACIP SARL	EVM	chinois	886	1997
4	AL ASMAC-1	ALASMAC	EVM	chinois	739	1988
5	AL ASMAC-2	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	740	1988
6	AL ASMAC-3	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	741	1988
7	AL ASMAC-4	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	742	1988
8	AL ASMAC-5	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	743	1988
9	AL ASMAC-6	ALASMAC	EVM	chinois	744	1988
10	AL ASMAC-7	ALASMAC	EVM	chinois	745	1988
11	AL ASMAC-8	ALASMAC	EVM	chinois	746	1988
12	AL VALAH	PARIMCO	MAURITANIEN	chinois	617	1987
13	ALMAP-1	Ets Nah Ould Nejib	MAURITANIEN	Francais	556	1985
14	ALMAP-2	Ets AHMED O AIDA	MAURITANIEN	Francais	557	1985
15	ALMAP-3	Ets GC et PA	MAURITANIEN	Francais	564	1985
16	ALMAP-4	ARPECHE	MAURITANIEN	Francais	565	1985
17	ANAGIM-1	Ets ANAGIM	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	604	1987
18	ANNAJAH-2	MAURIPECO	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	661	1994
19	ANNAJAH-3	MAURIPECO	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	662	1992
20	ARMACHIP-1	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	864	1994
21	ARMACHIP-2	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	865	1994
22	ARMACHIP-3	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	866	1994
23	ARMACHIP-4	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	867	1994
24	ARMACHIP-5	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois	906	1995
25	ARMACHIP-6	ARMACHIP SA	EVM	chinois		1995
26	ARPECO-1	ARMACHIP SA	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	602	1986
27	ARPECO-2	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	603	1987
28	ARPECO-3	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	650	1986
29	ARPECO-4	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	623	1987
30	ARPECO-5	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	624	1987
31	ARZAC	LUSOMAR	EVM	Portugais	888	1994
32	AWADI-2		EVM	Russe	802	1977
33	BAB EL KHAIR III	SMCRP	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	657	1994
34	BAB EL KHAIR-6	COPEMAC	MAURITANIEN	Chinois	910	1986
35	BAB EL KHEIR II	SMCRP	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	655	1992
36	BAB EL KHEIR-5	COPEMAC	MAURITANIEN	chinois	909	1987
37	BURMA-PECHE-1	SOMASCIR	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	574	1985
38	BURMA-PECHE-2	SOMASCIR	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	659	1992
39	BURMA-PECHE-3	SOMASCIR	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	660	1992
40	BURMA-PECHE-5	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	574	1985
41	CHOR	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Hollandais	619	1987
42	CIPA-3	CIPA	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	591	1987
43	CPMC-1	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	705	1991
44	CPMC-2	SIPECO	EVM	chinois	706	1992
45	CPMC-4	SIPECO	EVM	chinois	708	1991
46	CPMC-6	SMCRP	EVM	chinois	710	1992
47	CPMC-7	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	723	1987
48	CPMC-8	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	724	1987
49	CPMC-9	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	725	1987
50	CPMC-10	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	726	1987
51	CPMC-11	SIPECO	EVM	chinois	727	1986
52	CPMC-12	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	728	1986
53	CPMC-13	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	729	1987
54	CPMC-14	SIPECO	EVM	chinois	730	1987
55	CPMC-15	SIPECO	EVM	chinois	731	1985
56	CPMC-16	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	732	1987
57	DIDA	EMC	EVM	Espagnol	883	1973
58	ECHETV	SMEP	MAURITANIEN	portugais	835	1987
59	EL-GARVA	A2M	EVM	Espagnol		1969
60	EL-GHALEM	SP-COMA	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	611	1986
61	HANNAN	EMC	EVM	Espagnol	882	1986
62	HIMAPECHE-1	HIMAPECHE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	849	1973
63	HIMAPECHE-2	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	848	1973
64	HIMAPECHE-3	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	850	1973
65	HIMAPECHE-4	HIMAPECHE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	861	2001
66	HIMAPECHE-5	HIMAPECHE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	862	2001
67	HIMAPECHE-6	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	863	1986
68	HIMAPECHE-7	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	900	2003
69	HIMAPECHE-8	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	901	2004
70	HIMAPECHE-9	HIMAPECHE	EVM	Espagnol	902	2004
71	IFC-1	IFC	EVM	chinois	747	1988
72	IFC-2	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	748	1988
73	IFC-7	IFC	EVM	chinois	804	1987
74	IFC-8	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	791	1989
75	ISMAIL-1	MCP	EVM	chinois	648	1994
76	ISMAIL-2	MCP	EVM	chinois	245	1990
77	ISMAIL-3	MCP	EVM	chinois	653	1990
78	ISMAIL-4	MCP	EVM	chinois	664	1990
79	ISMAIL-5	MCP	EVM	chinois	665	1991
80	ISMAIL-6	MCP	EVM	chinois	666	1990

(Source:MPPEM 2005,Annex p. 49-56)

(EVM: on the way of beeing nationalized)

Table 22: List of Mauritanian Trawlers (ctd. (2 of 3))

Nr	Vessel Name	Nom Cons	Flag	Origin	No	Year of construction
81	ISMAIL-7	MCP	EVM	chinois	667	1990
82	ISMAIL-8	MCP	EVM	chinois	676	1990
83	ISMAIL-9	MCP	EVM	chinois	677	1994
84	ISMAIL-10	MCP	EVM	chinois	678	1995
85	ISMAIL-11	MCP	EVM	chinois	679	1990
86	IZIV-1	LUSOMAR	EVM	portugais	773	
87	LEJOUADE-1	Ets Med O/ Ely	MAURITANIEN	Francais	415	1982
88	LEJOUADE-2	Ets Med O/ Ely	MAURITANIEN	Francais	414	1982
89	LIMBAREK-1	Ets Cheikh Sida O/ Med Lemine	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	615	
90	MABROUKA-5	Ets Lejouad	MAURITANIEN	Francais	337	1978
91	MABROUKA-8	Ets Lejouad	MAURITANIEN	Francais	340	1979
92	MAPOPECHE-1	WOLD-FISH-SARL	EVM	Espagnol	308	1980
93	MAURAL-1	MAURAL	MAURITANIEN	Francais	531	1983
94	MAURAL-2	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Francais	425	1983
95	MAURAL-3	ARPECO	MAURITANIEN	Francais	425	1983
96	MAYEL	ATLANTIC-PECHE	EVM	portugais	829	1990
97	MCP-1	MCP	EVM	chinois	680	1993
98	MCP-2	MCP	EVM	chinois	681	1994
99	MCP-3	MCP	EVM	chinois	682	1993
100	MCP-4	MCP	EVM	chinois	683	1994
101	MCP-5	MCP	EVM	chinois	684	1994
102	MCP-6	MCP	EVM	chinois	685	1994
103	MCP-7	MCP	EVM	chinois	686	1994
104	MCP-8	MCP	EVM	chinois	687	1994
105	MENAVAA-1	MMC	MAURITANIEN	RUSSE	761	1973
106	MERZOUGH-I	ARECA Frigo	MAURITANIEN	Francais	408	1983
107	MESSOUD-1	MIZANE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	632	1987
108	N-DIAGO	MCPS	MAURITANIEN	japonais	276	1974
109	OUAD-CHEBKA	MASOF	EVM	chinois	795	1993
110	OUAD-ELBARKA	MASOF	EVM	chinois	793	1993
111	OUAD-EMMOUR	MASOF	EVM	chinois	800	1993
112	OUAD-IGUERG	MASOF	EVM	chinois	798	1991
113	OUAD-ILIJ	MASOF	EVM	chinois	797	1991
114	OUAD-LEBIAD	MASOF	EVM	chinois	794	1992
115	OUAD-TENEMROURET	MASOF	EVM	chinois	796	1992
116	OUAD-TENMEI	MASOF	EVM	chinois	799	1992
117	RABEH-WESSELAM	SP Coma	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	638	1980
118	RIBAMAR	WOLD-FISH-SARL	EVM	Espagnol	851	1989
119	RIDHA-1	Ets Kerkoube	MAURITANIEN	Francais	407	1983
120	RIMBAL-1	A2M	EVM	Espagnol	891	1978
121	RIMBAL-2	A2M	EVM	Espagnol	892	1977
122	RIMBAL-3	A2M	EVM	Espagnol	945	1988
123	SAHEL-1	MCP	EVM	chinois	875	1990
124	SAHEL-2	MCP	EVM	chinois	876	1990
125	SAHEL-3	MCP	EVM	chinois	842	2000
126	SAHEL-4	MCP	EVM	chinois	893	2000
127	SALIMAUREM-8	AFRICA-PECHE	MAURITANIEN	Francais	551	1985
128	SIDI-BOUBACAR-II	SANTAMAR-PECHE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	643	1985
129	SIDI-BOUBAKAR	SANTAMAR-PECHE	MAURITANIEN	Francais	552	1985
130	SINIYA-1	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois		1995
131	SINIYA-2	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	890	1995
132	SINIYA-3	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	891	1995
133	SINIYA-4	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois		1995
134	SINIYA-5	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois		1996
135	SINIYA-6	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	946	1996
136	SINIYA-7	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	947	1996
137	SINIYA-8	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	948	1988
138	SINIYA-9	MCF-CO.S.A	EVM	chinois	949	1988
139	SIPECHE-1	SIPECHE	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	614	1987
140	SIPECHE-2	SOMASCIR	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	642	1989
141	SIPECHE-3	SOMASCIR	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	555	1973
142	SMEP-I	SMEP	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol		
143	SMEP-II	SMEP	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	845	1973
144	SMFC-1	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	733	1990
145	SMFC-2	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	734	1990
146	SMFC-3	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	735	1990
147	SMFC-4	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	736	1988
148	SMFC-5	COPEMAC	EVM	chinois	737	1991
149	SMFC-6	SMCPS	EVM	chinois	738	1990
150	SOMA-11	ARPECO	EVM	Espagnol	927	1998
151	SOMA-12	ARPECO	EVM	Espagnol	928	1997
152	SOMASCIR-1	SOMASCIR	EVM	chinois	806	1993
153	SOMASCIR-2	SOMASCIR	EVM	chinois	807	1993
154	SOMASCIR-3	SOMASCIR	EVM	chinois	808	1993
155	SOMASCIR-4	SOMASCIR	EVM	chinois	809	1993
156	SOMASCIR-8	ETS AHMED YAKOB	EVM	chinois	825	1994
157	SULTANA-1	MASOF	MAURITANIEN	chinois	712	1993
158	SULTANA-2	MASOF	MAURITANIEN	chinois	713	1993
159	SULTANA-3	MSA	MAURITANIEN	chinois	711	1987
160	SULTANA-4	MASOF	MAURITANIEN	chinois	714	1987

(Source:MPem 2005,Annex p. 49-56)

(EVM: on the way of beeing nationalized)

Table 24: List of Mauritanian Trawlers (ctd. (3 of 3))

Nr	Vessel Name	Nom Cons	Flag	Origin	No	Year of construction
161	TAFARIT	CCT Sarl	MAURITANIEN	Russe	983	1978
162	TICHITT-1	Ets CHERIF-HAMAHOUILLA	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	634	1987
163	TICHITT-5	MP	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	633	1988
164	TICHITT-6	Ets-CHERIF-HAMAHOUILLA	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	654	1987
165	TIMIRIS-1	MCP	EVM	chinois	894	2000
166	TINDEWJA-1	ETS-KRKOUB	MAURITANIEN	Espagnol	588	1985
167	VASK-11	EURORIM Industries	EVM	Espagnol		1988
168	VETH-EL-KHAIR-901	SIPECO	MAURITANIEN	chinois	769	1995
169	VETH-EL-KHAIR-905	COPEMAC	MAURITANIEN	chinois	817	1994
170	VETH-EL-KHAIR-906	Ets Alex Pak	MAURITANIEN	chinois	818	199
171	VETH-EL-KHAIR-907	Ets Alex Pak	MAURITANIEN	chinois	819	1994
172	VETH-EL-KHAIR-909	Ets Alex Pak	MAURITANIEN	chinois	821	1994
173	WAF-12	EURORIM Industries	EVM	chinois	858	1987
174	ZAYD	COPAM	MAURITANIEN	chinois	9	1987

(Source:MPPEM 2005,Annex p. 49-56)
(EVM: on the way of beeing nationalized)

Table 26: Vessels allowed to export to the EU in 1996 and/or 2008 (1 of 2)

No	Name vessel	Type	Groupes integres	assumed Company	1996	2008
712	Sultana 1 (MSA) (o Seltana)	Ceph.		MASOF		Yes
713	Sultana 2 (MSA)	Ceph.		MASOF		Yes
714	Sultana 4 (MSA)	Ceph.		MASOF		Yes
661	Ennajah 2 (Mauripeco) Annajah-2	Ceph.		Mauripeco	Yes	Yes
632	Messoud 1 (Mizane SA)	Ceph.		Mizane	Yes	Yes
711	Sultana 3 (MSA)	Ceph.		MSA		Yes
617	Al Valah (Copam SA)	Ceph.		Parmico	Yes	Yes
614	SIPECHE 1	Ceph.		Sipeche	Yes	
642	BARAKAT 1	Ceph.		Sipeche	Yes	Yes
611	El Ghalem (Specoma)	Ceph.		SP Coma		Yes
638	Rabih Wassalam (SP SA)	Ceph.		SP Coma	Yes	Yes
308/NDB	Mapopeche I	Ceph.		World Fish Sarl		Yes
NDB 851	Ribamar	Ceph.		World Fish Sarl		Yes
421	CAP 1			unknown	Yes	
596	CIPA 1			unknown	Yes	
598	CIPA 2			unknown	Yes	
626	ERRACHID 1			unknown	Yes	
630	MFC 1			unknown	Yes	
631	MFC 2			unknown	Yes	
692	N TID 1			unknown	Yes	
693	N TID 2			unknown	Yes	
699	MACIPEC 1			unknown	Yes	
779	SAID 1			unknown	Yes	
952/NDB	Amabal 2			unknown		Yes

Table 28: Vessels allowed to export to the EU in 1996 and/or 2008 (2 of 2)

No	Name vessel	Type	Groupes integres	assumed Company	1996	2008
705	CPMC 1 (Copemac)	Ceph.	AON	Copemac		Yes
817/NDB	Veth El Khair 905 (Cofrima)	Ceph.	AON	Copemac		Yes
909/NDB	Babel Khair 5	Ceph.	AON	Copemac		Yes
910/NDB	Babel Khair 6	Ceph.	AON	Copemac		Yes
706	CPMC 2 (Copemac)	Ceph.	AON	Sipeco		Yes
708	CPMC 4 (Copemac)	Ceph.	AON	Sipeco	Yes	Yes
769/NDB	Veth El Khair 901 (Cofrima)	Ceph.	AON	Sipeco		Yes
655	MOURABITOUNE 1	Ceph.	AON	SMCRP	Yes	Yes
657	MOURABITOUNE 3	Ceph.	AON	SMCRP	Yes	
710	CPMC 6 (Copemac)	Ceph.	AON	SMCRP	Yes	Yes
656	MOURABITOUNE 2		AON	unknown	Yes	Yes
707	CPMC 3(Copemac)		AON	unknown		Yes
575	Burmapêche 5 (574)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco	Yes	
602	Arpeco 1 (Arpeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco	Yes	Yes
603	Arpeco II (Arpeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco		Yes
619	Chor (Copam SA)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco	Yes	Yes
623	Arpeco IV (Arpeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco		Yes
624	Arpeco 5 (Arpeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco	Yes	Yes
650	Arpeco 3 (Arpeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco	Yes	Yes
927/NDB	Soma 11	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco		Yes
928/NDB	Soma 12	Ceph.	MAOA	Arpeco		Yes
555	TICHIT 3 Sipeche 3	Ceph.	MAOA	Somascir	Yes	
574	Burmapêche 1	Ceph.	MAOA	Somascir	Yes	Yes
659	Burma pêche	Ceph.	MAOA	Somascir		Yes
660	Ennajah 3 (Mauripeco)	Ceph.	MAOA	Somascir	Yes	Yes
576	Burma pêche 5	Ceph.	MAOA	unknown		Yes
658	Burma pêche	Ceph.	MAOA	unknown	Yes	Yes
889/NDB	Siniya 1	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
890/NDB	Siniya 2	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
891/NDB	Siniya 3	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
935/NDB	Siniya 4	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
936/NDB	Siniya 5	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
946/NDB	Siniya 6	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
947/NDB	Siniya 7	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
948/NDB	Siniya 8	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
949/NDB	Siniya 9	Ceph.	MCP	MCF CO S.A.		Yes
635	Ismail 3 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
648	Ismail 1 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
652	Ismail 2	Ceph.	MCP	MCP	Yes	Yes
664	Ismail 4 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
665	Ismail 5 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
666	Ismail 6 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
667	Ismail 7 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
676	Ismail 8 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
677	Ismail 9 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
678	Ismail 10 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
679	Ismail 11 (MCP)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
683	YOUNESS 1 (MCP 4)	Ceph.	MCP	MCP	Yes	
875	NDB Sahel 1	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
876	NDB Sahel 2	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
892/NDB	Sahel 3	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
893/NDB	Sahel 4	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
894/NDB	Timiris 1	Ceph.	MCP	MCP		Yes
923/NDB	Rimbal 1	Ceph.		A2M		Yes
924/NDB	Rimbal 2	Ceph.		A2M		Yes
945/NDB	Rimbal 3	Ceph.		A2M		Yes
864	Armaship 1 (Armaship S.A.)	Ceph.		Armachip S.A		Yes
865	Armaship 2 (Armaship S.A.)	Ceph.		Armachip S.A		Yes
866	Armaship 3 (Armaship S.A.)	Ceph.		Armachip S.A		Yes
867	Armaship 4 (Armaship S.A.)	Ceph.		Armachip S.A		Yes
829	NDB Mayel (Atlantic-Pêche)	Ceph.		Atlantic Pêche		Yes
591	RAJA 2 (2008 Cipa 3 (Société Cipa))	Ceph.		CIPA	Yes	Yes
618	Zaid (Copam SA) (Zayd)	Ceph.		COPAM	Yes	Yes
819/NDB	Veth El Khair 907 (Cofrima)	Ceph.		Ets ALEX PAC		Yes
821/NDB	Veth El Khair 909 (Cofrima)	Ceph.		Ets ALEX PAC		Yes
604	Anajim (Anagim) (M L O Louleida)	Ceph.		Ets Anagim	Yes	Yes
634	1 (Ets Cherif Hamahallah)	Ceph.		Ets Anagim		Yes
615	Limbarack (Ch Sidiya o/ Md Lemine)	Ceph.		Ets CHEIKH SIDIA O/ M. L.		Yes
633	Tichit 5 (Ets Cherif Hamahallah)	Ceph.		Ets Cherif Hamahoulla	Yes	Yes
654	Tichit 6 (Ets Cherif Hamahalla)	Ceph.		Ets Cherif Hamahoulla	Yes	Yes
588	Tindewja (CPA)	Ceph.		ETS Krkoub		Yes
646	RAJA 1 Adar Peche	Ceph.		Ets Med BOUYA O. M.	Yes	
848	Himapeche I (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
849	Himapeche II (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
850	Himapeche III (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
861	Himapeche IV (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
862	Himapeche V (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
863	Himapeche VI (Himapeche S.A.)	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
900/NDB	Himapeche 7	Ceph.		Himapeche		Yes
773/NDB	Arzak 2	Ceph.		Lusomar		Yes
940/NDB	Azzoughi ex Mouta (IZIV - 1)	Ceph.		Lusomar		Yes

Table 30: Payments of the EU to Mauritania as arranged in the respective protocols of the fishery agreements in Euro

Period	Access due	Earmarked financial support	Additional payments when needed
1987-88	6,750,000	200,000	30,000
1988-89	6,750,000	200,000	30,000
1989-90	6,750,000	200,000	30,000
1990-91	9,250,000	300,000	120,000
1991-92	9,250,000	300,000	120,000
1992-93	9,250,000	300,000	120,000
1993-94	8,246,667	420,000	
1994-95	8,246,667	420,000	
1995-96	6,759,000	500,000	
1996-97	52,310,000	1,050,000	
1997-98	52,310,000	1,050,000	
1998-99	52,310,000	1,050,000	
1999-00	52,310,000	1,050,000	
2000-01	52,310,000	1,050,000	
2001-02	82,000,000	4,000,000	
2002-03	82,000,000	4,000,000	
2003-04	82,000,000	4,000,000	
2004-05	82,000,000	4,000,000	
2005-06	82,000,000	4,000,000	
2006-07	75,000,000	11,000,000	
2007-08	75,000,000	11,000,000	
2008-09	75,000,000	11,000,000	
2009-10	60,000,000	16,000,000	
2010-11	55,000,000	18,000,000	
2011-12	50,000,000	20,000,000	

Table 31: Licenses other than pelagic granted to the EU and license fees according to the EU-Mauritanian fishery agreements

Category	Lobster		No 1		No 2		No 3			No 4		No 5			No 6		No 10		Total
Year	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	s. 100 GRT ECU GRT	b. 100 GRT ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	Licenses (vessels)	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	Licenses in GRT	ECU GRT	
1987-88	3500	121	10000	138	15000	71													28500
1988-89	3500	121	10000	138	15000	71													28500
1989-90	3500	121	10000	138	15000	71													28500
1990-91			10000	276	15000	142											1950	242	26950
1991-92			10000	276	15000	142											1950	242	26950
1992-93			10000	276	15000	142											1950	242	26950
1993-94			4500	276	12000	142	2600	133	200	4200	156						300	242	23600
1994-95			4500	276	12000	142	2600	133	200	4200	156						300	242	23600
1995-96			4500	276	12000	142	2600	133	200	4200	156	5250		348			300	242	28850
1996-97			5500	290	8500	149	4200	140	210	5500	164	7500	25	365			300	254	31525
1997-98			5500	304	8500	149	4200	147	221	5500	172	12000	40	384			300	267	36040
1998-99			5500	320	8500	149	4200	154	232	5500	181	13500	45	403			300	280	37545
1999-00			5500	335	8500	149	4200	162	243	5500	190	15000	50	423			300	294	39050
2000-01			5500	352	8500	149	4200	170	255	5500	199	15000	50	444			300	309	39050
2001-02			6000	355	8500	154	3300	174	259	4000	203	16500	55	447			200	315	38555
2002-03			6000	358	8500	159	3300	178	263	4000	207	16500	55	450			200	321	38555
2003-04			6000	361	8500	163	3300	182	267	4000	211	16500	55	453			200	327	38555
2004-05			6000	364	8500	167	3300	186	271	4000	215	16500	55	456			200	333	38555
2005-06			6000	367	8500	172	3300	190	275	4000	219	16500	55	459			200	339	38555
2006-07			9440	268	3600	135	2324	233		750	144	18600	43	321			300	260	35357
2007-08			9440	280	3600	142	2324	244		750	150	18600	43	335			300	271	35357
2008-09			9570	291	3240	148	1162	254		375	156	13950	32	349			300	283	28929
2009-10			9570	303	3240	153	1162	264		375	163	13950	32	363			300	294	28929
2010-11			9570	315	3240	159	1162	274		375	169	13950	32	377			300	305	28929
2011-12			9570	315	3240	159	1162	274		375	169	13950	32	377			300	305	28929

Categories	No 1	No 1: Crustaceans
	No 2	Black Hake and Bottom Longliner
	No 3	Demersal Species other than Black Hake and other than trawler
	No 4	Deepwater Demersal Trawlers other than Black Hake
	No 5	Cephalopods
	No 6	Crawfish (Spiny Lobster since 2006)
	No 10	Crab

Table 32: Pelagic licenses granted to the EU and license fees according to the EU-Mauritanian fishery agreements

	No7		No 8 Bottom Long Liner Pole-and - Line				No9 smaller 5000 GT 5000 - 7000 GT 7000 - 9500 GT						No 9 b		No 9 c		No11 Licenses		Total	
Year	Licenses (vessels)	Lump sum EUR	Licenses (vessels)	Lump sum EUR	Lump sum EUR	Lump sum EUR	Licenses (vessels)	GRT (estim.)	EUR per month	EUR per month	EUR per month	EUR per month	Licenses GRT	EUR per GRT	Licenses GRT	EUR per GRT	GT per month average	EUR per GRT	vessels	GRT (estim.)
1987-88			45	2000		2000							2000	55	3500	55				14230
1988-89			45	2000		2000							2000	55	3500	55				14230
1989-90			45	2000		2000							2000	55	3500	55				14230
1990-91	25	1000	38	2000		2000							9000	110						42872
1991-92	25	1000	38	2000		2000							9000	110						42872
1992-93	25	1000	38	2000		2000							9000	110						42872
1993-94	24	1000	11	2000		2000													35	27574
1994-95	24	1000	11	2000		2000													35	27574
1995-96	24	1000	11	2000		2000													35	27574
1996-97	40	1000	17	2000		2000	22	108570	2										79	45698
1997-98	40	1000	17	2000		2000	22	108570	2										79	45698
1998-99	40	1000	17	2000		2000	22	108570	2										79	45698
1999-00	40	1000	17	2000		2000	22	108570	2										79	45698
2000-01	40	1000	17	2000		2000	22	108570	2										79	45698
2001-02	36	1250	31	2500		2500	15	74025	2.5										82	44174
2002-03	36	1250	31	2500		2500	15	74025	2.5										82	44174
2003-04	36	1250	31	2500		2500	15	74025	2.5										82	44174
2004-05	36	1250	31	2500		2500	15	74025	2.5										82	44174
2005-06	36	1250	31	2500		2500	15	74025	2.5										82	44174
2006-07	36	1750	31		3500	2500	22	108570		8	7	6					15000	7	89	44174
2007-08	36	1750	31		3500	2500	22	108570		8.1	7.1	6.1					15000	7	89	44174
2008-09	22	1750	22		3500	2500	17	83895		8.2	7.2	6.2					15000	7.2	61	27588
2009-10	22	1750	22		3500	2500	17	83895		8.3	7.3	6.3					15000	7.3	61	27588
2010-11	22	1750	22		3500	2500	17	83895		8.4	7.4	6.4					15000	7.4	61	27588
2011-12	22	1750	22		3500	2500	17	83895		8.5	7.5	6.5					15000	7.5	61	27588

Categories	No 7	Freezer Tuna Seiners
	No 8	Pole-and-line Tuna Vessel, Surface Longliner and Bottom Longliner
	No 9	Pelagic Freezer Trawler
	No 9 b	Pelagic Trawlers and Seiners
	No 9 c	Non-Industrial Pelagic Seiners
	No 11	Non-freezer Pelagic vessels




Figure 26: Pelagic licenses in number of vessels as granted by the fishery agreements to the EU for the Mauritanian EEZ




Figure 27: Pelagic licenses in GRT as granted by the fishery agreements to the EU for the Mauritanian EEZ

Table 33: Payments of the EU to Mauritania as reglemented in the fishery agreements (The indicated vessel owner license fee is the maximum amount that would have been paid in the case that all licenses were used)

	1987-88	1988-89	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Total Payments	10.2	10.2	10.2	16.1	16.1	16.1	12.8	12.8	13.2	65.2	66.4	66.6	66.3	66.2	100.7	100.9	101.0	101.2	101.3	105.8	106.4	102.6	93.1	90.5	87.6
Not Earmarked (Access Due and License Fees)	10.0	10.0	10.0	15.7	15.7	15.7	12.4	12.4	12.7	64.1	65.3	65.5	65.2	65.1	96.7	96.9	97.0	97.2	97.3	94.8	95.4	91.6	77.1	72.5	67.6
Access due	6.8	6.8	6.8	9.3	9.3	9.3	8.2	8.2	6.8	54.1	53.3	52.5	51.1	50.5	82.0	82.0	82.0	82.0	82.0	75.0	75.0	75.0	60.0	55.0	50.0
Earmarked and Additional Payments	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	16.0	18.0	20.0
License Fees	3.3	3.3	3.3	6.5	6.5	6.5	4.2	4.2	6.0	10.0	12.0	13.0	14.1	14.6	14.7	14.9	15.0	15.2	15.3	19.8	20.4	16.6	17.1	17.5	17.6

Table 34: Share of the three different elements of payments on total payments of the EU according to the fishery agreements (Reference values for the share of the vessel owner license fees are the maximum amounts that would have been paid in the case that all licenses were used)

	1987-88	1988-89	1989-90	1990-91	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
% Access Due	65.9	65.9	65.9	57.4	57.4	57.4	64.3	64.3	51.1	83.1	80.3	78.8	77.1	76.3	81.4	81.3	81.2	81.1	81.0	70.9	70.5	73.1	64.5	60.8	57.1
% Earmarked Payments	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.3	3.3	3.8	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	10.4	10.3	10.7	17.2	19.9	22.8
% License Fees	31.8	31.8	31.8	40.0	40.0	40.0	32.4	32.4	45.2	15.3	18.1	19.6	21.3	22.1	14.6	14.8	14.9	15.0	15.1	18.7	19.2	16.2	18.3	19.4	20.1

Table 35: Estimated license fees of vessel owners (in million Euro) paid to Mauritania when assuming that all granted licenses were/will be utilized

	Lobster	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5	Category 6	Category 7	Category 8	Category 9	Category 9b	Category 10	Category 11	TOTAL
1987-88	0.42	1.38	1.07				0.00	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.19			3.26
1988-89	0.42	1.38	1.07				0.00	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.19			3.26
1989-90	0.42	1.38	1.07				0.00	0.00	0.09	0.11	0.19			3.26
1990-91		2.76	2.13				0.47	0.03	0.08	0.99				6.45
1991-92		2.76	2.13				0.47	0.03	0.08	0.99				6.45
1992-93		2.76	2.13				0.47	0.03	0.08	0.99				6.45
1993-94		1.24	1.70	0.43	0.66		0.07	0.02	0.02					4.15
1994-95		1.24	1.70	0.43	0.66		0.07	0.02	0.02					4.15
1995-96		1.24	1.70	0.43	0.66	1.83	0.07	0.02	0.02					5.98
1996-97		1.60	1.27	0.74	0.90	2.74	0.08	0.04	0.03	2.61				9.99
1997-98		1.67	1.27	0.77	0.95	4.61	0.08	0.04	0.03	2.61				12.03
1998-99		1.76	1.27	0.81	1.00	5.44	0.08	0.04	0.03	2.61				13.04
1999-00		1.84	1.27	0.85	1.05	6.35	0.09	0.04	0.03	2.61				14.12
2000-01		1.94	1.27	0.89	1.09	6.66	0.09	0.04	0.03	2.61				14.62
2001-02		2.13	1.31	0.71	0.81	7.38	0.06	0.05	0.08	2.22				14.75
2002-03		2.15	1.35	0.73	0.83	7.43	0.06	0.05	0.08	2.22				14.89
2003-04		2.17	1.39	0.74	0.84	7.47	0.07	0.05	0.08	2.22				15.02
2004-05		2.18	1.42	0.75	0.86	7.52	0.07	0.05	0.08	2.22				15.15
2005-06		2.20	1.46	0.77	0.88	7.57	0.07	0.05	0.08	2.22				15.29
2006-07		2.53	0.49	0.54	0.11	5.97	0.08	0.06	0.09	9.77		0.08	0.11	19.82
2007-08		2.64	0.51	0.57	0.11	6.23	0.08	0.06	0.09	9.90		0.08	0.11	20.39
2008-09		2.78	0.48	0.30	0.06	4.87	0.08	0.04	0.07	7.75		0.08	0.11	16.62
2009-10		2.90	0.50	0.31	0.06	5.06	0.09	0.04	0.07	7.85		0.09	0.11	17.07
2010-11		3.01	0.52	0.32	0.06	5.26	0.09	0.04	0.07	7.95		0.09	0.11	17.52
2011-12		3.01	0.52	0.32	0.06	5.26	0.09	0.04	0.07	8.05		0.09	0.11	17.62




Figure 28: Estimated license fees of vessel owners (in million Euro) paid to Mauritania when assuming that all granted licenses were/will be utilized

Fishing category	No		MS allocation 2006-2008			Use 2006-2008			No		MS allocation 2008-2010			Use 2008-2010		
	GRT	Ves.	MS	GRT	Ves.	GRT	Ves.	%	GRT	Ves.	MS	GRT	Ves.	GRT	Ves.	%
1: Crustaceans other than crawfish and crab	9 440		ESP	7 313		7 162	27	98%	9 570		ESP	7 313		5 802	22	82%
			ITA	1 371		1 220	3	89%			ITA	1 371		1 143	3	63%
			PRT	886		740	3	84%			PRT	886		225	1	14%
			GRC			77	0	0%			GRC			0	0	0%
			Total	9 570		9 200	34	96.1%			Total	9 570		7 170	25	74.9%
2: Black hake	3 600		ESP	3 600		2 472	10	69%	3 240		ESP	3 600		1 666	7	54%
			GRC			0	0	0%			GRC					
			PRT			251	1	0%			PRT					
			Total	3 600		2 723	11	75.6%			Total	3 240		1 666	7	51.4%
3: Demersal species other than black hake with gear other than trawls	2 324		ESP	1 500		609	5	41%	1 162		ESP	1 500		542	4	50%
			GBR	800		0	0	0%			GBR					
			MLT	24		17	1	71%			MLT					
			Total	2 324		627	6	27.0%			Total	1 162		542	4	46.7%
4: Demersal freezer trawlers	750		GRC	750		0	0	0%	375		GRC	750		0	0	0%
			Total	750		0	0	0.0%			Total	375		0	0	0.0%
5: Cephalopods	18 600	43	ESP		39	8 818	22	57%	13 950	32	ESP		24	9 842	25	100%
			ITA		4	2 425	4	107%			ITA		4	2 502	4	125%
			PRT			272	1	0%			PRT		1	260	1	100%
			GRC			571	2	0%			GRC		3	464	2	50%
			Total	18 600		12 085		65.0%			Total	13 950		13 068		93.7%
					43		30	69.8%					32		32	100.0%
6: Crawfish	300		PRT	300		219	1	73%	300		PRT	300		0	0	0%
			Total	300		219	1	73.0%			Total	300		0	0	0.0%
7: Freezer tuna seiners	Annual Lic.	36	ESP		15	9 401	8	53%	Annual Lic.	22	ESP		17	11 916	8	59%
			FRA		20	0	0	0%			FRA		5	0	0	0%
			MLT		1	0	0	0%			MLT					
			Total		36	9 401	8	22.2%			Total		22	11 916	8	34.5%
8: Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners	Annual Lic.	31	ESP		23	2 200	11	43%	Annual Lic.	22	ESP		18	2 230	11	68%
			FRA		5	642	2	25%			FRA		4	775	2	17%
			PRT		3	175	1	10%			PRT					
			Total		31	3 017	14	44.7%			Total		22	3 005	14	62.7%
9: Demersal freezer trawlers. The % are calculated according to use and not allocation between MS	Monthly Lic.	22	DEU			3 918	1		Monthly Lic.	17	DEU			0	0	
			LTU			14 142	3.4				LTU			33 866	7.8	
			LVA			10 600	3.5				LVA			36 864	10.8	
			NLD			12 172	1.8				NLD			28 917	4.3	
			GBR			1 969	0.4				GBR			6 974	1.3	
			IRL								IRL			4 901	0.8	
			FRA								FRA			5 873	2.3	
			POL								POL			20 760	2.5	
			Total		22	42 800	8	38.0%			Total		17	138 153	11	62.0%
10: Crab	300		ESP	300		229	1	76%	300		ESP	300		138	1	31%
			Total	300		229	1	76.4%			Total	300		138	1	46.0%
11: Non-freezer pelagic vessels	15 000					0	0	0%	15 000		IRL			273	0	0%
			Total	15 000		0	0	0.0%			Total	15 000		273	0	1.8%

Figure 29: Allocation and use of fishing opportunities under the 2006 Fisheries Partnership Agreement and 2008 Fisheries Protocol (Source: Martín, 2010)




Figure 30: Distribution of the product of fines (Source: Martín (2010), p. 61)

Table 36: Landings from the Mauritanian EEZ by various countries (1:2)(Source: SAU available at <http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/478/4.aspx>, last access, 10.09.2010)

Year	MRT	Russian Federation	Senegal	Ukraine	Spain	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia	Romania	Netherlands	Other countries	Others	Total
1950	3,000	0	619	0	1,315	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,743	12,677
1951	3,000	0	619	0	1,225	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,397	11,241
1952	5,000	0	928	0	1,467	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,040	15,435
1953	5,000	0	928	0	1,244	0	0	0	0	0	0	8,698	15,870
1954	5,000	0	928	0	1,323	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,336	14,587
1955	5,000	0	1,038	0	1,769	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,259	15,066
1956	5,000	0	1,089	0	2,196	0	0	0	0	0	0	7,884	16,168
1957	5,000	0	1,196	0	2,260	0	0	0	0	0	0	10,024	18,479
1958	10,000	146	1,310	78	2,105	27	38	41	0	0	0	10,996	24,740
1959	10,000	532	1,703	284	2,274	98	137	148	0	0	0	11,122	26,297
1960	12,000	1,569	2,174	830	1,472	288	402	434	0	0	0	12,054	31,222
1961	14,000	2,618	2,417	1,387	2,698	481	671	724	18	0	0	12,154	37,169
1962	15,000	4,295	2,552	2,262	7,705	789	1,100	1,188	31	0	0	14,786	49,708
1963	15,000	4,664	3,407	2,455	6,221	857	1,195	1,290	31	0	0	14,378	49,498
1964	15,000	5,019	3,873	2,655	6,940	922	1,286	1,389	75	0	0	20,743	57,903
1965	17,000	2,739	3,716	1,449	6,189	503	702	758	330	0	0	30,410	63,797
1966	19,000	2,600	4,165	1,368	7,037	477	666	719	517	0	0	35,254	71,804
1967	22,700	6,090	4,621	3,213	6,420	1,117	1,563	1,682	662	0	0	39,572	87,641
1968	29,000	10,661	4,440	5,657	11,901	1,958	2,733	2,948	474	0	0	36,649	106,421
1969	35,000	19,631	4,873	10,436	12,084	3,606	5,030	5,431	718	0	0	38,177	134,985
1970	43,570	73,112	7,610	37,468	11,539	13,429	18,734	20,226	1,368	0	30,832	138,251	396,139
1971	52,108	93,516	8,845	47,925	10,423	17,176	23,962	25,871	4,189	0	22,480	148,116	454,611
1972	25,291	114,567	47,849	58,719	45,525	21,043	29,356	31,694	9,696	0	25,196	136,652	545,587
1973	22,507	108,450	63,977	55,579	56,977	19,919	27,789	30,002	12,982	0	25,511	119,563	543,256
1974	33,028	119,483	72,390	61,232	58,684	21,946	30,616	33,054	18,939	0	16,435	112,394	578,202
1975	25,165	90,155	74,491	45,804	62,316	16,416	22,901	24,725	19,876	0	26,513	116,827	525,189
1976	24,918	148,833	71,324	75,875	56,982	27,194	37,937	40,958	8,959	0	12,944	105,628	611,550
1977	28,929	107,414	72,872	55,035	46,565	63,616	27,516	29,707	20,656	0	34,493	154,417	641,219
1978	32,285	74,562	74,790	38,687	30,503	39,457	19,340	20,553	14,179	0	31,574	59,000	434,931
1979	16,583	48,909	75,774	25,171	18,676	26,186	12,584	13,401	14,078	0	14,134	58,095	323,590
1980	13,696	85,142	77,986	130,649	17,793	43,688	48,195	31,203	32,286	0	31,090	177,359	689,087
1981	44,554	73,505	73,580	37,689	18,677	41,733	18,842	20,041	28,865	0	15,918	105,712	479,115
1982	42,465	75,764	75,125	39,554	26,291	42,579	19,736	20,930	32,340	0	48	93,041	467,872
1983	67,865	74,520	86,511	38,937	34,882	43,060	19,432	20,588	20,737	0	111	83,944	490,587
1984	46,241	69,741	80,231	36,350	26,064	43,055	18,168	19,290	14,864	0	27	83,479	437,509
1985	54,735	75,075	79,041	39,076	22,726	43,745	19,531	20,765	31,868	0	11	73,208	459,780
1986	63,683	90,159	82,111	45,748	23,050	49,566	22,870	24,367	30,867	0	13	57,270	489,704
1987	74,461	113,960	83,700	58,241	28,797	66,668	29,117	31,093	49,834	0	39	67,481	603,391
1988	67,364	163,568	86,828	82,204	39,068	94,235	41,095	43,926	83,510	0	98	76,359	778,256
1989	60,082	190,212	94,827	95,592	29,067	113,254	47,790	51,100	65,489	0	118	60,278	807,808

Table 38: Landings from the Mauritanian EEZ by various countries (2:2)(Source: SAU available at <http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/478/4.aspx>, last access, 10.09.2010)

Year	MRT	Russian Federation	Senegal	Ukraine	Spain	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia	Romania	Netherlands	Other countries	Others	Total
1990	50,581	192,785	104,322	98,229	38,362	114,108	49,085	52,628	38,540	0	340	59,508	798,488
1991	52,362	155,527	108,943	79,857	30,772	90,833	40,226	42,849	49,625	0	3,283	62,761	717,038
1992	53,092	70,834	123,986	71,705	39,185	26,257	25,746	19,688	26,261	0	6,383	54,778	517,916
1993	46,506	38,606	83,330	37,644	42,416	36,210	16,550	17,432	390	0	1,095	45,478	365,657
1994	39,608	30,872	72,544	29,868	47,405	0	6,462	15,793	0	0	1,909	24,481	268,942
1995	40,190	63,482	72,611	61,505	51,412	0	2,713	24,211	0	0	34,286	42,885	393,294
1996	52,332	44,981	16,557	95,691	160,464	0	3,778	8,825	0	16,762	341	43,653	443,385
1997	62,546	27,902	18,088	274,159	158,343	0	0	2,012	0	38,319	321	32,743	614,434
1998	87,144	35,885	15,973	139,659	178,655	0	5,279	2,739	0	46,890	370	40,208	552,801
1999	92,737	31,410	26,762	40,844	88,958	0	5,959	5,512	0	44,328	5,247	29,140	370,897
2000	102,497	22,165	29,514	36,486	39,346	0	6,751	6,450	0	50,674	7,442	30,246	331,573
2001	128,088	10,805	28,791	19,457	41,667	0	9,070	5,944	0	65,717	21,595	89,274	420,409
2002	141,780	13,536	26,945	12,217	17,392	0	13,594	3,706	0	68,146	38,063	51,281	386,661
2003	184,291	7,451	33,432	5,496	16,577	0	14,090	2,877	0	84,374	22,141	35,274	406,003
2004	253,994	12,071	29,622	5,052	15,773	0	16,705	3,201	0	73,452	15,912	36,127	461,909
2005	287,710	13,589	27,591	5,290	18,679	0	14,374	4,724	0	57,867	15,920	32,636	478,381
2006	174,457	23,473	24,210	9,178	16,704	0	14,484	5,658	0	36,981	15,879	9,284	330,309

Table 40: EU landings by member countries in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Cyprus	France	Germany	Greece	Ireland	Italy	Latvia	Lithuania	Netherlands	Poland	Portugal	Spain	Total
1992											956	15,407	16,363
1993											683	18,500	19,182
1994		81									615	21,116	21,812
1995											578	17,429	18,007
1996		1,749	13,276						57,706		414	22,076	95,220
1997		12,985	32,542	234		872			81,629		714	24,087	153,064
1998		18,708	16,577	599		950			126,295		849	22,880	186,859
1999		3,073	25,266	700		1,330			82,775		659	28,033	141,837
2000		3,064		378		2,394			104,782		313	33,274	144,205
2001				287		2,581			64,195		216	35,472	102,752
2002			5,193	663		2,206			119,605		656	37,799	166,121
2003				254	4,636	675			130,035		836	20,136	156,572
2004			2,241	686	33,920	1,588			120,705		1,379	29,392	189,911
2005	72,663			872	33,260	1,992	24,198	28,397	83,555	6	517	28,819	274,278
2006	42,657			541		1,254	25,596	72,818	34,497		581	17,551	195,495

Table 41: Landings of originating from the EEZ of Mauritania by countries that joint the EU in 2004 (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Lithuania	Latvia	Cyprus	Poland
1991				
1992				
1993	10,585	18,480		
1994	16,651	33,402		1,637
1995	20,063	81,744		
1996	33,795	72,002	2,632	19,410
1997	32,991	19,549	13,640	7,632
1998	47,728	16,500	16,387	
1999	40,360	38,138	35,483	
2000	41,913	44,889	82,089	
2001	24,999	47,501	56,230	
2002	75,385	34,133	154,915	
2003	87,487	23,007	47,821	
2004	111,803	35,295	85,184	
2005	28,397	24,198	72,663	6
2006	72,818	25,596	42,657	

Table 42: EU landings of Mollusks by member countries in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Spain	Others	Total EU
1992	12	0	12
1993	92	3	95
1994	259	9	268
1995	336	33	369
1996	988	2	990
1997	929	88	1016
1998	1500	71	1571
1999	3724	180	3904
2000	2943	356	3298
2001	2892	452	3344
2002	3410	299	3708
2003	815	114	930
2004	1742	233	1976
2005	1871	633	2504
2006	653	509	1162

Table 43: EU landings of Octopus by member countries in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Spain	Others	Total EU
1992			
1993			
1994		1	1
1995	188	6	194
1996	2,481	0	2,481
1997	3,604	207	3,811
1998	4,339	369	4,708
1999	7,165	668	7,834
2000	10,874	1,315	12,190
2001	9,165	886	10,051
2002	7,742	384	8,126
2003	5,211	219	5,430
2004	7,269	510	7,780
2005	9,403	767	10,170
2006	5,192	484	5,676

Table 44: EU landings of Demersal Fish by member countries in tonnes (Source: IM-ROP/Gascuel)

Year	Spain	Netherlands	Lithuania Latvia Cyprus Poland	Others	Total EU
1992	1422.386			918.212	2340.598
1993	2392.362			660.319	3052.681
1994	5782.907			667.765	6450.672
1995	4676.528			412.399	5088.927
1996	5938.83	327.285		452.122	6718.237
1997	8129.705	297.384		2059.442	10486.531
1998	5388.535	868.387		3851.262	10108.184
1999	5429.517	234.75		1920.934	7585.201
2000	5785.73	532.47		1147.163	7465.363
2001	8629.706	98.873		1195.698	9924.277
2002	9159.434	1084.444		1486.968	11730.846
2003	4030.097	890.551		579.148	5499.796
2004	7655.372	573.186		2152.069	10380.627
2005	5552.903	462.871	557.678	2217.828	8791.28
2006	3623.208	31.66	772.971	426.531	4854.37

Table 45: EU landings of Hake by member countries in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Spain	Others	Total EU
1992	12,530	1	12,531
1993	13,855	11	13,867
1994	12,431	14	12,445
1995	10,448	31	10,479
1996	9,896	45	9,941
1997	8,669	66	8,734
1998	7,150	90	7,241
1999	7,715	27	7,742
2000	9,567	89	9,656
2001	10,562	7	10,569
2002	13,282	606	13,888
2003	6,800	416	7,216
2004	7,884	829	8,713
2005	8,097	399	8,496
2006	4,990	589	5,580

Table 46: EU landings of Crustaceans by member countries in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Spain	Others	Total EU
1992	1,442	37	1,479
1993	2,160	8	2,169
1994	2,643	3	2,647
1995	1,780	74	1,855
1996	2,765	33	2,799
1997	2,733	331	3,064
1998	4,478	432	4,910
1999	3,993	154	4,147
2000	4,092	250	4,342
2001	4,115	541	4,656
2002	3,577	806	4,383
2003	2,844	485	3,329
2004	3,366	561	3,926
2005	2,956	724	3,680
2006	2,350	558	2,908

Table 47: EU landings of Pelagic species by member countries of the EU operating under pelagic licenses in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	UK	Cyprus	Latvia	Lithuania	Ireland	Netherlands	Germany	France	EU total
1992									
1993									
1994									
1995									
1996	37					57,378	13,158	1,749	72,592
1997						81,318	32,319	1,230	125,928
1998						125,419	16,498	16,723	158,640
1999						82,534	2,515	2,980	11,618
2000	6,891					14,177		363	114,131
2001	27,180					6,496			91,276
2002	39,953					11,855	598		163,556
2003	8,276				468	129,124			1,429
2004					33,284	12,123	2,233		15,564
2005	55	72,433	23,684	2,811	32,314	8,392			239,679
2006		4,256	2,533	72,280		34,462			174,568




Figure 31: Pelagic landings of EU member countries originating from the EEZ of Mauritania
(Source: IMROP/Gascuel)




Figure 32: Landings of European Anchovy by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 33: Landings of Largehead Hairtail by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 34: Landings of Jack and horse mackerels nei by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 35: Landings of Chub Mackerel by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 36: Landings of European Pilchard (Sardine) by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 37: Landings of Sardinellas nei by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 38: Landings of Tuna-like fishes nei by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania




Figure 39: Landings of pelagic species by industrial pelagic vessels form the EEZ of Mauritania

Table 48: Detailed Dutch landings in tonnes (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Species or Species Group	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Diverse Demersal	327	184	685	235	343	99	1,084	891	573	463	32
Calamar					1						
Chub mackerel	861	2,065	2,052	1,085	6,983	3,636	15,395	14,279	6,862	2,703	916
Cuttlefish, bobtail squids nei	0							10			
European anchovy	330	263	440	10	488	143	446	700	195	171	0
European pilchard(=Sardine)	668	6,526	8,678	2,722	5,440	10,032	17,496	38,650	41,032	21,459	3,007
Hake nei		13	8	7	72	1	16	11	9	1	4
Jack and horse mackerels nei	2,432	2,041	4,145	2,028	6,164	4,569	9,355	3,776	18,697	9,526	11,819
Largehead hairtail	69	683	258	438	867	362	1,289	978	601	288	2
Porgies, seabreams nei	1	113	183		189						
Sardinellas nei	50,515	68,642	107,762	75,586	83,267	45,188	72,857	70,272	51,758	48,577	18,439
Tuna-like fishes nei	2,503	1,100	2,083	664	968	166	1,667	469	978	367	279
Total	57,706	81,629	126,295	82,775	104,782	64,195	119,605	130,035	120,705	83,555	34,497

Table 49: Landings of porgies (porgies, seabreams nei) in tonnes originating from the EEZ of Mauritania for the industrial fishery seperated by license types
(Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	EU			Other			MRT			Other	TOTAL
	Cephal.	Pelagic	Total	Cephal.	Pelagic	Total	Cephal.	Pelagic	Total	licences	EEZ
1992			0	38	908	946	1,843		1,843	4	2,794
1993			0	17	392	409	1,813		1,813	24	2,246
1994			0	104	206	310	2,358		2,358	76	2,744
1995	2		2		1,128	1,128	1,608		1,608	33	2,772
1996	324	1	325		1,422	1,422	2,975		2,975	7	4,728
1997	898	195	1,092	19	1,067	1,086	926		926	0	3,105
1998	531	313	844	18	914	932	193	9	202	1	1,980
1999	694	61	755		1,056	1,056	113		113	0	1,924
2000	455	189	644		832	832	160		160	0	1,636
2001	741		741		1,173	1,173	252		252	0	2,166
2002	1,162	21	1,183		1,435	1,435	287		287	0	2,906
2003	302		302		861	861	206		206	0	1,369
2004	814	242	1,056		702	702	89	40	128	0	1,886
2005	847	126	973		645	645	136	71	206	0	1,825
2006	689	72	761		157	157	84		84	0	1,002

Table 50: Landings of sardinella in tonnes originating from the EEZ of Mauritania for the industrial fishery (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	Nether- lands	Lithuania, Latvia Cyprus	EU total	Lithuania, Latvia, Cyprus (before 2005)	SUN	Others	MRT	TOTAL EEZ
1992					97,370	919	0	98,290
1993				4,740	50,533	129		55,402
1994				10,106	19,460	2,400		31,966
1995			3	25,502	63,150	12,022	495	101,171
1996	50,515		63,688	52,227	128,199	58,868	96	303,078
1997	68,642		96,835	25,652	79,187	55,987		257,661
1998	107,762		132,367	18,883	71,497	67,714	710	291,173
1999	75,586		99,018	26,985	63,872	46,086		235,961
2000	83,267		85,650	28,340	34,347	32,192		180,529
2001	45,188		45,188	19,226	32,258	45,507		142,178
2002	72,857		74,378	32,826	40,028	69,894		217,126
2003	70,272		70,661	18,132	17,474	23,733		129,999
2004	51,758		71,306	23,293	22,342	24,374	181	141,496
2005	48,577	13,073	84,980		19,351	40,999	3,711	149,041
2006	18,439	14,938	33,378		7,720	26,321	0	67,419

Table 51: Landings of *Octopus vulgaris* in tonnes originating from the EEZ of Mauritania for the industrial fishery(Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Year	EU	China	Others	Mauritania	Total EEZ
1992		6,170	357	29,218	35,746
1993		9,580	242	18,995	28,817
1994	1	5,679	481	14,261	20,422
1995	194	4,513	0	16,540	21,246
1996	2,481		33	19,747	22,261
1997	3,811		47	12,048	15,905
1998	4,708		15	8,424	13,147
1999	7,834		0	10,511	18,345
2000	12,190		0	11,188	23,379
2001	10,051		5	10,443	20,498
2002	8,126		6	9,777	17,908
2003	5,430		0	7,055	12,485
2004	7,780		0	13,179	20,958
2005	10,170		0	14,023	24,192
2006	5,676		0	8,042	13,718

Table 52: Subsidies granted to vessels identified in the EEZ of Mauritania by Greenpeace (1:2)
(Source: www.fishsubsidy.org)

Name	Flag	Construction of new vessel		Modernization of vessel	
Albacora Frigo Dos	Spain		-		-
Alcalde Uno	Spain	1997	656,097		
Carmen Pilar	Spain	1997	677,143	2005	30,048
Curbeiro	Spain	1998	980,623	2004	151,081
Febel Tercero	Spain	1998	716,845		
Gober Primero	Spain		-	1996	19,453
Gober tercero	Spain	2002	656,390		
Ivan Nores	Spain	2001	1,630,727		
Kukin	Spain	1999	916,729		
Lameiro Uno	Spain	1997	721,066	2005	18,780
Lozamar	Spain		-	2005	18,780
Mar rojo dos	Spain	1999	1,094,532	2006	19,240
Mar terra	Spain	1997	1,142,451		
Monte Carrasco	Spain		-	2004	60,309
Monte Vios	Spain	2002	1,115,200		
Nuevo Atis	Spain	1999	499,091		
Peix mar veinticinco	Spain	1999	866,961		
Peix mar veinticuatro	Spain	1998	757,053		
Peix mar veintiseis	Spain	1999	761,330		
Peix mar veintisiete	Spain	2002	858,240		
Peix mar veintiuno	Spain	1997	776,745		
Playa de Areavilla	Spain		-		-
Playa de Huelva	Spain		-		-
Playa de Pintes	Spain		-		-
Playa de Santos	Spain		-		-
Praia de Rodeira	Spain	2002	1,271,546		
Praia de Samil	Spain	2002	1,512,465		
Roca dos Dos	Spain		-		-
Santo do Mar	Spain	2002	1,283,058		
Sierra de Huelva	Spain	1998	939,202		
Varalonga	Spain			2002/05	75,656
Viduido	Spain			2002/06	71,086




Figure 40: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen octopus exported from Spain




Figure 41: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen hake exported from Spain




Figure 42: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen anchovies exported from France and Italy




Figure 43: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen tuna spp. exported from Spain and France




Figure 44: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen hairtale exported from China, Rep. Korea and Japan




Figure 45: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen crab exported from Spain




Figure 46: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen angler (monk) exported from Spain to EU 15




Figure 47: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen seabream exported from Spain




Figure 48: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen diverse demersal exported from Spain




Figure 49: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen cuttle fish exported from Spain




Figure 50: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen sardines and sardinellas exported from Netherlands




Figure 51: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen diverse cephalopods exported from Spain




Figure 52: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen calamar exported from Spain




Figure 53: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen diverse shellfish exported from Spain




Figure 54: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen crustaceans exported from Spain




Figure 55: Prices in EUR/tonne for frozen lobster exported from Spain




Figure 56: Landings of EU member countries by taxa others than pelagic originating from the EEZ of Mauritania (Source: IMROP/Gascuel)

Table 53: Subsidies granted to vessles identified in the EEZ of Mauritania by Greenpeace (1:2)
(Source: www.fishsubsidy.org)

Name	Flag	Construction of new vessel		Modernization of vessel	
		Year	EUR	Year	EUR
Afrika	Netherlands		-		
Frank Bonefass	Netherlands		-		
Willem van der Zwan	Netherlands		-		
Cidade de Faro	Portugal	1999	853,872		
Jose Veste	Portugal		-		
Johanna Maria	Ireland/Netherlands		-		
One seven	Italy			2007	0
Seize	Italy	1997	1,505,307		
Twelve	Italy			2004	526,800
Marshal Krylov	Latvia		-		
Marshal Vasilyevsiky	Latvia		-		
Stende	Latvia		-		
Tamula	Latvia		-		
Apuokas	Lithuania		-		
Aras I	Lithuania		-		
Balandis	Lithuania		-		
Koralas	Lithuania		-		
Pluto	Lithuania		-		
		Total	22,192,672	Total	991,232
				Total	23,183,903

Table 54: Subsidies granted for vessels of the PFA (Source:www.fishsubsidy.org)

Company	Name	Construction of new vessel		Modernization of vessel	
		Year	EUR	Year	EUR
Parlevliet	Hellen Mary	1994	6,247,357	2002	132,296
	Gerda Maria			1997	197,391
	Atlantic Peace			1998/99	702,478
	Farnella				
Cornelis Vrolijk	Annie Hillina			1999	1,558,392
	Prins Bernhard			1996	312,259
	Scobrus			1998	996,330
		Total	6,247,357	Total	3,899,145
				Total	10,146,502


FISHING CATEGORY	Authorised gear	Prohibitions	Minimum mesh	Biological recovery
Category 1: Crustaceans other than crawfish and crab	Bottom shrimp trawl and other selective types of gear	Doubling of the cod-end. Doubling of the twine forming the cod-end	50 mm	May to June and September to October
Category 2: Black hake	Bottom longline and bottom trawl for hake	Doubling of the cod-end. Doubling of the twine forming the cod-end	70 mm for the trawl net	
Category 3: Demersal species other than black hake with gear other than trawls	Longline, fixed gillnets, handline, creels and seines for fishing for live bait	Gillnets made of polyamide monofilaments	120 mm for the gillnet. 20 mm for live bait fishing	
Category 4: Demersal freezer trawlers	Trawl net	Doubling of the cod-end. Doubling of the twine forming the cod-end	70 mm	May to June and September to October
Category 5: Cephalopods	Demersal trawling	Doubling of the cod-end. Doubling of the twine forming the cod-end	70 mm	May to June and September to October
Category 6: Crawfish	Pot		60 mm	May to June and September to October
Category 7: Freezer tuna seiners	Seine net		Recommended ICCAT standard	
Category 8: Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners	Pole-and-line and surface longlines			
Pole-and-line tuna vessels: Live-bait fishing			16 mm	
Category 9: Pelagic freezer trawlers	Pelagic trawl	Doubling of the cod-end. Doubling of the twine forming the cod-end	40 mm	
Category 10: Crab	Crab pot		50 mm; from 1 August 2007, 60 mm	
Category 11: Non-freezer pelagic vessels	Pelagic trawl and purse seine for industrial fishing		40 mm for trawlers and 20 mm for seiners	

Figure 57: Technical measures under the 2008 Fisheries Protocol (Source: Martín, 2010)

Table 55: Exchange rates USD - EUR indicated as annual average

Year	Euro/USD	USD/ Euro
1990	0.7714	1.296344309
1991	0.7946	1.25849484
1992	0.7561	1.322576379
1993	0.8406	1.189626457
1994	0.831	1.203369434
1995	0.7546	1.325205407
1996	0.7745	1.291155584
1997	0.8849	1.130071194
1998	0.8985	1.112966055
1999	0.9393	1.064622591
2000	1.0863	0.920556016
2001	1.1177	0.894694462
2002	1.0606	0.942862531
2003	0.8851	1.12981584
2004	0.8049	1.242390359
2005	0.8053	1.241773252
2006	0.7969	1.254862593
2007	0.7306	1.368738024
2008	0.6838	1.462415911
2009	0.7192	1.390433815

(Source: www.bankofengland.co.uk)



Source : d'après Note de synthèse commission Systèmes d'exploitation

Figure 58: Comparison of efficiency (in kg of octopus per hour) between EU and Mauritanian cephalopod trawlers (Source: Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM, 2005, appendix p. 22)




Figure 59: Average structure of the artisanal catches in Mauritania, source: FAO (2004-2010): Profils des pêches et aquaculture par pays - Mauritanie- Profils, see 11.2.22, on p. 6 in the document stored in the data base




Figure 60: Evolution of fishing efforts and catches of octopus of the artisanal sector (Source: CSC (2008))

Tableau 2.9.1: Synthèse des évaluations des stocks de petits pélagiques dans la zone nord ouest africaine (GT 2008)

Stocks	BIOMASSE Campagnes acoustiques (Moy :2003- 2007)	MSY	Captures courantes en Tonnes dans la sous région (moyenne 5 ans)	Captures courantes en Tonnes en Mauritanie	Captures courantes réalisées par l'UE	Capture de l'Union européenne en 2007	Diagnostic	Recommandati on de gestion
Sardine Stock C	5 140 000	1 108 000	215 000	76 300	36 000	15 000	Sous-exploitée	Augmentation progressive de l'effort de pêche
Sardinelle ronde	1 140 000	236 000	351 500	181 000	91 000	102 000	Surexploitée	Réduction de l'effort de pêche; Les captures ne doivent pas dépasser 220000 tonnes
Sardinelle plate	1 753 000	?	154 000	15 000	4 600	1 800	?	?
Chincharde noir	743 000	247 000	244 000	187 000	28 000	62 000	Modérément à pleinement exploité	Réduction de l'effort de 20 %, vue la nature multispecificque de la pêcherie
Chincharde de l'Atlantique	226 000	78 000	108 000	42 000	5 200	12 300	Surexploitée	réduction de l'effort de pêche de 20 %
Maquereau	412 000	200 000	177 200	87 600	13 500	15 000	Modérément exploité	Effort maintenu

Figure 61: State of the pelagic stock in Mauritania (Source: CSC (2008))

Tableau 16 : Bilan des licences effectivement utilisées en 2005

	Cephalopodes	Démersaux	Crevette	Pélagique	Merlu	Sélective	Thon	Total
Licences nationales	113	0	13	0	1	4	0	131
Licences UE	47	0	24	13	10	10	32	136
Licences libres	0	0	7	22	0	0	11	40
Affrètement	0	0	0	20	0	3	0	23
Total	160	0	44	55	11	17	43	330

Source : MPEM. Direction de la Pêche Industrielle

Figure 62: Licenses used in 2005 (Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM, 2005, p. 19)

Tableau 6 : Distribution des navires opérationnels selon les types de pêche

	Effectif	%/total
Chalutier congélateur	91	50%
Chalutier glacier	80	43%
Crevettier (congélateur)	12	7%
Total	183	100%

Source : FNP et MATEMA

Figure 63: Trawlers under Mauritanian flag in 2005 (Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM, 2005, p. 11)

Tableau 12 : Typologie économique des armements

	Sociétés mauritaniennes		Sociétés mixte (chine)		Société mixtes (Europe + Algérie)		
Effectifs	Cong.	Glaciers	Cong.	Glaciers	Cong.	Glaciers	Total
Armements possédant un seul bateau							
Armements	8	6				2	16
Bateaux	8	6				2	16
Armements possédant plusieurs bateaux du même type							
Armements	5 (*)	2	3 (**)	2	1	3 (***)	16
Bateaux	11	5	20	12	3	8	59
Armements possédant plusieurs bateaux de divers types							
Armements	2				4		6
Bateaux	8				16		24
Groupes intégrés							
Armements			3				3
Bateaux			84				84
Total							
Armements	23		8		10		41
Bateaux	38		116		29		183

(*) dont un armement intégré aval et pêche artisanale (**) dont deux armements intégrés aval (***) dont un armement intégré aval (cf. point D)

Figure 64: Ownership of trawlers under Mauritanian flag in 2005 (Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM, 2005, p. 17)

Tableau 19 : Dynamique de la flotte industrielle mauritanienne

	98	99	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	evol. 98/2005
Congélateurs actifs	60	54	55	56	76	80	96	94	57%
dont crevettiers	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	N.I.	18	14	12	11	-
Congélateurs arrêt provisoire	4	5	6	7	6	9	3	1	-75%
Congélateurs arrêt prolongé	22	21	20	18	8	12	11	10	-55%
sous total arrêt congélateurs	26	26	26	25	14	21	14	11	-58%
Total Congélateurs	86	80	81	81	90	101	110	105	22%
Glaciers actifs	77	79	71	72	78	71	81	67	-13%
Glaciers arrêt provisoire	15	10	18	23	11	26	2	14	-7%
Glaciers arrêt prolongé	17	12	13	13	10	8	8	6	-65%
sous total arrêt glaciers	32	22	31	36	21	34	10	20	-38%
Total Glaciers	109	101	102	108	99	105	91	87	-20%
Total arrêt provisoire	19	15	24	30	17	35	5	15	-21%
Total arrêt prolongé	39	33	33	31	18	20	19	16	-59%
Total arrêt	58	48	57	61	35	55	24	31	-47%
Total actifs	137	133	126	128	154	151	177	161	18%
Total actifs + arrêt provisoire	160	153	156	165	177	195	185	177	11%
Total flotte	195	181	183	189	189	206	201	192	-2%
% arrêt / total flotte	30%	27%	31%	32%	19%	27%	12%	16%	-46%
% glaciers arrêt / total arrêt	55%	46%	54%	59%	60%	62%	42%	65%	17%
% congélateurs actifs/total actifs	44%	41%	44%	44%	49%	53%	54%	58%	33%

Source : d'après données FNP

Figure 65: Position of trawlers under Mauritanian flag in 2005 (Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM, 2005, p. 21)

Categories	Fishing possibilities (number of vessels)	Allocation of fishing possibilities among Member States
1. Cephalopod vessels	128 to 86*	100% Spain
2. Shrimp vessels	150 to 113*	100% Spain
3. Longliners	174 to 140*	65.4% Spain, 34.6% Portugal
4. Seiners – north	26	100% Spain
5. Seiners – south	11	100% Spain
6. Small-scale fishing	46	100% Spain
7. Black Hake Trawlers	50	100% Spain
8. Pelagic (mid-water) Trawlers	12	100% France
9. Tuna vessels	27	63% Spain, 37% France
10. Sponge fishing	5	100% Greece
All categories	629 to 516	

*Progressive reduction of fishing possibilities from year 1 to year 4

Figure 66: Licenses granted to the EU in the agreement with Morocco from 1995 to 1999 (Source: European Union, 1995-2010)

Imports

Octopus: Japan

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
	(1000 tonnes)					
Mauritania	14.5	19.5	16.6	14.0	12.6	26.5
Morocco	5.2	8.7	8.7	10.3	10.9	13.8
China	13.1	9.9	8.2	7.2	6.7	5.5
Viet Nam	5.9	5.6	5.5	4.8	5.5	3.7
Spain	5.9	6.2	4.0	1.8	2.7	3.0
Thailand	1.8	3.0	1.9	1.8	1.2	1.4
Others	6.9	2.6	3.5	6.9	5.1	2.3
Total	53.3	55.5	48.4	46.8	44.7	56.2

China

Figure 67: Octopus import of Japan (Source: FAO Globefish)

Imports Octopus: Italy

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
	(1000 tonnes)					
Morocco	5.0	9.1	11.7	12.3	14.5	16.2
Spain	6.0	8.4	8.5	6.9	8.2	7.6
Mauritania	3.5	5.4	3.4	2.5	1.4	6.6
Senegal	5.9	4.7	3.7	4.2	3.4	4.9
Viet Nam	3.8	3.8	5.6	3.3	4.5	4.3
Mexico	*	3.3	2.8	4.6	2.2	3.1
Indonesia	*	1.7	*	2.5	4.0	2.8
Thailand	5.3	3.3	3.4	2.4	2.8	2.8
Tunisia	2.1	2.7	1.9	2.0	0.8	1.0
Others	12.4	6.3	10.2	7.4	9.1	5.5
Total	44.0	48.7	51.2	48.1	50.9	54.8

Source: GLOBEFISH AH 10457

Figure 68: Octopus import of Italy (Source: FAO Globefish)

Imports Octopus: Spain

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
	(1000 tonnes)					
Morocco	14.3	18.2	20.2	19.6	23.2	20.0
Mauritania	2.8	2.8	4.9	4.9	4.5	9.2
China	1.9	1.3	2.8	1.6	1.8	3.7
Viet Nam	1.8	0.7	1.9	2.2	1.6	1.7
Portugal	1.2	1.9	1.4	1.7	2.2	1.1
Senegal	1.4	2.0	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.9
Others	10.0	9.9	8.6	8.8	8.7	6.7
Total	33.4	36.8	40.3	39.3	42.6	43.3

Source: GLOBEFISH AH 10452

Figure 69: Octopus import of Spain (Source: FAO Globefish)




Figure 70: Octopus import of Spain (Source: FAO Globefish)

	NATIONAL					EU					OTHER					TOTAL				
CATEGORIES	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH
1	22	10 484	5 413	2 390	1 538	35	18 408	9 889	4 682	7 663	9	7 151	2 135	697	468	66	36 043	17 437	7 769	9 669
2	8	7 042	3 171	398	386	14	4 794	3 089	1 956	7 210	1	307	161	18	6	23	12 143	6 421	2 372	7 602
3	6	2 049	1 040	904	1 294	13	2 387	1 244	1 418	4 036	4	1 939	799	418	503	23	6 375	3 083	2 740	5 833
4	0	0	0	0	0	9	4 946	2 470	834	858	0	0	0	0	0	9	4 946	2 470	834	858
5	C	100	63 316	29 876	19 795	22 333	50	34 554	20 922	9 758	16 833	0	0	0	0	150	97 870	50 798	29 553	39 166
	G	88	26 699	20 081	11 714	10 137	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	88	26 699	20 081	11 714	10 137
	ST	188	90 015	49 957	31 509	32 470	50	34 554	20 922	9 758	16 833	0	0	0	0	0	238	124 569	70 879	41 267
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	23	46 265	28 983		1 708	0	0	0	0	0	23	46 265	28 983	0	1 708
8	0	0	0	0	0	27	9 797	6 137		7 633	4	1 451	909			31	11 248	7 046	0	7 633
9	3	10 350	17 136	594	28 587	12	75 460	59 699	1 044	112 347	51	145 449	316 158	7 848	416 212	66	231 259	392 993	9 486	557 146
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1 236	839	44	80	4	1 236	839	44	80
TOTAL	227	119 940	76 717	35 796	64 275	183	196 611	132 433	19 691	158 288	73	157 533	321 001	9 025	417 269	483	474 084	530 151	64 512	639 833

CATEGORIES:

VN:	Vessel Number	1	— CRUSTACEANS EXCLUDING SPINY LOBSTER	7	— TUNA WITH SEINE
KW:	Power in Units	2	— BLACK HAKE	8	— TUNA WITH POLE-AND-LINE AND LONGLINES
GT:	Gross Tonnage	3	— DEMERSAL SPECIES WITH GEAR OTHER THAN TRAWLS	9	— PELAGICS
NFD:	Number of Fishing Days	4	— DEMERSAL TRAWLERS TARGETING SPECIES OTHER THAN HAKE	10	— CRAB
CATCHES:	Overall vessel catches, including targeted species and by-catches	5	— CEPHALOPODS	11	— NON-FREEZER PELAGICS
		6	— SPINY LOBSTER		

NB: For 2005, data on the activities of Baltic vessels (Lithuania and Latvia), including figures on catches (1 33 053 tonnes), are included in the columns relating to 'other' vessels and not in the columns relating to EU vessels.

(*) the data relating to tuna categories 7 and 8 for the EU fleet are the EU's figures.

Figure 71: Data on activities of fishing vessels for 2005(Source: European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III

CATEGORIES	NATIONAL					EU					OTHER					TOTAL				
	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH	VN	KW	GT	NFD	CATCH
1	20	13 616	4 715	3 039	1 474	34	14 926	9 601	6 910	7 042	3	1 501	936	293	308	57	30 043	15 252	10 242	8 824
2	2	589	224	88	476	13	3 915	3 414	2 526	7 874	0	0	0	0	0	15	4 504	3 638	2 614	8 350
3	6	2 779	1 010	594	4 661	7	1 110	552	637	2 173	0	0	0	0	0	13	3 889	1 562	1 231	6 834
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	C	84	67 290	26 176	18 947	11 212	43	30 086	17 983	7 665	13 995	0	0	0	0	127	97 376	44 159	26 612	25 207
	G	42			7 546	4 838	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	42			7 546	4 838
	ST	126			26 493	16 050	43			7 665	13 995					169			34 158	30 045
6	0	0	0	0	0	1	570	219	98	11	0	0	0	0	0	1	570	219	98	11
7 (*)	0	0	0	0	0	10	20 062	8 547		978	11	22 068	5 650			21	42 130	14 197		
8 (*)	0	0	0	0	0	20	8 383	3 207		7 812	16	4 611	4 914			36	12 994	8 121		
9	0	0	0	0	0	15	56 269	73 441	1 939	264 645	22	90 385	113 506	3 705	271 480	37	146 654	186 947	5 644	536 125
10	1	692	132	90	160	1	441	252	61	180	0	0	0	0	0	2	1 133	384	151	340
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	155	84 966	32 257	30 304	22 821	144	135 762	117 216	19 836	304 709	52	118 565	125 006	3 998	271 788	351	339 293	274 479	54 138	590 528

CATEGORIES:

VN:	Vessel Number	1 — CRUSTACEANS EXCLUDING SPINY LOBSTER	7 — TUNA WITH SEINE
KW:	Power in Units	2 — BLACK HAKE	8 — TUNA WITH POLE-AND-LINE AND LONGLINES
GT:	Gross Tonnage	3 — DEMERSAL SPECIES WITH GEAR OTHER THAN TRAWLS	9 — PELAGICS
NFD:	Number of Fishing Days	4 — DEMERSAL TRAWLERS TARGETING SPECIES OTHER THAN HAKE	10 — CRAB
CATCHES:	Overall vessel catches, including targeted species and by-catches	5 — CEPHALOPODS	11 — NON-FREEZER PELAGICS
		6 — SPINY LOBSTER	

(*) The data relating to tuna categories 7 and 8 for the EU fleet are the EU's figures.
The two Parties agree to update this fishing effort each year by 1 May of the following year.

Figure 72: Data on activities of fishing vessels for 2006(Source: European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III

MAURITIAN LEGISLATION IN FORCE CONCERNING BY-CATCHES

IRM legislation — 2002/073

	<i>Categories</i>	<i>Authorised by-catches</i>	<i>Prohibited catches</i>
1	Vessels fishing for crustaceans other than spiny lobster and crab	20 % fish and 15 % cephalopods 7,5 % crabs	Spiny lobster
2	Black hake trawlers and bottom longliners	Trawlers: 25 % fish Longliners: 50 % fish	Cephalopods and crustaceans
3	Vessels fishing for demersal species other than black hake with gear other than trawls	10 % of the total for the authorised target species or group of species (live weight), including a maximum of 5 % for shrimps and 5 % for squid and cuttlefish	Octopus Hake (maximum % to be decided within the Joint Committee)
4	Freezer trawlers fishing for demersal species	10 % of the total for the authorised target species or group of species (live weight), including a maximum of 5 % for shrimps and 5 % for squid and cuttlefish	Octopus
5	Cephalopod vessels	5 % shrimps	
6	Lobster boats		Fish, cephalopods, shrimps, royal spiny lobsters and crabs
7	Freezer tuna seiners		Species other than the target species or group of species
8	Pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners		Species other than the target species or group of species
9	Pelagic freezer trawlers	3 % of the total for the authorised target species or group of species (live weight)	Crustaceans or cephalopods except squid
10	Crab fishing		Fish, cephalopods and crustaceans other than the target species
11	Non-freezer pelagic vessels	3 % of the total for the authorised target species or group of species (live weight)	Crustaceans or cephalopods except squid

Figure 73: Allowed and prohibited by-catch in reference to the Mauritanian Legislation (Source: European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008), Annex III)

11.2 Citations

Articles

11.2.1 Atta-Mills et al. (2004)

The decline of a regional fishing nation: The case of Ghana and West Africa, Natural Resources Forum, 28, p. 13-21

1. *"In the 1950s and 1960s, Ghana stood out as a fishing country of regional importance in West Africa (Adjetey, 1973). However, recent developments in the region have affected Ghana's status as distant water fishing country (Acquay, 1992)"* (p. 13)
2. *"The recent events and circumstances that have intervened to alter Ghana's position include: regional political developments (Overa, 2002), globalization, the expansion of foreign fleets - especially Western European, Russian Chinese - along with drastic economic changes (Acquay, 1992). These factors have impacted on the viability of some of Ghana's fishing operations in foreign locations, which in turn affected the country's domestic fishery economy."* (p. 2)

11.2.2 CSC (2008)

Rapport de la seconde réunion du Comité Scientifique Conjoint RIM-UE Rennes, 8 au 10 octobre 2008

Database reference: R-2008-Comite-Scientifique

1. *"L'arrêt de pêche est une mesure de gestion essentielle adoptée par la Mauritanie face à la surexploitation du poulpe, la plus importante ressource démersale du pays."* (p. 4)
2. *"En 2006, la flottille est composée de 81 navires, dont 32 unités espagnoles responsables de 46 % de l'effort totale pour *P. longirostris* et de 40 % de l'effort pour *F. notialis* (d'après Copace 2007)." (p. 6)*
3. *"Le modèle montre que le stock de *Parapenaeus longirostris* est pleinement exploité (Tableau 2.1.1). La biomasse actuelle est proche de la biomasse cible B0.1. La recommandation du Copace est de "ne pas augmenter l'effort de pêche actuel"."* (p. 7)
4. *"Le stock de crevette rose du sud, *F. notialis*, est également pleinement exploité. La biomasse actuelle est proche de la biomasse cible B0.1. Tenant compte des résultats des évaluations, le sous-comité scientifique du Copace recommande "de ne pas augmenter l'effort de pêche actuelle (2006)"."* (p. 8)
5. *"Les résultats de ces évaluations concluent que "la biomasse du merlu noir (*Merluccius senegalensis* et *Merluccius polli*) présente dans la ZEE mauritanienne est largement audessous de la biomasse produisant le rendement durable maximal (BMSY). On a estimé que l'effort de pêche est à un niveau élevé par rapport à celui qui permettrait une production durable maximale (FMSY). Cependant le maintien de l'effort à son niveau actuel laisse espérer une amélioration dans la biomasse du stock pour les années prochaines ".*" (p. 9)
6. *"Les captures du merlu noir sont principalement réalisées par des navires chalutiers et palan-*

griers européens. Depuis 1998 des chalutiers mauritaniens ont rejoint la pêche. Ce segment de la flottille a enregistré son pic de production en 2000. Depuis lors, la production nationale est en nette régression pour devenir nulle en 2007.” (p. 9)

7. *”Le CSC, tenant compte des résultats de l’évaluation menée par le groupe de travail COPACE en 2007 qui indiquait une situation de surexploitation de l’ensemble de deux espèces de merlu, recommande ” de geler l’effort de pêche orienté sur le merlu noir à son niveau de 2006 et de plafonner les captures pour qu’elles n’excèdent pas 7000 tonnes.” (p. 11)*
8. *”L’effort en nombre de jours de mer de la pêche artisanale et ses captures sont très variables (Fig.5.5.3.). A partir de 2005, une tendance à la baisse de l’effort est perceptible passant de 180000 jours de mer en 2005 à 120000 en 2007. Les captures quant à elles enregistrent une forte baisse entre 2006 (.8000 t) et 2007 (4000 t). Cette variabilité qui pourrait être liée à une instabilité d’une ressource surexploitée depuis plusieurs décennies mais pourrait aussi imputable à des erreurs d’estimation de ces indicateurs.” (p. 13)*
9. *”Le CSC rappelle que la recommandation d’une diminution globale de 30 % concerne l’effort de pêche effectif et non l’effort nominal.” (p. 14)*
10. *”Le CSC rappelle que la recommandation d’une diminution globale de 30 % concerne l’effort de pêche effectif et non l’effort nominal. De nombreuses causes peuvent potentiellement induire un accroissement des puissances de pêche moyennes par navire : maintien des navires les plus performants, augmentation du nombre d’heures ou de jours de pêche annuels par navires, progrès technologique, concentration de l’effort sur les périodes/saisons les plus favorables, etc. Ainsi, la simple régulation du nombre de navires pourrait s’avérer insuffisante pour réduire significativement l’effort effectif.” (p. 14)*
11. *”Trachurus trachurus La biomasse actuelle estimée est d’environ les deux tiers de la biomasse B0.1 et le niveau d’effort de pêche excède de 31 % celui qui maintient le stock au niveau d’équilibre. L’effort actuel est supérieur à l’effort permettant la maximisation de la production soutenable (FMSY) ($F_{cur}/FMSY = 167\%$). Ces résultats mettent en évidence que le stock est surexploité.” (p. 17)*

11.2.3 Gascuel et al. (2007)

Reconstructed catches in the Mauritanian EEZ. Pages 105 - 119 of: Zeller, D., & D., Pauly (eds), Reconstruction of marine fisheries catches for key countries and regions (1950-2005), vol. Fisheries Centre Research Reports

Online available at:

<http://www.seaaroundus.org/doc/CatchReconstruction/EEZ/Mauritania-Gascuel-2007.pdf>

Database reference: R-Gascuel-2007-ReconstructedCatchesMauritania

1. *”For the more recent years, artisanal demersal catches are estimated around 60,000 t·year⁻¹ (80,000 t·year⁻¹ including pelagic fishes). Thus, demersal fisheries, in particularly the artisanal fishery, appears much more important than usually considered.” (p. 105)*
2. *”The demersal fishery is overwhelmingly dominated by the industrial fishery and developed in the 1960s.” (p. 105)*
3. *”Initiated in 1982, and since 1985 on a more regular basis, IMROP undertakes periodic surveys, usually twice a year, to estimate the total number of pirogues operating in Mauritanian [...]. Monthly surveys, recording catches by gear in the main landing locations (Nouakchott and Nouadhibou), began in the 1980s, but did not cover all fisheries, and were not published for every year. Two periods seem to be correctly covered, allowing for estimation of total artisanal catches: 1980-1987 (Josse and Garcia, 1986; Josse, 1989), and 1997-2005 (Gas-*

cuel et al., in press). Based on these data, a mean annual catch per pirogue was estimated [...]. The observed increase in catch rate, from around 18 t-year⁻¹ in 1982 to 25 t-year⁻¹ in 2002, suggests a strong increase in fishing efficiency, which over-compensated for the decrease in resource biomass. Catches for the 1988-1996 intermediate period were estimated as the product of the pirogues number by the mean yearly catch per pirogue." (p. 106)

4. "The demersal fisheries have increased substantially over the last few decades, but few studies have been conducted that estimate and describe catches and fishing effort on a long term basis (Chavance, 2004). In such cases, statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) are rarely applicable or appropriate. Indeed, a major part of the fishery is undertaken by foreign countries, which normally declare their catches as being taken in FAO sub-areas 'Sahara coastal' and 'Cape Verde costal', which cover much more than the Mauritanian EEZ. As a consequence, neither the catches by area, nor the catches by country (especially for Mauritania) identify the Mauritanian EEZ as source of origin." (p. 106)
5. "Industrial catch statistics, based on logbooks declarations, underestimated total catches for two reasons. First, catches reported by vessels from each license type are almost exclusively comprised of target species or species groups, but report no or very little by-catch. For demersal fisheries, this is incorrect. For example, the shrimp fishery declares by-catch as low as 15 % of their total landings, whereas realistic values should be greater than 70-80 %. Secondly, it is well known that some targeted catches are not reported to the IMROP database. For example, some IMROP surveys show that Dutch vessels may report more catches to their government than to the Mauritanian statistical system (Taleb Sidi, unpublished data)." (p. 109)
6. "Regarding the industrial demersal fishery, catches for the 1950s and early 1960s were likely limited. This fishery developed in the late 1960s with Japanese vessels targeting octopus beginning in 1966. These boats were nationalized in the late 1970s, and replaced by Korean, and more recently, Chinese vessels in the form of joint agreements. Foreign vessels, mainly Spanish, also targeted cephalopods in the 1970s before the 'Nouvelle Politique des Pêches', and more recently according to the agreements signed in 1996, 2001 and 2006 between Mauritania and the EU. During the entire time period, foreign boats were also authorized for particular fishing such as those targeting hake, pink spiny lobster and shrimps. Total reported landings, half of which were cephalopods, remained around 80-100,000 t-year⁻¹ during the 1970s and 1980s, but have decreased during the last fifteen years to approximately 60,000 t-year⁻¹ [...]." (p. 111)
7. "Taking into account the importance of each license type suggests that around 50,000 t-year⁻¹ of by-catches, including nearly 40,000 t-year⁻¹ of demersals, are not reported. This means that almost half of demersal fish and around 30 % of molluscs and hake are missing from the industrial reports. Thus, taking all taxa combined, we estimate that catches reported by the demersal industrial fishery have to be multiplied by a factor of 1.7 to take into account unreported by-catch. Regarding pelagic fish by-catch due to the demersal fishery appears rather negligible compared to total landings. In that case, misreporting comes from the industrial pelagic fishery itself. Indeed, results suggest that unreported catch by licensed boats might constitute more than 35 % of the reported catch, resulting in several hundred thousand tons of unreported catch per year [...]." (p. 112)
8. "Having established that demersal resources are important, we must then deal with the fact that these resources suffer from tremendous overexploitation. The industrial demersal fisheries developed in the late 1960s, mainly targeting octopus, whose abundance increased at that time, probably due to the previous overexploitation of bottom fish, notably porgies (family Sparidae). Since then, total demersal catches have remained around 180,000 t-year⁻¹, albeit with a huge increase of fishing effort. For instance, the number of industrial trawlers grew from around 150 in the early 1980s to 300-350 in the late 1990s/early 2000s. Given that

their fishing efficiency has also increased, this further increases the effective effort. In the process, various species groups have been successively exploited, then overexploited. This was probably the case for several fishes belonging to the Sparidae community in the 1960s and 1970s; octopus is overexploited since the mid 1980s (Gilly and Maucorps, 1987; Chassot et al., in press), which induced a decrease in cephalopods landings from a maximum of 55,000 t-year⁻¹ to presently about 35,000 t-year⁻¹; and coastal fishes of the Scianidae community reached their maximum in the 1990s and are now decreasing, too. At the present, it is mullets and shrimps that are on target for overexploitation. Overall, the biomass of demersal resources has been substantially depleted: at present it is about 25% of what it was in 1982, when regular trawl surveys began (Gascuel et al., in review). This corresponds to a loss of 20,000 t-year⁻¹. Moreover, the biomass of top predators has been reduced by a factor of 8 to 10, and of up to 20 for the most affected species. The mean trophic level of the catch, and its biodiversity decreased, inducing a higher sensitivity to the effects of climate change (Gascuel et al., in review)". (p. 116)

9. *"Foreign countries have to pay for licenses or fishing agreements, for example resulting in presently about 30 % of Mauritanian public receipts coming from the EU."* (p. 116)

Reports

11.2.4 ACP/EC (2000)

Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States on the one part, and the European Community and its members states, of the other part, signed in Cotonou, Benin on 23 June 2000

Online available at: <http://www.acpsec.org/en/conventions/cotonou/accord1.htm>

Database reference: OP-ACP-EC-Cotonou-Agreement

1. *"If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Parties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, it shall, except in cases of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. To this end, it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the situation.[...]"* (Article 96)

11.2.5 Blanc 2007

Rapport final de l'assistance technique du sous programme Guinee, Senegal et Mauritanie. Tech. rept. Global Fisheries Consortium.

Online available at:

<http://www.sfp-acp.eu/sites/all/files/projects/technicalpapers/TP043.pdf>

Database reference: R-2007-Blanc-Assistance-Technic

1. *"Les autorités compétentes sont les structures suivantes : [...]En Mauritanie : Pour la commission, l'autorité compétente est le Département de Valorisation et de l'Inspection Sanitaire (DVIS) sous la tutelle de l'Institut Mauritanien de Recherche Océanographique et des Pêches (IMROP)/ Ministère de la Pêche. Cependant l'autorité compétente devrait*

changer de tutelle, pour être un service à part dépendant directement du Ministre. Le projet de création d'un office national de l'Inspection Sanitaire de la pêche et de l'aquaculture (ONISPA) est en cours.” (p. 2)

11.2.6 Pechecops/CAPE (2001)

A New Mauritania-European Union Fisheries Agreement Protocol
Overexploitation of Mauritania's Cephalopods is up for Auction

Online available at: http://www.monachus-guardian.org/library/pech_CFFA01.pdf

Database reference: WA-CAPE-2001-Mauritania-Cephalopods

1. *"The European Commission justifies this increase by citing the "departure of the Asian vessels" that targeted those stocks. These vessels, imported by Mauritanian ship-owners with credit facilities provided by China, were returned in 1999 to their suppliers because the ship-owners had failed to honour their commitments. Their catches had dwindled due to the overexploitation of the cephalopod and coastal demersal stocks. What then is the scientific basis for the Commission to claim that "fishing opportunities" have arisen thanks to this "departure"?" (p. 1)*
2. *"As early as 1995, when these boats of Asian origin were operating in the Mauritanian zone, the CNROP were already warning that there was overcapacity for octopus. At the time the EU was one of the most important sources of finance to Mauritania, and was strongly urging a decrease in fishing effort on octopus and a reduction in the catch of juveniles. This was even made a condition for granting some of the monies agreed for STABEX funding. It is true that at the time the agreement between Mauritania and the EU did not cover access to cephalopods [...]" (p. 1-2)*
3. *"On the basis of past figures, the average catch rate of a European cephalopod boat is about 800 tonnes, of which almost 60 % is made up of octopus. This has been used to give a potential catch of 44,000 tonnes for the 55 vessels specified in the new protocol to the agreement, of which 26,000 tonnes are octopus." (p. 2)*
4. *"According to the CNROP's 1998 Working Group, the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for octopus is 35,000 tonnes. The optimum economic yield is known to be below the MSY and that the closer one gets to this figure the less profitable the fishing activity becomes. It is generally recommended that a figure of 70 % of MSY be used, implying, in this context, about 24,500 tonnes of octopus." (p. 2)*
5. *"The very survival of the Mauritanian national sector directly depends on the octopus stocks. In 1993, with around 400 pirogues, Mauritania's artisanal fishery sector alone landed nearly 8,100 tonnes of octopus. Today, more than 1,500 boats engage in octopus fishing, which is triple the 1993 catching capacity! Today, due to the octopus's demise, this fleet lands less than 3,000 tonnes of octopus: about one third of the catch taken by 400 pirogues in 1993!" (p. 2)*
6. *"In addition to the artisanal fishery, Mauritania's cephalopod fleet includes more than a hundred trawling units with a catching capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 tonnes per annum. Extrapolating only from the 1993 artisanal catch to estimate the capacity of the current artisanal fleet, one would arrive at a figure of between 23,000 and 28,000 tonnes! Given the overcapacity in the octopus fishery, particularly of the European fleet, most of the Mauritanian fishing industry (boats, processing factories etc) are at a standstill. Consequently, octopus exports have dropped by more than 50 % since 1993!" (p. 2)*
7. *"the FNP(Fédération Nationale de Pêche) of Mauritania had sent an official statement to*

Brussels. This recognised that "the large-scale introduction of the EU's demersal fishing vessels in 1996 had plunged this national fishing sector into an unprecedented crisis." The FNP had therefore requested that cephalopod fishing be exclusively reserved for the national fleet from then on, and for the other types of fishing activities a fishing zone of at least 6 nautical miles be established." (p. 2-3)

8. "An EU press release states that "the fishing zone in which EU vessels are authorised has been moved further off the Mauritania's coastline so as to provide better protection for the local boats involved in local small-scale fisheries". But the "local small-scale fishery" depends mainly on the octopus and the new zoning scheme does not meet with its demands to put a stop to the access provided for octopus." (p. 3)
9. "In spite of the new zoning, the new protocol of the agreement allows European fishing vessels to operate in the same fishing zone as the Mauritanian cephalopod vessels: from outside of 9 miles from the base line North of Cape Timiris; to outside 6 miles in the South. The reality is that, given current returns and thanks to strong political and financial support, it is only the European vessels that can continue their operations. Mauritania's fishermen are thus being gradually eliminated." (p. 3)
10. "By signing this protocol, Mauritania risks compromising the long-term potential of the sector. This will reduce the rent the sector provides to financial compensation alone. Experts have estimated that, given good stock management, the rent generated could be 100 million dollars annually for cephalopods alone!" (p. 3)
11. "The subsidies allocated by the EU to maintain a fleet that would not otherwise be profitable (given the depletion of the resource) also represent a waste of European public funds." (p. 3)
12. "It is important to remember that this fleet of European cephalopod trawlers has suffered quite a few setbacks in recent times, notably due to the non-renewal (announced in 1995!) of the EUMorocco agreement. The additional demands of European ship-owners are not linked to new fishing opportunities in Mauritania but to the loss of the opportunities they enjoyed in Morocco." (p. 3)
13. "Lastly, a financial package has been earmarked for the artisanal fisheries sector. But is that what the sector really needs? In fact, thanks to BADE (African Development Bank) and AFD (French Development Agency), this sub sector is already over-funded!" (p. 3)

11.2.7 Pechecops/CAPE (2006)

CAPE (Coalition pour des Accords de Pêche Equitables) and Pechecops (Pour une Pêche Ecologique génératrice de Progrès social),
Mauritania EU Fisheries Partnership Agreement: What impacts on fisheries sustainable development in Mauritania?

Online available at:

<http://www.cape-cffa.org/spip.php?article95>

Database reference: WA-CAPE-2006-FPA-Mauritania

1. "While Mauritania is rich in a wide variety of fish resources, some stocks are either heavily overexploited (e.g. octopus) or fully exploited (e.g. coastal shrimp). For pelagic species (tuna and small pelagics), where distribution is regional, a precautionary approach is recommended for determining the level of fishing effort, given the uncertainty about stock levels." (p. 3)
2. "In 2004, the Société Mauritanienne de Commercialisation du Poisson (SMCP - The Mau-

ritanian Fish Trading Company), which is responsible for marketing all frozen demersal fish and cephalopods landed by the national fleet, exported almost 40,000 tons of fish for a total value of 119 million euros. Octopus itself accounted for 51.2 % of the total tonnage exported with a value of almost 98 million euros, equating to 82 % of the total turnover of the SMCP.” (p. 3)

3. “In 2004, European cephalopod trawlers accounted for 33 % of the turnover achieved under fisheries agreements (compared to 38 % for small pelagics fishing and 16 % for shrimp fishing)”. (p. 3)
4. “In the early 1990s, when small-scale octopus fishing was undergoing rapid expansion, there was a massive influx of boats of Chinese origin as part of a fleet renewal programme undertaken. This was despite warnings from the National Centre of Oceanographic Research and Fisheries (CNROP) and the FAO about the level of stocks and the fact that they could not sustain such pressure. Today, the majority of the 125 boats making up the national industrial fleet are these boats of Chinese origin. The arrival of cephalopod trawlers from the EU between 1994 and 1996 therefore had the effect of accelerating the collapse of stocks and profitability.” (p. 3)
5. “Today, the IMROP working group [...] estimates that there is an excessive capacity of 31 % in the octopus fishery, which is the cause of a 20 % loss in production.” (p. 3)
6. “[...]Because of the poor selectivity of this fishing gear, trawling for octopus takes a 60 % by-catch, made up notably of juveniles of other species. [...]Moreover, a large number of juvenile octopus are caught, which is a sign that stocks are over-exploited.” (p. 4)
7. “[...]based on the scientific advice of CECAF (Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries), a regulation was adopted by the EU in 2006, relating to the minimum size of octopus coming from the CECAF zone, which includes Mauritania. The regulatory minimum weight for eviscerated octopus fished in this zone must be 450 gr.” (p. 4)
8. “The financial support for “restructuring the Mauritanian industrial fleet” which is included in the wording of the agreement and which should see Mauritania’s cephalopod trawlers converted for pelagic fishing, thereby reducing the fishing effort, is complete fantasy. A recent study commissioned by the Mauritanian government, concluded that in practice such a conversion was technically and economically impossible.” (p. 5)
9. “The position of Mauritania’s small-scale fishermen, and shared by their Senegalese and Guinean colleagues, is very clear on this issue: “The use of non-selective equipment and equipment that has a negative impact on the environment should be banned”. (p. 6)
10. “[...]it is important to take into account the regional aspect of the fishery, where certain interactions may be possible between this fleet and the Senegalese artisanal small pelagic fishery (based in Joal, M’bour, Saint Louis in Senegal as well as Ndiago in Mauritania). In total, between 500,000 and 600,000 tons are caught each year in Mauritania’s EEZ, these being primarily horse mackerel and round sardinella.” (p. 6)
11. “The new agreement restricts the number of European boats authorised to fish simultaneously to 22. Its important to note that while this number is an increase on the last agreement (where the number was 15), it now covers the fleets of new EU members such as Lithuania, which in the past were already present in the area, but not under the fisheries agreement. The total catch permitted is limited to 440,000 tons per year.” (p. 7)
12. “[...]given the importance of small-scale catches for food security, notably in Senegal where sardinella is the “fish of the poor”. (p. 7)

13. "[...]a freeze on the capacities of small-scale fishing for octopus has been in place since 1998, while that of European cephalopod fishing has in fact increased by 30 % since the agreement signed in 2001." (p. 9)
14. "The fact that the EU is in direct competition with this artisanal fishery, and that through the management of the financial compensation, it is now a player in the decision taking process on Mauritania's fisheries policies, could represent a danger for the small-scale sector. Given the depleted state of resources, there is a fear that the EU may wish to restrict - "control" as stipulated in the terms of the agreement - the development of Mauritanian small-scale fisheries in order to guarantee its own access to overexploited resources." (p. 9)
15. "Another positive feature is the fact that the Joint Scientific Committee has to meet once per year and is open to scientists from other countries. In the previous agreement, the operational aspect of the Joint Scientific Committee was far from satisfactory. Meetings were too few and far between, and were called at the last minute; opinions were only partially, if at all, taken into account by the Joint Committee." (p. 10)
16. "[...]the port of Las Palmas (Canary Islands), which serves as an entry port for fish coming from illegal activities throughout the West African zone." (p. 11)
17. "As regards boats fishing under the agreement, recent years have seen numerous problems connected with the arrest of European boats accused of false catch declarations and large catches of juveniles, notably octopus. Better administrative cooperation and the provision stipulating that "following a request from the Surveillance authorities, the captain must bring his or her vessel into Nouadhibou port" are among the measures designed to improve the situation." (p. 11)

11.2.8 Pechecops/CAPE (2008)

CAPE (Coalition pour des Accords de Pêche Equitables) and Pechecops (Pour une Pêche Ecologique génératrice de Progrès social),
Denouncing the EU-Mauritania Fisheries Agreement protocol: Putting the "Fisheries Partnership" to the test

Online available at:

http://www.caffa.org/IMG/pdf/CFFA_PECHECOPS_denunciation_agreement_mauritania_7jan2008.pdf

Database reference: WA-CAPE-2008-FPA-Mauritania

1. "The European Commission proposes to denounce the EU - fisheries agreement protocol before end of January 2008. The method is brutal; true partnerships are built up through dialogue, not ultimatums." (p. 1)
2. "Recently, twenty Spanish boats fishing for octopus in Mauritanian waters decided to stop their activities there due to the declining profitability. It's worth recalling that since the arrival of the European fleet in 1995, the octopus stock has been subjected to a 30 to 40 % excess in fishing effort." (p. 1)
3. "Some months ago, a report from FAO sounded another alarm bell. This time for one of the West African small pelagic stocks: the round sardinella, a resource vital for the West African artisanal fishing sector and targeted by EU "super trawlers" fishing under the EU - Mauritanian agreement, is showing signs of over exploitation." (p. 1)
4. "Since 1999, together with artisanal fishing representatives from the Mauritanian National Fisheries Federation (FNP), Pechecops and CFFA have regularly warned that maintaining

the fishing pressure on these stocks would result in profitability losses, for both the national and foreign fleets that exploit them. In Mauritania, this loss of profitability is reflected in the erosion of the Mauritanian fleet's capacity to contribute to the national economy. Fisheries contribute 25 % of Mauritania's budgetary receipts, but most of these come from the EU fisheries agreement financial compensation." (p. 1)

5. *"According to Dr Ahmed Mahmoud Cherif, president of Pêchecops: 'This increased financial dependency towards the single European partner bears risks, and the pressure put on the authorities by the EU's denouncement of the agreement shouldn't distract the Mauritanian government from its priority: to put an end to over exploitation of its resources, through adjusting fishing capacity with the resources available, as has been recommended during the Etats Generaux du secteur de la Pêche' meeting, held in Nouadhibou from 14th to 18th December 2007."* (p. 1-2)
6. *"For Sid'ahmed Ould Abeid, President of the FNP's artisanal section, 'The precautionary approach must be the guiding principle. A partnership agreement with the EU shouldn't allow European fleets to access over exploited stocks, and shouldn't allow access for fishing vessels that either use unselective fishing gears or methods that may impact negatively on the environment."* (p. 2)
7. *"The European Union bears co-responsibility for Mauritanian fisheries resource depletion. It cannot turn a blind eye to these proposals and wash its hands of its commitment to support, in a substantial way, the sustainable development of fisheries in Mauritania."* (p. 2)

11.2.9 CTA (2006)

The future of ACP-EU fisheries relations: Towards more sustainability and improved social and economic well being for ACP coastal communities

Online available at:

http://www.anancy.net/documents/file_en/Version%20ANG.pdf

Database reference: R-2006-CTA-ACP-EU-fisheries-relations

1. *"Anticipating the UN Law of the Sea Convention, in the mid-1970s, an increasing number of coastal states established Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) by extending their jurisdiction out to sea from 3-12 to 200 nautical miles. This brought almost 90 % of the world's exploitable fishery resources under the control of coastal states."* (p. 4)
2. *"Information on the activities of these other foreign fleets is often scarce and/or incomplete. This could be a major obstacle to change in ACP-EU fisheries relations. The European Commission rightly stresses the importance of non-discriminatory treatment between European fleets and other foreign fleets plying ACP waters: any change applied to EU fleets must also be applied to other distant-water fishing fleets - not necessarily a straightforward matter. This 'non-discriminatory treatment' requirement may also have side benefits for sustainable fishing. Any change in a fisheries agreement, for example, could set a precedent, prompting the ACP country concerned to introduce a general measure. In the most recent negotiations, the EU and the Republic of Guinea reached agreement to remove European trawlers from the 12-mile zone in order to protect the vulnerable coastal ecosystem and small-scale fishing activities, on condition that the measure was applied indiscriminately to all trawlers fishing Guinean waters¹¹."* (p. 5-6)
3. *"An IFREMER (Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer) cost-benefit study of EU fisheries agreements (1999) identified the EU's main reasons for entering into these agreements with ACP countries, which include:*
 - *securing access to ACP fishery products as a "raw material". Growing EU market demand*

combined with diminishing and over-exploited resources means that the EU processing industry requires everincreasing volumes of raw material;

-The study estimates that EU-ACP fishing agreements have generated value added of EUR 694 m in EU member states through processing and marketing of fish caught in ACP waters by EU vessels. Consequently, each euro invested as community financial compensation generates a turnover of approximately EUR 3 in the EU.

- The ACP-EU fisheries agreements represent 35,000 direct and indirect jobs in the EU (mainly in processing). The number of jobs for EU nationals provided by the ACP agreements should diminish if the EU keeps to its pledge on increasingly employing local ACP labour.” (p. 7)

4. *”While access to the European market for ACP fishery products is not constrained by tariff barriers, other limiting factors are increasing. ACP fish exporters have to meet increasingly stringent health, hygiene and quality control standards. These form a complex body of rules and regulations which ACP fish and fishery product exporters find it difficult to get on top of. So, the European Commission says, for example, that: ’To be authorised to export fishery products to the EU, the third country’s public health legislation and controls applied to the fisheries sector must be of an equivalent standard to that provided by EU legislation’.” (p. 16)*

11.2.10 Cullberg & Lövin (2009)

To draw the line: EU fisheries agreements in West Africa, Swedish Society for Nature Conservation

Online available at:

<http://www.naturskyddsforeningen.se/upload/Foreningsdokument/Rapporter/engelska/To%20draw%20the%20line.pdf>

Database reference: R-2008-Cullberg-DrawTheLine

1. *”In the EU agreement it says that artisanal fisheries should receive some of the money, but we have never seen any money from the protocol. Can you see a hospital here? Did you know that we can only go out to sea on two days out of every seven, because the sea is so dangerous? Where are the cold storages along the coast? Where are the transport facilities?” (p. 9)*
2. *”We are completely against Mauritania having an agreement with the EU for fishing octopus! It is strategically important for the small-scale fisheries which employ 25 000 people. Besides, we have much less destructive fishing methods than the EU boats and we don’t have any discard.” (p. 16)*
3. *”The reform of the CFP in 2002 resulted in considerable changes, not least for external fisheries. Until then, operators could receive subsidies to build new vessels; this was phased out after 2002. Subsidies were also available for vessels to change flags or to move to distant waters; these subsidies were also phased out. Before 2002, the number of EU vessels in the external fleet was increasing but since 2002, both the internal and external fleets have decreased in numbers.” (p. 16)*
4. *”Before the creation of the EEZs, fishing in the ocean outside of each country’s territorial waters (12 nautical miles from land) was free for all. European fishers, in particular from Spain, Portugal and France, have long fished in foreign waters, including those off West Africa. They were present during the colonial period, and have continued fishing ever since. The development of the economic zones was forced during the 1970s as a way to control fisheries and to generate new incomes. The requirement to allow fishing rights in the economic zones to other countries came in to being as a compromise when the fisheries that were previously free were closed for foreign vessels.” (p. 19)*

5. " - It could be better. In 2006, the Europeans insisted on lowering the financial contribution, but the truth is that they do not have anywhere else to fish. I wish that the agreement could generate more investment in Mauritania. We have the fish, that's not a problem. My attitude is that the fish in Mauritania's waters belong to everyone in the world. Our task is to manage the resource in the best possible way." (p. 41)
6. " - I came to this post in August 2008 and I want to invite the European Commission to work with us in ensuring that these funds are used in ways that are beneficial to the fisheries sector, down to the very last cent. I want full transparency; everything should be handled as openly as in a Swedish government ministry! In reality, we could do whatever we want with the money, but we now want to be completely open with you. I am still waiting for a response from the Commission. Let's hope that the EU can be as open as Mauritania!" (p. 41)
7. " - [...]But let us differentiate once and for all between political and economic development. People are calling for more democracy everywhere, but what we need is economic development!" (p. 41)

11.2.11 (Doherty, 2010)

The Importance of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures to Fisheries Negotiations in Economic Partnership Agreements: Issue Paper No. 7. Geneva.

Online available at:

<http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/03/the-importance-of-sps-to-fisheries-negotiations-in-epas.pdf>

Database reference: R-2010-Doherty-SanitaryFisheryAgreements

1. "The scope and requirements of food safety measures are increasingly replacing tariff barriers as the main concern of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries seeking to export to the EU. The ACP countries are beneficiaries of preferential access to the EU market under the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). However, the increasing coverage and sophistication of many SPS measures are preventing ACP countries from benefiting from the full potential advantage of the Agreement." (p. 1)
2. "The greater presence of SPS issues on the international trade scene has been driven by the increasing awareness and concern for food safety among European consumers, particularly relating to the presence of chemical residues and various carcinogenic additives in food. This has been exacerbated by repeated 'food alarms' and, to a certain extent, by the resultant EC action to tighten and harmonise an EU food safety regime that had been developed in a piecemeal fashion over forty years. This has resulted in attention being focused on the entire food chain, from primary source to final consumer. With this streamlining, a greater emphasis has been placed on assessing the effectiveness of the legislation, enforcement agencies and technical support services of third countries seeking to export to the EU." (p. 2)
3. "However, it is also worth noting that throughout the developing world, a major cost in HACCP relates to the employment of foreign consultants for the basic design and implementation stages of HACCP systems. Consequently, for similar work undertaken in Africa, Europe or the United States, that which is carried out in Africa is often more expensive. When relative spending power is considered, the cost to businesses in Africa becomes even more expensive." (p. 9)
4. "The European Commission's Directorate General for Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO) is responsible for food safety in the EU. This responsibility is largely carried out through SANCO's executive arm, the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). The main legisla-

tion affecting fish dates from 1991, but since then there have been a series of complementary Directives that introduce stricter requirements. Alongside the tightening of its food safety legislation, the EU now requires the adoption by exporting countries of agreed inspection, examination and certification procedures. Seafood production in such countries has to match EU standards in terms of hygiene and food safety.” (p. 14)

5. *”These differences in interpretation have given rise to a feeling in some ACP countries that in seeking to ensure correct application of the regulations, some FVO inspectors may be seeking systems that reflect practices in the EU model rather than recognising the concept of equivalence in output.”* (p. 14)
6. *”EU requirements are enforced and regulated at the country level. This involves a two-tier approach:*
 - *A country has to be licensed to export fish to the EU;*
 - *Each individual exporting company has to apply to a Competent Authority (CA) within the particular country for permission to export.*

(p. 14)

7. *”The costs of meeting SPS requirements are high not only in terms of initial outlay but also for day to day monitoring and administration. Unnecessarily high costs to carry out remedial action can make the difference between viability and going out of business.”* (p. 16)

11.2.12 Fisheries (unknown)

Fact Sheet Fisheries Partnership Agreements

Online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/fisheries_partnership_agreements_en.pdf

Database reference: R-factsheet-FPAs

1. *”The 2002 reform of the CFP introduced the concept of ‘partnership’, to emphasise the EU’s intention to support the development of the national fisheries sector in its partner countries. As a result, since 2004 they have been known as Fisheries partnership agreements (FPAs).”* (p. 1)

FoodandVeterinaryOffice (2006) Extract from a report on a FVO Mission to Mauritania from 9 to 16 December 2006 in order to evaluate public health monitoring and the conditions for the production and export of fishery products to the European Union, European Commission Health and Consumer Protection DG - DG(SANCO)/8238/2006 - RS EN

Online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_id=1735

Database reference: R-2006-FVO-Report

1. *”However, in view of the products which are exported (fresh products exported on ice by air, fish and cephalopods frozen without any major processing, few species of fish which are associated with high levels of histidine), it is unlikely that the fishery products exported from Mauritania present an immediate and grave risk for the health of European consumers. However, there is a medium and long-term public health risk as a result of the shortcomings observed during the inspection and, in particular, the absence of monitoring of environmental contaminants in fishery products combined with the large quantities of cephalopods Mauritania exports to the EU.”* (p. 2)

11.2.13 Ifremer (1999)

Evaluation of fishing agreements concluded by the European Community: Final Report: European Contract N97/S 240-152919.10.12.1997

Online available at: www.accordsdepeche.com/fichiers/docs/bibli_05/05-0002.doc

Database reference: R-1999-Ifremer-Evaluation-Fisheryagreements

11.2.14 Josupeit (2008)

World Octopus Market. 94 edn. FAO, Globefish Research Programme. Rome

Online available at: not available Database reference: not available

1. *"Export figures are less accurate than the import figures for Octopus."* (p. 1)
2. *"Octopus resources, especially in the Eastern Central Atlantic are overexploited and national authorities have taken draconic steps for the protection of the species."* (p. 3)
3. *"All indications go for an overexploitation of the existing octopus resources."* (p.16)
4. *"The access to the Mauritanian octopus resource is distributed between the artisanal fishermen (pot fishing), national industrial fisheries (by trawlers donated in the early nineties by Chinese Development Assistance) and 43 EU trawlers under the 2006-2012 fishing agreement. The catches by each of these categories are up to estimates, from the published and grey material available, the author would estimate the artisanal octopus fisheries around 7,500 tonnes, the industrial at about 10,000 tonnes and the EU trawlers at about 12,000 tonnes"* (p. 16-17)
5. *"Octopus export earnings are important for the Mauritanian industry."* (p. 17)
6. *"Mauritanian octopus statistics are thus difficult to interpret. Official trade statistics talk about 14,400 tonnes of export in 2005, while the sum of all imports of octopus from Mauritania during the same year was 29,400 tonnes. 2006 statistics show a 10 % decline in exports to 27,000 tonnes."* (p. 17)
7. *"Octopus export earnings are important for the Mauritanian industry. Total export earnings in 2005, the last year for which complete export statistics are available, exceeded US \$ 170 million. Total foreign exchange earnings of the Mauritanian industry were US \$ 980 million, thus octopus accounted for about 18 % of total import earnings. However, back in 1995, the share of octopus was much more important at 32 % of total foreign exchange earnings."* (p. 17)
8. *"While the official Mauritanian catch and trade statistics, as reported to FAO, almost balance (see table below) the statistics reported by each importing country, when compared to catches show a difference of over 10,000 tonnes. Probably this difference is represented by catches from foreign fleets (mainly Spanish vessels) landed in Mauritanian harbours and then exported oversea."* (p. 18)
9. *"Mauritania accounts for Morocco is the main partner for octopus supply in the Spanish market, shipping about 20,000 tonnes per year. Only in 2004, when catches were practically stopped, exports from this country had dropped to 14,300 tonnes. Mauritania is a distant second, but exports have expanded in recent years."* (p. 44)

Lesourd (2009) Révision des statuts de pêche dans le cadre des futures interventions du module 1 pour certains pays ACP/OCT francophones bénéficiaires du programme SFP Mission CA040GEN du 29 Juillet au 25 Septembre, 2009.

Online available at: <http://www.sfp-acp.eu/en/category/regionscountries/africa/mauritania>
Database reference: R-2009-Lesourd-RevisionStatusPeches

1. "1.1 La Mauritanie fait partie de la liste des pays en provenance desquels les importations de produits de la pêche sont autorisées : [...]
1.2 La liste des établissements autorisés à exporter les produits de la pêche vers l'Union Européenne est publié sur le site officiel de la DG SANCO. La liste officielle a été validée le 04/08/2008 et est application depuis le 22/07/2008.
1.3 Cette liste mentionne le nombre d'établissements agréés : 44 établissements de transformation des poissons et produits de la pêche ainsi que 85 navires-congélateurs. [...]
1.4 L'OAV a effectuée 2 missions en Mauritanie. Ces missions datent respectivement de mars/avril 2004 et de décembre 2006. [...]" (Annexe 15, p. 100)

11.2.15 Martín (2010)

Fisheries in Mauritania and Fisheries Agreements with the EU

Online available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies>
Database reference: R-2010-Jesus-Iborra-Fisheries-Mauritania

1. "The Mauritanian waters are very rich in fishery resources due to nutrients carried by the Canary Current and cold water upwells." (p. 11)
2. "Fishing is very important to the Mauritanian economy in terms of its contribution to GDP, exports, income for the national budget and job creation. However, catches made by the Mauritanian fleet are very limited compared to those made by fleets from other countries, which have access to the fishery resources of the Mauritanian EEZ under signed fisheries agreements or fleet licences." (p. 11)
3. "This Agreement has developed from the 1987 Fisheries Agreement, through the 1996 Co-operation Agreement, to the 2006 Fisheries Partnership Agreement. In the process, aspects associated with the conservation of resources, contribution to development, implementation of a fisheries policy, scientific and technical assistance and business cooperation have been reinforced." (p. 12)
4. "The authorised fishing zones have gradually been moved further away from the coast to encourage the development of the small-scale fleet, with an exclusive zone being reserved for the latter and interactions with the industrial fleet being limited, and to reduce the fishing effort on octopus. Although the technical measures have gradually been clarified in the successive agreements, they are still a source of problems, resulting in discriminatory treatment for the European Union fleets." (p. 12)
5. "There are two species of hake: black hake (*Merluccius senegalensis*), which is the most important, and Benguela hake (*Merluccius polli*). Traditionally these have been fished by foreign vessels, although the Mauritanian fleet began to catch these in 1998. However, this segment has developed little.
Fishing for crustaceans began in the 1960s with Spanish trawlers. This fishery was left to the foreign vessels until, at the beginning of the 2000s, a shrimp fleet developed in Mauritania using vessels that had abandoned cephalopod fishing. [...]Fishing effort was reduced at the

beginning of the 1990s, but has since developed again, although it varies widely.

The arrival of the Japanese fleet in Mauritanian waters at the end of the 1960s marked the start of fishing for cephalopods. Since then, octopus has been the focus of demersal fishing activities.

With regard to the gear used, most of the catches in Mauritanian waters are made using seine nets and, to a lesser extent, pelagic trawls. The gear has changed in line with the development in catches of small and medium-sized pelagic species, with a peak at the beginning of the 1990s." (p. 26)

6. "Fishing is very important to the Mauritanian economy. It accounts for 10 % of GDP and between 35 % and 50 % of Mauritanian exports. It also provides 29 % of the income for the national budget. The bulk of the contribution to the Mauritanian budget comes from cephalopods (46 %), crustaceans (30 %) and small pelagic species (15 %). Other fisheries contribute to a lesser extent. This is the case with hake (7 %) and demersal species and tunas (2 %).

Fishing also generates around 45 000 direct and indirect jobs. This represents 36 % of the jobs in what are termed 'modern sectors'. It is estimated that 31 % of these jobs are generated by small-scale fishing, and 12 % by industrial fishing. Most of the jobs in the industrial sector are generated by foreign fleets. Jobs on land account for 54 %, with 3 % in other secondary activities.

The development of the fisheries sector is also hindered by the lack of finance and very high interest rates. This has led to a high level of debt in both the extractive activity and processing. At the same time, production facilities are frequently antiquated and some processing facilities are undersized. These factors prevent the industry complying with international standards for access to the markets.

Despite everything, the contribution of fishing to the national economy is decreasing, due to increasing costs and falling prices. [...] Only the Imraguen in the north and in N'Diogo in the south, close to the border with Senegal, have a fishing tradition. Given that the N'Diogo fishermen are prohibited from landing their catches in Saint Louis in Senegal, they are moving northwards.

Another important reason for the lack of development of fishing lies in the remoteness of Nouadhibou, which used to be the only landing point for the industrial fleet. As a result, the Mauritanian fisheries sector only began to develop in the 1980s." (p. 31-32)

7. "The fish processing industry is relatively undeveloped. There are around 80 processing facilities, mainly involved in storage and freezing. Out of these, 66 have been recognised as complying with European Union standards. However, the number of facilities currently in compliance and operational may be closer to something over 50. The installed freezing capacity is in the order of 700 tonnes/day. However, this is underused at around 30 %. The most recently constructed processing facilities turn out products with a high degree of preparation, such as tinned pilchards, mackerel and tuna, and prepared food. The pelagic trawlers produce some fish meal and oil." (p. 33)
8. "Although the intended management plans never came to fruition, cephalopods were excluded from the 1987 Fisheries Agreement with the European Communities. The reduction in fishing effort helped to improve the state of resources, and the rise in prices and the increasing use of pots led to a considerable increase in national catches. However, the cephalopod fleet was very old. China then exported several hundred cephalopod trawlers, creating a new scenario of fishing overcapacity." (p. 35)
9. "In October 1987 the European Community concluded a Fisheries Agreement with Mauritania. This Agreement was a continuation of the agreement concluded on 6 January 1984 between Portugal and Mauritania, which predated Portugal's accession to the EC in 1986 and which also applied to Spanish vessels permanently registered in Canary Island ports. The Agreement initially applied for a three-year period (from 1 August to 31 July) and could be renewed unless terminated. The terms of the Agreement were defined every three years

through protocols.” (p. 40)

10. *”On 20 June 1996 the European Community and Mauritania signed a Cooperation Agreement on sea fisheries for a period of five years. This differed from the previous agreement in that it formed part of the Euro-Mediterranean project, bearing in mind the spirit of cooperation resulting from the Lomé Convention.”* (p. 40)
11. *”In February 2008 the EU Fisheries Ministers rejected the option of terminating the Protocol and decided instead to renegotiate it. The European Parliament had also indicated that it was against termination, as it felt that this would pose a risk to the continuation of the Agreement and that the underuse of some fishing opportunities was partly the result of inadequate negotiation of the applicable Protocol.
[...]Between 2008 and July 2010, the categories in which the fishing opportunities were used to a reasonable degree were Category 5 (cephalopods), Category 1 (crustaceans other than crawfish and crab), Category 8 (pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners) and Category 9 (pelagic freezer trawlers). In other fishing categories, the fishing opportunities were used to a lesser degree. This was the case with black hake (Category 2) and demersal species other than black hake with gear other than trawls (Category 3).”* (p.46)
12. *”In addition, in 1996 two points were set for entering and leaving the fishing zones. These were 20° 40’ N - 17° 40’ W in the northern zone and 16° 20’ N - 16° 40’ W in the southern zone. All vessels except for tuna vessels and pelagic trawlers were to enter and leave the zone through these points, in the presence of the surveillance authority. It was anticipated that control operations should not take more than an hour for entries or more than three hours for exits.[...]Despite the clarity of the Protocol’s terms, the Mauritanian authorities use alternative methods to satellite monitoring or raise issues associated with the format of the position reports.
Transshipments should be carried out within the roadstead of the Mauritanian ports and should be notified to the surveillance authority. All transshipments are regarded as exits from the fishing zone.”* (p. 48)
13. *”At the proposal of Mauritania, the extension of the biological recovery period was included in the negotiation of the 2008 Fisheries Protocol at the last moment and was discussed outside the Joint Scientific Committee.[...]As a result, vessels that were fishing did not have to leave the fishing ground in September.* (p. 50)
14. *”In fishing for cephalopods (Category 5), the main problem lay in the minimum size of octopus. Mauritania had set a minimum weight of 500 grams, whereas in Senegal the minimum size was 350 grams and in Morocco 400 grams. The Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF) launched a study into whether a common minimum size of octopus should be set for the whole region. At the moment, a minimum size of 400 grams is applied, which is the size laid down in Mauritanian legislation.”* (p. 51)
15. *”The Joint Committee began to assume importance in 1990. It is responsible, inter alia, for studying the terms of business cooperation, the provisions on the employment of Mauritanian seamen and the possibility of transshipping catches for crustacean fishing vessels.
The 1996 Cooperation Agreement strengthened the Joint Committee to ensure that the Agreement was correctly applied.”* (p. 57-58)
16. *”The Joint Committee was to meet once a year, alternately in Mauritania and the Community. The possibility of holding extraordinary sessions at the request of either of the Contracting Parties was also stipulated. The issue of the boarding of Community vessels has become the focus of a large part of the Joint Committee’s discussions.”* (p. 58)
17. *”It is important to understand the context in which boardings of Community vessels occur in order to gain a proper overview of the problem. Firstly, the Mauritanian authority responsi-*

ble for boardings should be identified. [...]Its work includes applying the law on health and safety on vessels and participating in sea rescue operations.

It also carries out other functions beyond the sphere of fisheries control and maritime activities. In fact, in June 2010, a parliamentary debate was held on the activities of the DSPCM. [...]This function is important given the migration of sub-Saharan populations to the European Union via the Canary Islands. To fund its operations, the DSPCM uses 33 % of the amount stipulated in the EUMauritania Fisheries Partnership Agreement for the support of the fisheries sector. The person who heads the DSPCM (Cheikh Ould Ahmed) should also be noted, as his closeness to the President of the Republic gives him significant political influence.” (p. 60)

18. *”Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that Mauritanian legislation stipulates that part of the fines must be paid to the officials involved in the procedure. These bonuses increased from 7 % of the fines in 1989 to 18 % from 2009. For minor offences, fines are often in the order of five million ouguiya. This means that, for every fine for a minor offence, the officials involved receive around EUR 2 500. Given the standard of living in Mauritania, this system is lucrative and forms a powerful incentive to carry out boardings.” (p. 60)*
19. *”In recent years the total fines imposed by the DSPCM have ranged between 2 000 and 2 500 million ouguiya. Up to 2009, the amount received from these fines was distributed between the national budget (52 %), the maritime surveillance and promotion fund (10 %), the officials involved in the procedure (14 %), the illegal fishing and fraud fund (20 %) and the Ministry of Fisheries and the Marine Economy (4 %). Since Decree No 2009-053 entered into force, the share for the Ministry of Fisheries and the Marine Economy has disappeared, thus increasing the financial independence of the DSPCM, whereas the percentages for the illegal fishing and fraud fund (20 %) and for the officials involved in the procedure (18 %) have been increased.” (p. 61)*
20. *”According to the Protocol, following an inspection there should be an opportunity to comment on the inspection report. Shipowners frequently find themselves having to pay the fine, otherwise their vessels will be sent to port and detained, with higher fines then being imposed. In this case, the only option is to sign the inspection report and accept the fine imposed by the Settlement Committee.” (p. 61)*
21. *”In addition to their economic impact, these fines involve vessels being detained for around two days in port, resulting in the deterioration of their catch, as the procedure required to pay the fine involves a SWIFT bank transfer, the issue of a certificate by the Central Bank of Mauritania and its presentation to the Public Treasury and the DSPCM before the vessel can be released.
Otherwise, legal proceedings are brought, which tend to be extremely lengthy and involve costs associated with the lack of activity, operational costs, possible loss of catches and deterioration of the vessel. As this situation leaves shipowners without any practical defence, they find themselves having to settle the boardings by paying the fines, and can then return to fishing or at least take their catch to port.” (p. 62)*
22. *”The most important aspect in all this is the unjustified nature of most of the boardings, in which disproportionate fines are applied for minor documentary or procedural irregularities, where these even exist. [...]This problem is more common in Categories 5 (cephalopods) and 1 (crustaceans other than crawfish and crab). It also occurs in a large number of cases in Category 9 (pelagic trawlers). This problem has affected Italian, Latvian and Irish vessels. In another 20 % of the boardings, the reason invoked was fishing in a prohibited zone. This case is similar to the case of transmitting the vessel’s position. [...]The vessels involved in this type of incident were Italian, Spanish or Lithuanian flagged vessels, although a Dutch vessel and a Portuguese vessel were also boarded.
The other types of incident involved isolated cases. The description of the reasons for most of the incidents give credence to the allegations of harassment and unjustified boardings.” (p.*

62-63)

23. *"It is also interesting to compare the boardings carried out in 2010 with those in other years to understand the development of this problem. In quantitative terms, compared to the 70 boardings in the first nine months of 2010, in 2002 there were 34, 42 in 2003 and 29 in 2004. The increase in the number of boardings is therefore evident. In qualitative terms, bearing in mind the reasons for the boardings, the situation is also radically different. Compared to the reasons described above, 69 % of all boardings in the 2002-2004 period involved fishing for juveniles. Some 13 % of boardings were due to a failure to comply with the time-limits for reporting at the crossing point and only 8 % to issues connected with the daily fishing log. As a result, it must be concluded that the criteria have changed and that boardings are being carried out more on pretexts than on circumstances involving the conservation of resources."* (p. 63)

11.2.16 Milazzo (1998)

Subsidies in World Fisheries - A Reexamination, World Bank Technical Paper No. 406, The World Bank Washington D.C.

1. *"A second category of budget subsidies is assistance provided to fishing operations in the waters of other coastal states. This type of subsidy can assume many forms, but the most important type is the government-to-government payment."* (p. 36)
2. *"Essentially, foreign access payments are subsidies because governments, and not the fishing companies pay them."* (p. 36)
3. *"A good, recent example of how these agreements work is the fisheries access arrangement that the EU has negotiated with Mauritania. In June 1996, the EU signed a five-year fisheries access-for-trade agreement with Mauritania that lifted an EU embargo on fishery imports from that African nation in return of almost \$350 million, or \$70 million per year. Interestingly, the agreement permits an increase in EU access to Mauritanian waters, authorizes higher EU total harvests and, for the first time, specifically allows EU directed fishery for highly valued squid and octopus"* (p. 36-37)
4. *"In response to Mauritanian industry complaints that these arrangements will harm domestic fishermen, Mauritanian authorities are considering remedial measures, including tax exemptions and fuel subsidies."* (p. 37)

11.2.17 Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime MPEM (2005)

Ministère des Pêches et de Ministère l'Economie Maritime - MPEM, Direction de l'Amenagement des Ressources Halieutiques
Etude sur l'ajustement des capacités céphalopodières de pêche industrielle et possibilités de transfert vers d'autres segments

Main Article:

Online available at: http://www.accordsdepeche.com/fichiers/docs/bibli_07/484.pdf
Database reference: R-2005-MPEM-EtudeCephelopodiere

Appendix:

Online available at: http://www.accordsdepeche.com/fichiers/docs/bibli_07/480.pdf

Database reference: R-2005-MPEM-EtudeCephalopodiére-Appendix

11.2.18 Obaidullah & Osinga (2010)

How Africa is feeding Europe: EU (over)fishing in West Africa, Expedition Report West Africa Ship Tour, Greenpeace international

Online available at: <http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/eu-unit/press-centre/reports/stolen-fish-how-africa-feeds-europe.pdf>

Database reference: R-2010-Greenpeace-Africa-Ship-Tour

11.2.19 PNUE (2006)

Evaluation de l'impact de la libéralisation du commerce. Une étude de cas sur le secteur des pêches de la République Islamique de Mauritanie. (Pêche et Environnement, 5)

Online available at: http://www.unep.ch/etb/publications/Mauritanie_int.pdf

Database reference: R-PNUE-2006-SecteurPêcheMauritania

1. *"Toutes les ressources démersales ciblées par les navires nationaux et communautaires sont en situation de pleine exploitation ou de surexploitation."* (p. 3)
2. *"Ainsi, selon la méthode et les hypothèses retenues, la pêche artisanale mauritanienne produit annuellement (année de référence: 2000) de l'ordre de 80,000 t, avec un intervalle de confiance de plus ou moins 10,000 t compte tenu des incertitudes pesant sur les variables utilisées. Cette production totale est composée de 32% de pélagiques (sardinelles, courbine et mullet) et de 68% d'espèces démersales, dont 4,000 t de poulpe [...]. Avec 50,000 t, la zone Nord contribue à hauteur de 62% à la production nationale artisanale totale estimée (80,000 t), le PNBA, avec 1,600 t, à seulement 2% et la zone Sud, avec 28,000 t, à 35%."* (p. 70)
3. *"la pêche artisanale exploite une très grande diversité d'espèces, essentiellement démersales. Ceci est vrai aussi bien au Nord qu'au Sud de la Mauritanie. Néanmoins, si les profils de composition spécifique des captures sont proches entre les deux zones, certaines espèces ont préférentiellement exploitées dans la zone Nord (poulpe, tollo), alors que d'autres sont plus typiques de la zone Sud (sardinelles). Bien que très diversifiée, la composition des captures est dominée par quelques espèces ou groupes d'espèces, qui sont, par ordre d'importance, les mulets (avec une prédominance du mullet noir), les sparidés (notamment les dorades grises et roses), la courbine, ainsi que les mérours et les bars."* (p. 71)

11.2.20 UNDP (2006)

Environmental Impact Assessment of Trade Liberalisation: A case study on the fisheries sector of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Summary

Online available at: www.unep.ch/etb/publications/mauri_summary_final.pdf

Database reference: R-UNDP-2006-Trade-Liberalisation

1. *"The diversified Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Mauritania offers the country great potential to sustainably develop its fisheries sector, engage in international trade, reduce poverty and increase food security. With a total of 36 billions UM in 2001, fish exports*

contribute up to 50 % of national exports and represent about 25 % of the State budget. Of highest exporting value are the celaphodes fisheries (mainly squid) and demersal fisheries (noble demersal species and shrimp). Despite the 30,000 direct and indirect employments that the fisheries sector provides, the sector is nevertheless not integrated into the national economy and its contribution to national GDP in real terms is continuously decreasing (from 4.5 % in 1995 to 2.8 % in 1999)." (p. 3)

2. "The study indicates that the impact of trade liberalisation, principally taking place under EU access agreements, has been mixed. On the one hand, Mauritania has benefited from the payments under the access agreement by reducing its national debt. On the other hand, access agreements have negative effects on national food consumption, poverty reduction, resulting in a situation of high dependence of the fisheries sector on these foreign financial payments." (p. 4)
3. "However, these external funds also create a situation of high dependency and hence significantly reduce Mauritania's negotiating powers in new access agreements negotiations. [...]First, it leads to a real disconnection between the production system under access agreements and the Mauritanian system. Second, there is no investment in Mauritania's processing facilities, remaining uncompetitive. Third, increasing exports lead to a lack of local market supply in fish, particularly in high value fish. A rise in the prices of fish in local markets has already taken place, resulting in a substitution of fish for poultry, which has become cheaper than fish. Fourth, traditional fish species are substituted by new species that are of lower value and quality. Thus, in addition to fierce competition over fish catches, the European fisheries sector also outcompetes Mauritania in the processing sector." (p. 4)
4. "In addition to an overexploitation of targeted species, the industrial fleet in Mauritania's EEZ also produce important volumes of bycatch of up to 80 % in shrimp fishing. Despite the economic and ecological distorting effects of such destructive fishing practices, political debates over bycatch reduction measures are repeatedly pushed into the background by negotiations over catch quotas and fishing licences." (p. 5)
5. "According to the author, the issue of bycatch reflects two realities. First, short term economic gains largely outweigh protection of marine resources. [...]High bycatch levels and non-compliance are exacerbated by the increasing strictness of market access criteria that is becoming incompatible with the diversity of industrial fish catches. The increasing complexity of those market access conditions and stricter quotas, which it is argued represent European commercial interests, oblige fleets to throw back all the species of less commercial value, thus resulting in wasteful and inefficient resource use." (p. 6)
6. "Furthermore, despite various modernisation efforts to renovate the processing facilities, they are still only partly up to the sanitary requirements of foreign markets. [...]EU support through development funds is therefore crucial to build up the necessary sanitary and technical amendments. Unfortunately, in supporting solely the amelioration of landing infrastructure, freezing facilities, and transport." (p. 8)
7. "In terms of overall impact, not the fisheries sector nor the country itself really profit from the improvements through access agreements that, not based on a national capacity building strategy to process fish products, do not generate much national value. Rather, large international pressures encourage the selling of natural resources to satisfy the minimal requirements of economic growth and reduce poverty. In this context, the sea and its marine resources represent a source of exploitation and earning, without taking into account the fragility of these resources and the necessity to guarantee their long-term survival." (p. 8)
8. "Even though the Cotonou Agreement between ACP countries and the EU will be reformed after 2008, Mauritania as a Least-Developed Country (LDC) is allowed to keep its non-reciprocal preferences. However, since Mauritania has decided to join the Economic Com-

munity of West African Countries (ECOWAS), it will keep preferential access to European markets but on a reciprocal basis. This framework will be in place until 2020.” (p. 8-9)

9. *”The overprotection secured by the Cotonou Agreement, all in Europe’s interests to its market supplies with primary materials, created a context of dependency from which Mauritania will have difficulties to withdraw. The structure of the fisheries sector in the absence of international competition will likely lead to an increase in poverty. The international competition will lead to a significant reduction in market prices. In other words, Mauritania will have to export more in order to satisfy the requirements of growth, intensifying the firm pressures put on fisheries resources already.”* (p. 9)
10. *”Although the EU access agreement, concluded in 1995, has significantly contributed to state finances and the reduction of public debt, it has nevertheless harmed the national industry. With a competitive advantage, the European fleet slowly but surely outcompetes Mauritanian fleets. The Mauritanian artisanal sector, on the other hand, does not suffer under the new regime and has increased its total catch, from a few hundred up to 80,000 tons/year. The key to such a success seems to arise from the utilisation of cost-effective fishing methods that allow catching the fish alive, in close proximity to the shore.”* (p. 9)
11. *”The development of the artisanal and industrial fisheries sector is taken into consideration during the negotiations, however they are not a final determinant of the outcome of the agreement.”* (p. 9)

Newspapers and Magazines

11.2.21 the Courir, March-April(author unknown) (2002)

A new EU - Mauritania fishing agreement is concluded

http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier191/en/en_063.pdf,
Database reference: NP-2002-CourirACP-Mauritanian

1. *”Mauritanians themselves consume relatively little fish, but the activity accounts for more than half of export income, one third of budget revenue and 36 percent of the jobs in the modern sector.”* (p. 63)
2. *”Mauritanian waters have always welcomed foreign boats, particularly those from Europe. Since the creation of exclusive economic zones, coastal countries have become masters of their more than 200 nautical miles (370 km) of ocean resources, but they are ”invited” to negotiate the surplus that they do not manage to exploit themselves. It is against this backdrop that, after several months of intense negotiations, the European Commission and the Mauritanian government renewed the fishing agreement on 1 August 2001.”* (p. 63)
3. *”The main added feature of the new agreement is that provision has been made for specific actions aimed at modernising the sector, in particular in the areas of scientific research and development of non-industrial fishing. However, funding for this has been reduced (EUR 4 million per year) and is now deductible from the annual EUR 86 million financial contribution paid to the State.”* (p. 63)
4. *”However, fleets operating in pelagic waters have seen their numbers reduced by 22 vessels to 15, because the full quota of licences was not taken up in the previous agreement.”* (p. 63)

5. *"Spanish shipowners are reproaching the EU for not defending their interests even though they are the main beneficiaries of the agreement because they have the highest share of the European vessels fishing in the area. In addition, the deal has provided an unexpected escape route for part of the Spanish fleet, which found itself stranded as a result of the failure to renegotiate a similar agreement with Morocco and Senegal."* (p. 63-64)
6. *"A number of NGOs have criticised this partnership agreement. During the negotiations, the Coalition for Fair Fishing Agreements (CAPE), together with two Mauritanian organisations, signed an alarmist document relating in particular to the exploitation of octopus and cephalopods that according to the consortium, represents 89 percent of the turnover of Mauritanian boats. CAPE also recalled that in 1998 various scientific institutes believed that the octopus was clearly the victim of over-fishing. Some Mauritanian shipowners went as far as to brand it the systematic looting of a national heritage."* (p. 64)
7. *"At the same time, while the pressure on the octopus and cephalopods is undeniable, it has yet to be decided who is to blame."* (p. 64)
8. *"According to statistics, foreign fleets are responsible for a large part of catches made in the exclusive economic zone, but it is almost impossible to obtain precise figures as to the quantities caught by traditional fishing boats. Yet these are the boats that fish closest to the coast, the breeding ground of the octopus. To protect species, the effectiveness and efficiency of controls over both non-industrial fishing and industrial fishing are at least as important as scientific studies."* (p. 64)
9. *"Another contentious issue concerns how the financial contribution is to be used. Although the support given to the Research Centre, to monitoring, and to development of the non-industrial sector is rarely challenged, the Mauritanian sector is claiming a bigger slice of the pie."* (p. 64)
10. *"While the financial contribution could be used to compensate for the loss in turnover suffered by the Mauritanian fishing industry owing to competition from foreign vessels, the State still has to make the decision to invest in its own fishing sector. Moreover, the financial compensation could enable the government to tackle poverty more effectively."* (p. 64)
11. *"Development organisations are critical of the symbolic sum (4,6 percent) reserved for specific actions and campaign for priority to be given to the development of local industry. However, the fishing agreement is not a development partnership - even if it is sometimes presented as such - but essentially a trade agreement drawn up between two responsible entities. This does not prevent increasing numbers of political figures and organisations, both in the North and the South, to aim for greater coherence between the fishing agreements and cooperation policy."* (p. 64)

Websites

11.2.22 FAO (2004-2010)

Profils des pêches et aquaculture par pays - Mauritanie-Profils. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department [en ligne],

Online available at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_MR/fr,

Database reference: OWP-FAO-2004-2010-Mauritania

1. *"La flotte industrielle démersale est dominée par les catégories de navires céphalopodières avec plus de 185 navires en activité dont 125 navires nationaux et 55 navires pêchant dans*

*le cadre de l'accord de pêche RIM/UE dont la fin est prévue en juillet 2006 ;
Le second segment de la flotte industrielle démersale est spécialisé dans la pêche de la crevette
et des espèces démersales autres que les céphalopodes avec des engins autres que le chalut ou
la drague. Ce segment compte*

- *23 navires crevettiers nationaux ;*
- *37 navires crevettiers européens ;*
- *31 navires nationaux de pêche merlu et autres espèces démersales aux engins sélectifs;*
- *34 navires étrangers de pêche au merlu et autres espèces démersales aux engins sélectifs
;”*

(p. 4 in the document stored in the data base)

11.2.23 The Sea Around US Project (2010)

Online available at: <http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/478.aspx>

Database reference: OWP-TheSeaAroundUs-2010-EEZ-Mauritania

11.2.24 DG SANCO (2010)

Online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm

Documents:

1. List in force of Mauritanian Processing Plants and Freezing Vessels allowed to export to the EU

Online available at: https://sanco.ec.europa.eu/traces/output/FFP_MR_en.pdf

Database reference: OWP-DG-SANCO-MauritaniaFisheryProduct

11.2.25 European Union (1995-2010)

Europa Gateway to the European Union

Online available at: <http://europa.eu/>

1. **European Union (1995-2010) - Fisheries agreements with countries outside the EU:**

Online available at: http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/index_en.htm

Database reference: WA-ec-europa-eu-fisheryagreements

2. **European Union (1995-2010) - Mauritania:** *Online available at:* http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/mauritania/index_en.htm

Database reference: WA-ec-europa-eu-fisheryagreements-B

- a) *"The first fisheries agreement concluded between the Community and Mauritania dates back from 1987."*
3. **European Union (1995-2010) - Europa Press Released RAPID, MEMO/05/275**
Online available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/275&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>
Database reference: WA-Europa-press-EU-Morocco-1995
4. **European Union (1995-2010) - European Fisheries Fund:** *Online available at: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/maritime_affairs_and_fisheries/fisheries_sector_organisation_and_financing/l66004_en.htm*
Database reference: WA-ec-europa-eu-fisheryagreements-B
- a) *"This Regulation establishes a new European Fisheries Fund (EFF) for the period 2007-13. It sets the Fund's objectives and priorities plus the responsibilities under it and the financial framework. It also sets out the arrangements for programming, managing monitoring and following up the EFF. The new Fund provides financial assistance to help implement the 2002 reform of the common fisheries policy (CFP) and to support the restructuring that has become necessary as the sector has developed."*

FAO GlobeFish (2010)

Online available at: <http://www.globefish.org/cephalopods-market-reports.html>
Database reference: WA-GlobeFish-Octopus

1. *"In order to counterbalance the difficult economic situation last year, Mauritanian authorities allowed extremely high octopus catches. This production flooded the market, and prices of octopus declined sharply. As a result imports into the main markets were high, owing to Mauritanian octopus. This country doubled its exports to Japan (26 500 tonnes) and to Spain (9 200 tonnes), while Italy reported octopus imports four times higher than previously from Mauritania (6 000 tonnes). Prices of Mauritanian octopus reached a high of USD 14.50/kg in December 2009 in the Japanese market, but since then have declined, to the present level of USD 12.70/kg." (p. 1)*

11.2.26 InshoreIreland (2007)

EU/Mauritania Fisheries Agreements: A case of oil and troubled waters

Online available at: http://inshore-ireland.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=241&Itemid=138
Database reference: WA-inshoreireland-2010

1. *"Last year Atlantic Dawn was banned from fishing in Mauritanian waters after several infringements inside the exclusion zone, and after reportedly being fined almost \$100,000. It seems that the Mauritanian authorities are now reluctant to allow it back. The Fisheries Minister is reported to have stated that the Irish supertrawler is not welcome in Mauritanian waters because of its history of alleged infringements."*
2. *"Another factor in the negotiating equation is the dramatic change in Mauritania's economic prospects since becoming Africa's newest oil producer. In February, the Chinguetti offshore oil field in the Atlantic Ocean, about 70 kilometres from the capital, Nouakchott, started pumping oil and is expected to produce 75,000 barrels per day for the next 10 years. Already this would seem to be impacting on Mauritania's negotiating stance in renewing its*

fisheries agreement with the EU, where the annual compensation of EUR 86,000 pales into insignificance compared to potential future petrodollar earnings."

3. *"Thus, on February 21 the Mauritanian paper Nouakchott Info announced that the authorities had rejected an EU proposal for a Fishery Partnership Agreement (FPA). The European's reportedly had wanted to have access to Mauritania's over-exploited cephalopod (octopus) and shrimp stocks, and were proposing as compensation (including licence fees) of EUR 83m. The Mauritians were demanding EUR 150m."*
4. *"The demands of the artisanal fishermen are put forward in an 8-point declaration. These include reserving exclusive access to shrimp and cephalopod stocks for the national fleet whilst reserving access to deeper water stocks (hake and pelagics) for the EU fleet. They also call for any future compensation payments to be invested in the development of the local sector; in research; surveillance; training; infrastructure; artisanal coastal fisheries development and adding value to processed fisheries products."*
5. *"Meanwhile however, the EU is exploring the possibilities of establishing an agreement with Peru for tuna, cephalopod and small pelagic fishing, which could go some way to accommodate the fleet that may be displaced from Mauritania. This agreement has already been strongly rejected by Peru's Artisanal Fishermen's organisation, representing 6,000 seagoing fishermen."*

SFP (2010) Strengthening Fishery Products Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries

Online available at: <http://www.sfp-acp.eu/en/content/glance>

Database reference: WA-SFP-2010

1. *"In order to help third countries to fall in line with these rather complex regulations, the European Commission and the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), represented by its General Secretary, have decided to finance a support programme "Strengthening Fishery Products' Health Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries (SFP Programme)". The SFP Programme started on 30 November 2002 for a period of five years. On 19 September 2007, the European Commission approved its extension until 30 November 2010. [...]The SFP Programme provides support to all those involved in the health control of fishery products: - The relevant authorities (known in EU regulations as the Competent Authorities) and other institutional stakeholders;
- Testing laboratories and technical institutes;
- Processing companies and exporters of fishery products;
- The small-scale fishery sector.
The overall amount of EU financing for the Programme is EUR 44 860 000, including EUR 2 184 800 funded by The Netherlands and the United Kingdom for their OCTs."*

11.2.27 Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010)

Online available at: <http://www.worldfishing.net/>

1. **Worldfishing and Aquaculture (2006) - Mauritania and the EU fail to agree:**

Online available at: <http://www.worldfishing.net/comment-and-analysis/interviews/mauritania-and-the-eu-fail-to-agree>

Database reference: WA-worldfishing-net-negotiation2006

- a) *"Dr Sidina explained that Mauritania had put a value of EUR 150 million per year for*

the fishing effort the EU was hoping to secure, but that the EU had not responded in a formal way. In fact it is understood that the EU was offering no more than half of the ?84m/annum Mauritania received under the outgoing treaty.” (p. 1)

- b) *”In 2001 the current treaty, which runs out at the end of July, was negotiated. As doubts were raised about the sustainability of the effort on octopus a mid-term review was ordered to be carried out by the Dutch fisheries institute RIVO on behalf of the Mauritanian fisheries institute IMROP in the northern port of Nouadhibou. However, the review’s conclusions that the effort on octopus should be reduced by at least 25 % and that the effort on prawns should be stabilised, were rejected by Spanish fishermen who in fact accused the Dutch fishing interests in Mauritania of seeking to undermine the Spanish interests even though the latter were not engaged in fisheries in competition with the former. The question was left to the renewal of the fishery treaty in 2006. The question was left to the renewal of the fishery treaty in 2006.” (p. 1)*
- c) *”The new government also looked at allegations of corruption in relation to the operation of foreign vessels in Mauritanian waters and told the EU that it did not wish to see the return of Atlantic Dawn after she was arrested again for infringements of the treaty shortly after the 3rd August coup and fined \$250,000. The EU initially responded that it could not allow any EU vessel to be discriminated against. But Dr Sidina explained that Atlantic Dawn had committed two serious offences. ”Any sovereign country has the right to withdraw the licence of a trawler that has proven to be a repeat offender.” (p. 1)*
- d) *”Income from fishing, whether from the sale of licences to foreign vessels and the export of fish and fish products from Mauritania remain important to the country and the government’s budget. ”The fishing industry represents 10 % of Mauritania Gross Domestic Product, while more than 25 % of the government’s budget is derived from the fishing industry and between 40 to 50 % of foreign currency is earned from the fishing industry,” said Dr Sidina.” (p. 2)*
- e) *”However, the progress of Mauritania as an oil exporting country had certainly increased the new government’s confidence in dealing with the EU, oil companies and foreign trawler owners, said Dr Ad Corten, a Dutch fisheries scientist attached to IMROP. Dr Sidina was, until the coup, the director of IMROP. ”It is clear that the new government and the business classes want to see change from the pure extraction of Mauritanian resources like oil or fish by foreign interests to see more of these resources processed in Mauritania and then exported as value added products,” said Dr Corten.” (p. 2)*
- f) *”Why should we allow such big boats like Atlantic Dawn to just take our fish in return for money for the government without investing anything in the Mauritanian fishing industry,” said Mohamed El Mamy, director of SOPAC PP, a processor of artisanal caught fish.” (p. 2)*
- g) *””We have now the ridiculous situation that the EU is in fact subsidising its fishermen to compete against the fishermen of a developing nation by offering a box of octopus in the Far East one dollar cheaper than ours. Do they want them to take their canoes and sail to the Canaries or Gibraltar to enter the EU as illegal immigrants because they cannot make a living?” asked Mr Cherif. He explained that 440 local fishing partnerships that owned between them 600 canoes or small boats crewed by three to four men, supplied his plants with octopus, 80 % of which went to Japan frozen, with the balance to Spain and other EU countries as well as prawns and sole to Europe.” (p. 2)*

- h) *"The artisanal method of potting for octopus should be protected as it was much more selective and sustainable than trawling as practised by the Spaniards, added Mr Cherif. It is clear that when the minister is talking about a reduction in the effort on octopus by 30 % under a future treaty with the EU, he was not talking about the artisanal sector."* (p. 2)
- i) *"Dr Corten agrees, but he believes that continuing foreign involvement could still be beneficial for Mauritania in the exploitation of those stocks that had still room for expansion in effort like the small pelagics and by investing substantially in processing capacity in Mauritania. Not without reason the Mauriticians had been disappointed in seeing promises in this regard not being fulfilled."* (p.2)
- j) *"Originally Dutch trawler owners had promised, with the assistance of the Dutch authorities, to improve Nouadhibou port so that vessels of more than 100 metres could berth and discharge catches for processing and/or export but nothing had happened, said Dr Corten. Even though the plan appeared to have been given a new lease of life in conjunction with shipping company Maersk, doubts about a new EU fishery might still scupper it."* (p. 2)
- k) *"Another project now in doubt is a proposal by Shellfish Holland, formerly Heiploeg, to dredge for cockles on offshore banks to be processed in Nouadhibou for export to Europe. IMROP was currently engaged in setting up a testing regime that should make it compatible with the EU rules for imports, said Dr Corten. He explained that the project had been severely attacked by Dutch environmentalists who accused Heiploeg of intending to send dredgers to Mauritania that had just been banned from the Dutch Waddenzee to protect seabirds who foraged on cockles. "Those accusations are ridiculous and untrue. At a depth of 20 to 30 metres these dredgers will be different than those that operated on the Waddenzee and the cockles at those depths don't constitute a source of food for any seabird, but they grow until they suffocate each other and die, unless they are harvested in a sustainable way," said Dr Corten."* (p. 2)
- l) *"But Dr Sidina did not think the EU was overpaying. On the contrary he suggested that if the EU wanted to pay less, its vessels would be allowed to fish less, but the EU seemed to want to retain its share at the current level."*
- m) *"But the Mauritanian industry appears not to be happy with this possibility. "We have former Chinese vessels reflagged as Mauritanian, but they are still mainly crewed by Chinese and I cannot regard them as really national vessels," said Mr Cherif."* (p. 2)

2. Worldfishing & Aquaculture (2006-2010) - All change in Mauritania:

Online available at: <http://www.worldfishing.net/features/new-horizons/all-change-in-mauritania>
 Database reference: WA-worldfishing-net-landings-2010

- a) *"Vall, a Mauritanian-born, up-and-coming fishing agent and entrepreneur who has Irish nationality, explained that the days have definitely gone whereby the government in the country's capital of Nouakchott would happily sell fishing licences to the EU, Russia, China etc. The Mauritanian government now wants to 'Mauritanise' its fishing industry as much as possible through commercial measures and policies."* (p. 1)
- b) *"This stance was something the minister for fisheries and economic development, Aghd-hefna Ould Eyih, strongly affirmed in an interview with WF. "It is the government's and my personal objective to have 50 % of our total catch of pelagic, demersal, cephalopods (octopus etc) and crustaceans (mainly shrimp) landed and processed in Mauritania," he said.*

- e) *"I believe that the Commission in Brussels has good intentions, but I have already told them and the EU fishing firms that the 50 % landing target is the Mauritanian aim. While I have no reason to doubt getting a positive response from the EU, the Commission and fishing firms should have no doubt that Mauritania takes this very seriously." (p. 2)*
- d) *"I understand there have already been two Spanish delegations in Mauritania exploring the possibility of a return to private agreements in case the EU treaty is not renewed," said Vall." (p. 2)*
- e) *"Mauritanians themselves would not be too disappointed to see the EU treaty lapse as they are unhappy with Brussels' interference, in particular the influence of environmental lobbyists." (p. 2)*
- f) *"The director general of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development, Mohamed El Hassan Ould Boukhreiss, echoed Eyih's view. "My department fully supports our colleagues in the Fisheries and Maritime Economy Ministry, we basically take the same approach regarding the exploitation of our other natural resources, whether oil and gas, or minerals from iron to gold. "We are moving away from a situation from when all the raw materials were exported without creating any additional added value or employment benefits." "Fishing is of course different from oil, gas and mineral exploitation because the latter three are finite resources. But the former, if properly managed, is a permanent resource and therefore my department fully supports the plans to have at least 50% of the catch processed onshore for export," said Boukhreiss. He explained his department and the Fisheries Ministry had drawn up plans to increase and improve existing port facilities at the capital Nouakchott and the northern port of Nouadhibou on the Cap Blanc peninsula, which is the main port for foreign trawlers. They will also create new ports and allocate suitable land for the processing plants that are needed to reach the 50% landing target." (p. 2)*
- g) *"Under the programme, a new pelagic port will be created 45km south of Nouakchott and a new pelagic port in the bay of Nouadhibou. Work has already started on the extension of the commercial port in Nouakchott and in Nouadhibou, which is the best natural harbour on the Atlantic from Agadir in Morocco to Liberia." (p. 2)*
- h) *"The population of Mauritania is no more than 3.3 million, but it is conservatively estimated that there are at least 500,000 people from neighbouring West African countries living illegally in country whose main aim is to use Mauritania as a springboard to get into Europe, either over land through the Moroccan-controlled western Sahara and Morocco or by the treacherous sea route to the Canary Islands. "The EU expects us to stem this flow of desperate young men in search of an opportunity to make a living for their families back home. Mauritania allows the Spanish Guardia Civil to patrol our waters and we detain the people they catch, but that is only half the picture; Mauritania should be assisted to create employment for these people that will also be of benefit to Mauritania," said Boukhreiss." (p. 3)*

11.2.28 PFA (2010)

The Pelagic Freezer-Trawler Association

1. **FPA (2010) - Welcome:** Online available at: <http://www.pelagicfish.eu/nl/paginasamenstellingNIEUW.asp?paginaID=1&menuID=267>
Database reference: WA-PFA-Agreements-WestAfrica1

- a) *"The Pelagic Freezer-trawler Association (PFA) represents the interest of 9 European pelagic freezer-trawler companies on an international level. At present, the association has members in the UK, Ireland, France, Germany, Lithuania and the Netherlands, all operating freezer trawlers that catch and process pelagic fish for human consumption."*

2. FPA (2010) - Fishing Agreements with Mauritania:

Online available at: <http://www.pelagicfish.eu/nl/paginasamenstellingNIEUWS.asp?stamIDsamengesteldepagina=21&menuID=534>

Database reference: WA-PFA-Agreements-WestAfrica

- a) *"The PFA has concluded fishing agreements with Mauritania since 1996. When the Soviet Union-fleet of stern trawlers in West African waters significantly reduced at the beginning of the 1990s, there was a situation of under-utilization of the pelagic fish stock. From a biological point of view, no objections existed to start fishing on pelagic species. Contrary to the pelagic fleet, the Mauritanian local fishing fleet is specialized in catching high value demersal (ground fish) and octopus, which is mostly exported abroad. Demersal fisheries is carried out close to the coast and is often classified as 'mixed' fisheries in which different species are caught. Whereas pelagic fisheries is carried out further off the coast (deep sea). Pelagic species swim in shoals, which results in a selective way of fishing."*
- b) *"The PFA conducts a responsible fishery in West African countries, which includes more employment opportunities, the continuation of biological research in Mauritania and possible infrastructure projects. The PFA has approximately 50 Mauritanian crewmembers working on board of vessels. In addition, trainee officers, inspectors, agents and fisheries biologists are involved in pelagic fishing activities."*
- c) *"For the years to come, the efforts of the PFA are aimed at supporting to increase regional co-operation and the prevention of over-fishing. The pelagic fish stocks must be maintained on such a level that both present and future generations can consume (pelagic) fish."*

11.2.29 United Nations (2010)

Online available at: <http://www.un.org>

1. UN (2010) - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982

Online available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm

Official Treaties and Regulations

11.2.30 United Nations (1982)

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Online available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

Database reference: OP-UNCLOS-1982

1. *"Utilization of the living resources 1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.*
2. *The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.*
3. *In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks.*
4. *Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws and regulations of the coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent with this Convention and may relate, inter alia, to the following:" (Article 62)*

11.2.31 Commission of the European Communities (1996a)

Commission Decision 96/293/EC of 30 April 1996 concerning certain protective measures with regard to fishery products originating in Mauritania: (Text with EEA relevance). Official Journal L 111, 22. (The document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents)

Database reference: OP-CD-293-SPS-1996

1. *"Whereas an expert of the Commission went to Mauritania to check the conditions of production and processing of fishery products exported to the Community; whereas according to the observations of this expert, the official guarantees given by the Mauritanian authorities are not adhered to and the conditions of production and storage of fishery products show serious defects as regards hygiene and control which can constitute risks to public health; Whereas it is necessary to suspend the import of all fishery products originating in Mauritania pending improvement of the conditions of hygiene and control of production;" (Preamble)*
2. *"Member States shall prohibit the import of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods in whatever form originating in Mauritania." (Article 1)*
3. *"This Decision shall be re-examined before the 13 July 1996." (Article 3)*

11.2.32 Commission of the European Communities (1996c)

Commission Decision 96/426/EC of 28 June 1996 amending Decision 96/293/EC concerning certain protective measures with regard to fishery products originating in Mauritania: (Text with EEA relevance). Official Journal L 175, 0033-0033.

Database reference: OP-CD-426-SPS-1996

1. "Whereas the knowledge of serious defects as regard hygiene and control of fishery products in Mauritania led the Commission to adopt Decision 96/293/EC (2), in order to suspend the import of such products originating in Mauritania; Whereas a mission of experts of the Commission went recently to Mauritania to evaluate the measures taken by the authorities of Mauritania; whereas according to the observations of these experts, it is necessary to maintain the protection measures with regard to bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods in any form whatsoever;" (Preamble)
2. "Article 1 of Decision 96/293/EC is replaced by the following:
Article 1
Member States shall prohibit the import of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods in whatever form originating in Mauritania." (Article 1)

11.2.33 Commission of the European Communities (1997)

Commission Decision (97/20/EC) of 17 December 1996 establishing the list of third countries fulfilling the equivalence conditions for the production and placing on the market of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods: (Text with EEA relevance): Reprinted version by Consolid text. Official Journal L 6, 46.

Database reference: OP-CD-97-SPS-1996

1. "Amended by: No page date
Commission Decision 97/565/EC of 28 July 1997 Official Journal L 232 15 23.8.1997
Commission Decision 98/571/EC of 12 October 1998 Official Journal L 277 42 14.10.1998
Commission Decision 2000/332/EC of 25 April 2000 Official Journal L 114 40 13.5.2000
Commission Decision 2001/38/EC of 22 December 2000 Official Journal L 10 66 13.1.2001
Commission Decision 2001/255/EC of 21 March 2001 Official Journal L 91 89 31.3.2001
Commission Decision 2001/675/EC of 20 August 2001 Official Journal L 236 16 5.9.2001
Commission Decision 2002/21/EC of 11 January 2002 Official Journal L 10 79 12.1.2002
Commission Decision 2002/469/EC of 20 June 2002 L Official Journal 163 16 21.6.2002"
(p. 1, slightly modified)

11.2.34 Commission of the European Communities (2004)

Commission Decision 2004/98/EC of 29 January 2004 repealing Decision 96/293/EC concerning certain protective measures with regard to fishery products originating in Mauritania (notified under document number C(2004) 128): (Text with EEA relevance). Official Journal of the European Union L 29/16.

Database reference: OP-CD-98-SPS-2004

1. "Commission Decision 97/20/EC of 17 December 1996 establishing the list of third countries fulfilling the equivalence conditions for the production and placing on the market of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods [...] has superseded Decision 96/293/EC which has therefore become obsolete and should be repealed." (Preamble)

11.2.35 Commission of the European Communities (1996b)

Commission Decision 96/425/EC of 28 June 1996 laying down special conditions governing the import of fishery and aquaculture products originating in Mauritania: (Text with EEA relevance):

Database reference: OP-CD-425-SPS-1996-B

1. *"for fishery or aquaculture products originating in Mauritania and intended for export to the European Community with the exception of bivalve molluscs, echinoderms, tunicates and marine gastropods in any form" (Annex A)*

11.2.36 Council of the European Communities (1991)

Council Directive 91/493/EEC of 22 July 1991 laying down the health conditions for the production and the placing on the market of fishery products. Official Journal, 0015-0034.

Database reference: OP-CD-493-SPS-1991

1. *" 1. For each third country or group of third countries, fishery products must fulfil the specific import conditions fixed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 15, depending on the health situation in the third country concerned.
2. In order to allow the import conditions to be fixed, and in order to verify the conditions of production, storage and dispatch of fishery products for consignment to the Community, inspections may be carried out on the spot by experts from the Commission and the Member States. The experts of the Member States who are to be entrusted with these inspections shall be appointed by the Commission acting on a proposal from the Member States. These inspections shall be made on behalf of the Community, which shall bear any expenditure incurred. [...]" (Article 11)*
2. *"[...]Whereas, with a view to achieving the internal market and more especially to ensuring the smooth operation of the common organization of the market in fishery products established by Regulation (EEC) No 3796/81 (4) , as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2886/89 (5) , it is essential that the marketing of fish and fish products should no longer be hindered by disparities existing in the Member States in respect of health requirements; whereas this will enable production and placing on the market to be better harmonized and bring about competition on equal terms, whilst ensuring quality products for the consumer; [...]" (Preamble)*
3. *"Whereas fishery products from third countries intended to be placed on the market of the Community must not qualify for more favourable arrangements than those applied in the Community; whereas provision should therefore be made for a Community procedure for the inspection in third countries of the conditions of production and placing on the market in order to permit the application of a common import system based on conditions of equivalence; [...]
3. When fixing the import conditions of fishery products referred to in paragraph 1, particular account shall be taken of:
(a) the legislation of the third country;
(b) the organization of the competent authority of the third country and of its inspection services, the powers of such services and the supervision to which they are subject, as well as their facilities for effectively verifying the implementation of their legislation in force;
(c) the actual health conditions during the production, storage and dispatch of fishery products intended for the Community;
(d) the assurances which a third country can give on the compliance with the standards laid down in Chapter V of the Annex. [...]
13. 'competent authority' means the central authority of a Member State competent to carry out veterinary checks or any authority to which it has delegated that competence;" (Article 2)*

11.2.37 European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1987)

Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing of the coast of Mauritania - Protocol setting out fishing opportunities and financial compensation for the period 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1990. Official Journal L 302 and 388.

Database reference: OP-FA-Mauritania-1987

1. *"1. The amount of the compensation referred to in Article 6 of the Agreement shall be set, for the period referred to in Article 1, at 20 250 000 ECU, payable in three annual instalments.
2. The use to which this compensation is put shall be the sole responsibility of Mauritania."* (Protocol, Article 2)
2. *"Opportunities to fish for demersal species shall be offered to Community vessels should Mauritania decide, taking account of the state of stocks, to re-authorize the fishing of these species by non-national vessels. In this case, the financial compensation referred to in Article 2 shall be increased proportionally pro rata temporis."* (Protocol, Article 3)
3. *"1. The Community shall also contribute during the period referred to in Article 1 up to 600 000 ECU towards the financing of Mauritanian scientific and technical programmes (equipment, infrastructure, etc.) to improve information on the fishery resources within Mauritania's fishing zone.
2. The competent Mauritanian authorities shall send to the Commission a brief report on the utilization of the funds."* (Protocol, Article 4)
4. *"The Community shall facilitate the reception of Mauritanian nationals in establishments in its Member States or in any other country linked to the Community by a cooperation agreement and to that end it shall provide, during the period referred to in Article 1, six five-year study and training awards, equivalent to a total of 30 academic years, in the various fisheries-related scientific, technical and economic disciplines."* (Protocol, Article 5)
5. *"The Annex and the Protocol shall form an integral part of this Agreement and any reference to this Agreement shall include a reference to the Annex and the Protocol."* (Article 12)
6. *"2. However, for the duration of this Protocol, the percentage of fishermen and seamen actually taken on board may not be lower than 25 %. In this case, shipowners are required to pay compensation to the Mauritanian authorities of 200 ECU/month for each seaman of the number constituting the difference between the 35 % quota and the number of seamen actually employed on board; such compensation shall be used for the training of Mauritanian fishermen."* (Annex D)
7. *"4. The employment contracts of the fishermen shall be drawn up in Mauritania between the shipowners or their representatives and the fisherman in agreement with the Mauritanian fisheries authorities. These contracts shall cover the social security arrangements applicable to the fishermen (including life, accident and sickness insurance)." (Annex D)*

11.2.38 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1996a)

Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Official Journal L 334, 0020-0054.

Database reference: OP-CoopAgreem-Mauritania-1996

11.2.39 European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1997)

Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the amendment to the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania initialled in Brussels on 20 June 1996. Official Journal L 332, 0020-0023.

Database reference: OP-FA-Mauritania-1996

1. *"With reference to the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, initialled in Brussels on 20 June 1996, I have the honour to inform you that the European Community agrees to the amendments to the following technical provisions of the Agreement, provided that the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is disposed to do likewise:*
 - *datasheet No 5 on cephalopods shall be replaced by the corresponding datasheet attached,*
 - *datasheet No 9 on pelagic fishing shall be replaced by the corresponding datasheet attached,*
 - *pole-and-line tuna vessels and surface longliners may be granted quarterly licences. Fees shall continue to be calculated on the basis of the annual statement of catches per vessel and be subject, in accordance with datasheet No 8, to payment of an advance of ECU 2 000 per year,*
 - *whether or not scientific observers are present on board, owners of pelagic vessels who are in possession of a licence shall contribute ECU 350 per month per vessel to the cost of scientific observation. Clearly, shipowners shall not be liable for the salaries of scientific observers on board their vessels."*

11.2.40 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006a)

Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol amending the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006. Official Journal of the European Union L 48/24.

Database reference: OP-FA-letter-Mauritania-2006

1. *"I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is prepared to apply, in accordance with scientific opinion, a temporary reduction in the fishing effort for the cephalopod fishing category, as specified in Datasheet No 5 of this Protocol, by temporarily decreasing by five licences the fishing opportunities offered by the Protocol. The future reactivation of those five licences shall be decided by common accord on the basis of the state of resources. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania shall also decide on a second closed period of one month for demersal fishing on a non-discriminatory basis. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania also undertakes to apply the amendments to the Protocol concerning the fishing opportunities laid down in Fishing Datasheet No 8 for the pole-and-line tuna vessel and surface longliner fishing category by raising the number of vessels in this category from 31 to 35, and those laid down in Fishing Datasheet No 9 for the pelagic freezer trawler fishing category by raising the number of vessels in this category from 15 to 25, on a provisional basis with effect from 1 January 2005"*

11.2.41 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006b)

Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Official Journal of the European Union L 343/4.

Database reference: OP-FPA-Mauritania-2008-2012

1. *"the arrangements for policing fisheries in Mauritanian fishing zones with a view to ensuring that the above rules and conditions are complied with, that the measures for the conservation and management of fish stocks are effective and that illegal, undeclared and unregulated fishing is prevented,"* (Article 1)
2. *"4. By way of derogation from the suspension procedure provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the Community reserves the right to suspend application of the Protocol immediately in the event of failure by Mauritania to comply with commitments made with regard to implementation of its sectoral fisheries policy. Such suspension shall immediately be notified to the Mauritanian authorities."* (Article 9)
3. *"cooperate to prevent and combat illegal fishing, in particular through the exchange of information and close administrative cooperation."* (Article 9)
4. *"This Agreement shall apply for six years from the date of its entry into force; it shall be renewable for six-year periods unless notice of termination is given in accordance with Article 14."* (Article 12)

11.2.42 European Economic Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1991)

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing of the coast of Mauritania for the period 1 August 1990 to 31 July 1993. Official Journal L 117, 0015-0019.

Database reference: OP-Protocol-Mauritania-1991

1. *"The Community shall contribute during the period referred to in Article 1 the sum of ECU 900 000 towards the financing of scientific and technical programmes to improve biological and fishery resource information as regards the Mauritanian fishing zone. Part of this amount shall be used to carry out a scientific assessment of crawfish stocks. These programmes shall be drawn up by the CNROP and submitted to the Community, which will participate in their implementation. Once the content of the programmes has been approved by both Parties, the corresponding amounts shall be paid into an account indicated by the Mauritanian authorities by the dates specified in the programmes. The Mauritanian authorities must report regularly on the implementation of the approved programmes and the results obtained. The Community reserves the right to request any further scientific information from the other Party."* (Article 4)
2. *"1. The Community shall make it easier for nationals of Mauritania to find places in establishments in its Member States and shall provide for that purpose awards for study and practical training in the various scientific, technical and economic disciplines relating to fisheries. Such awards may also be used in all countries linked to the Community by a Co-operation Agreement. The Community shall contribute to the costs of participating in international meetings or*

training courses on fisheries. 2. The cost of these measures may not exceed ECU 360 000. This sum shall be paid as and when it is needed.” (Article 5)

11.2.43 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1993)

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing of the coast of Mauritania for the period 1 August 1993 to 31 July 1996. Official Journal L 290, 0020-0031.

Database reference: OP-Protocol-Mauritania-1993-1996

1. *”If Mauritania decides, taking account of stock levels, to re-open cephalopod fishing to vessels other than those of the national fleet, cephalopod fishing authorizations shall be granted to Community vessels under technical and financial conditions to be agreed. In such a case, the financial compensation referred to in Article 2 shall be adjusted.” (Article 3)*
2. *”Of the amount of total financial compensation provided for in Article 2 (1), Mauritania shall allocate, for the period referred to in Article 1, the sum of ECU 900 000 towards the financing of scientific and technical programmes to improve biological and fishery resource information as regards the Mauritanian fishing zone. This sum shall be made available to Mauritania and the corresponding amounts shall be transferred to the accounts indicated by the Mauritanian authorities (CNROP in Nouadhibou). The Community reserves the right to request the contracting party to provide any information that may be useful for scientific purposes.” (Article 4)*
3. *”1. Of the amount of total financial compensation provided for in Article 2 (1), Mauritania shall allocate, for the period referred to in Article 1, the sum of ECU 360 000 to study and practical training in the various scientific, technical and economic disciplines relating to fisheries. To this end, the Community shall make it easier for nationals of Mauritania to find places in establishments in its Member States. 2. Part of the amount referred to in paragraph 1 may be allocated to cover the costs of participating in international meetings or training courses on fisheries.” (Article 5)*

11.2.44 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (1996b)

Supplement to the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing of the coast of Mauritania, for the period 15 November 1995 To 31 July 1996. Official Journal L 076, 0027-0028.

Database reference: OP-Supplement-Mauritania-1996

1. *”From 15 November 1995 to 31 July 1996 further fishing opportunities are hereby granted, pursuant to Article 3 of the Protocol, to cephalopod fishing vessels: 5 250 GRT/month annual average, which may vary by a margin of 5% above or below that figure, for not more than 18 vessels. Should the figure be exceeded within the 5% limit the shipowners shall pay the fees for the additional GRT.” (Article 1)*
2. *”1. The total financial compensation for the period referred to in Article 1 shall be ECU 7 259 000.” (Article 2)*

11.2.45 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2001)

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial compensation provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006. Official Journal L 341, 0128-0159.

Database reference: OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2001-2006

Database reference (Czech Version): OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2001-2006-cz

1. *"1. For the period of application of this Protocol, the total financial contribution referred to in Article 7 of the Agreement shall be EUR 86 million per year (comprising EUR 82 million financial compensation and EUR 4 million for the financial contributions set out in Article 5 of this Protocol).*
 2. *The Government of the Republic of Mauritania shall have full discretion regarding the use to which the financial compensation is put."* (Article 2)
2. *"The measures set out below shall be financed from the financial compensation provided for in Article 2(1), broken down as follows: (a) EUR 800000 per year for assistance for research to improve information on fishery resources, monitoring changes in the state of those resources in Mauritania's fishing zone, running the CNROP and improving health conditions in the fisheries sector; (b) EUR 1,5 million per year for support for fisheries surveillance, intended to finance the operating costs of the DSPCM and possibly the introduction of new means of surveillance;*
 - (c) *EUR 300000 per year for institutional support to maritime training with a view to developing and strengthening human resources;*
 - (d) *EUR 50000 per year for institutional support for developing fisheries statistics;*
 - (e) *EUR 50000 per year for institutional support for rescue services at sea;*
 - (f) *EUR 50000 per year for institutional support for the arrangements for managing fishing licences;*
 - (g) *EUR 50000 per year for institutional support for managing seamen;*
 - (h) *EUR 400000 per year to cover the expenses of organising and participating in international seminars and meetings;*
 - (i) *EUR 800000 per year for support to develop small-scale fishing.**These measures, and the amounts to be allocated to them each year, shall be decided on by the Ministry, which will inform the Commission thereof. The annual amounts shall be paid into an account of the Central Bank of Mauritania opened with a financial body designated by the Mauritanian authorities, no later than 31 December 2001 for the first year, and the anniversary date of the Protocol in subsequent years."*
3. *"No later than three months after the anniversary date of the entry into application of this Protocol, the Mauritanian Ministry shall transmit to the Commission Delegation an annual report on the implementation of these measures and the results achieved, as well as on any difficulties encountered.*
The Commission reserves the right to request additional information on these results from the competent national authorities and, if necessary, to review the payments concerned in the light of the actual implementation of the measures, after holding consultations with the Mauritanian authorities in the Joint Committee provided for in Article 10 of the Cooperation Agreement." (Article 6)
4. *"LANDINGS IN MAURITANIA Vessels shall not be obliged to land fishery products, except in the case of the compulsory landings provided for below:*
Category 4 vessels, i.e. demersal trawlers, shall be obliged to land catches as follows:

*1st year of the Protocol: 8 landings
2nd year of the Protocol: 11 landings
3rd year of the Protocol: 14 landings
4th year of the Protocol: 17 landings
5th year of the Protocol: 20 landings*

General conditions and financial incentives 1. Landings shall be made at the Mauritanian port of Nouadhibou. Shipowners shall choose the landing dates. They shall inform the Mauritanian port authorities of the chosen date by fax 72 hours before their expected arrival at the port, indicating the estimated total quantity to be landed. The port authorities shall confirm by fax within 24 hours, to the shipowner or agent, that the landing operations can take place within 24 hours of the vessel's arrival in port. Where the port authorities fail to confirm the landing notification within the deadline laid down, the landing obligation of the vessel concerned shall be deemed to have been fulfilled.

2. Landing operations must have been completed within 24 hours following a vessel's arrival in port, failing which the vessel shall be entitled to leave the port and its landing obligation shall be deemed to have been fulfilled. A certificate equivalent to the certificate provided for in point 3 below must be issued to the master.

3. At the end of landing operations, the competent port authorities shall issue a landing certificate to the master. 4. If the number of landings provided for in this Protocol has not been achieved by the end of the third quarter of a given year, the Commission shall notify the Ministry of the list of vessels which are due to make landings during the fourth quarter when it makes its application for licences for that quarter.

5. Where a vessel included in the list referred to in point 4 is unable to make a landing, it may either defer its landing to a subsequent trip or arrange to be replaced by another vessel in the same category. The Commission must be notified immediately to that effect, and shall inform the Ministry forthwith.

6. Any vessel failing to comply with the point of exit and to fulfil its landing obligation shall be penalised in accordance with Chapter I of Annex II to this Protocol.

7. Deep-sea fishermen shall be entitled to free transit with a seaman's licence.

8. Community vessels making landings at Nouadhibou shall have their licence fees reduced for the period during which the landings are made. That reduction shall be 25 % of the cost of the current licence. 9. Detailed rules: Copies of the landing certificate(s) for the landing operations carried out by the vessel concerned shall be transmitted to the Delegation. When submitting a new licence application for that vessel, the Delegation shall send the Ministry the copies of the certificates together with a request for reduction of the fees. Unless the Ministry decides otherwise, the reduction shall be applied automatically to the amount of the fee for the new licence.

Before the end of the first three months of application of this Protocol, the Ministry shall send the following information to the Delegation: - the general rules on landings, including port charges;

- the establishments approved under the relevant Community regulations;*
- the bonded warehouses;*
- the maximum size and number of vessels which can have access to them;*
- storage conditions and capacity for fresh, chilled and deep-frozen (- 22o C) products;*
- means and frequency of transport to bring fresh fishery products to external markets;*
- average supply prices and terms (fuel, provisions, etc.);*
- radio call sign, telephone and fax numbers, telex addresses, working hours of the port authorities' offices;*
- any other information which can facilitate landing operations.*

Tax and financial conditions

Community vessels landing at Nouadhibou shall be exempt from all taxes or charges having an equivalent effect other than port fees and charges which apply on the same terms to Mauritanian vessels.

The fishery products landed shall be under customs control arrangements in accordance with Mauritanian legislation. They shall therefore be exempt from all customs procedures and duties or charges having an equivalent effect when they enter the Mauritanian port or at the

time of export, and shall be treated as "temporarily-admitted goods" (temporary storage). Shipowners shall decide on the destination of the their vessels' production. It may be processed, stored under customs control, sold in Mauritania or exported (in foreign currency). Sales in Mauritania intended for the Mauritanian market shall be subject to the same charges and levies as Mauritanian fishery products. Profits may be exported without additional charges (exemption from customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect). Vessels not covered by the obligation to land under this Protocol but which nevertheless choose to land catches in Mauritania shall receive favourable treatment." (Annex I, Chapter VII)

11.2.46 European Community & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2006c)

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Official Journal L 343, 0009-0060.

Database reference: OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2006

1. "1. The financial support referred to in Article 7(1)(b) of the Agreement amounts to EUR 11 million per year in accordance with Article 2(1) of this Protocol. This financial support shall contribute to the development and implementation of the *Stratégie Nationale de Développement durable du secteur des Pêches et de l'Economie Maritime de Mauritanie* (national strategy for the sustainable development of Mauritania's fisheries sector and marine economy) with a view to introducing responsible fishing in its waters, and in particular to the areas of activity listed in paragraph 3 below and detailed in Annex IV and to the PNBA. 2. Mauritania shall be responsible for managing the amount corresponding to the financial support referred to in paragraph 1 above, in the light of objectives identified by mutual agreement between the two Parties and of the programming to attain them. 3. Notwithstanding the objectives identified by the two Parties and in accordance with the priorities of the *Stratégie Nationale de Développement durable du secteur des Pêches et de l'Economie Maritime de Mauritanie* and with a view to ensuring sustainable and responsible management of the sector, the two Parties agree to focus on the following areas of assistance:
 - (a) improving governance in the field of fisheries:
 - support for the controlled development of small-scale and coastal fisheries, in particular by setting up, monitoring and evaluating fisheries development plans,
 - programmes to promote a better understanding of fishery resources,
 - support for fishing effort management,
 - setting up specially adapted laboratories within the IMROP, modernising their equipment and developing systems for computerising and analysing statistics;
 - (b) accelerating the integration of the fisheries sector into Mauritania's national economy:
 - developing infrastructure, in particular port infrastructure, by means of investment programmes such as the refurbishment of the port of Nouadhibou and Nouakchott fish market for unloading catches from small-scale fishing,
 - financial support for the restructuring of the Mauritanian industrial fleet,
 - setting up a programme of modernisation of the small-scale fishing fleet to help it meet health and safety standards, including initiatives such as the replacement, in the long term, of wooden canoes with canoes made of more suitable materials which include means of conserving the catch,
 - setting up programmes of support and investment with a view to improving fisheries surveillance, such as the creation of mooring pontoons in ports for use by the surveillance authority and IMROP only, and setting up a training programme adapted to monitoring techniques and technologies, in particular VMS,
 - implementing programmes and initiatives to promote fisheries products, in particular through measures to improve the health and plant-health conditions of the products landed and processed;

(c) developing capacities in the sector and improving governance:
 - setting up a programme of training and support for improving safety at sea and rescue services, in particular for the small-scale fleet,
 - setting up support programmes for the technical services of Mauritania's Ministry of Fisheries and the Marine Economy involved in managing the sector,
 - setting up an action plan to improve the effectiveness of the services involved in managing the sector,
 - setting up and developing the system for managing licences and monitoring vessels." (Article 6)

2. "2. In order to develop the fresh products sector, by way of an incentive Mauritania shall grant Community operators landing fish in Mauritanian ports (in particular for the purposes of sales to local industries, adding value to these products in Mauritania or transporting catches made in Mauritanian fishing zones by land) a reduction in the amount of fees, in accordance with Annex I to this Protocol and with the relevant Mauritanian law." (Article 8)
3. "4. By way of derogation from the suspension procedure provided for in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, the Community reserves the right to suspend application of the Protocol immediately in the event of failure by Mauritania to comply with commitments made with regard to implementation of its sectoral fisheries policy. Such suspension shall immediately be notified to the Mauritanian authorities."
4. "This Protocol and its Annexes shall apply for a period of two years from 1 August 2006. They may be renewed twice, each time for a period of two years, on the basis of tacit agreement between the Parties, unless notice of termination is given in accordance with Article 13." (Article 12)

11.2.47 European Union & Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2008)

Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2012. Official Journal of the European Union L 203/4.

Database reference: OP-Protocol-Mauritania-2008-2012

1. "3. The allocation of the fishing opportunities among different categories of vessels may also be reviewed by mutual agreement between the Parties, provided that any changes comply with recommendations made by the Joint Scientific Committee regarding the management of stocks liable to be affected by such redistribution. The Parties shall agree on the corresponding adjustment of the financial contribution where the redistribution of fishing opportunities so warrants." (Article 4)
2. "1. The financial support under Article 7(1)(b) of the Agreement shall be set at EUR 11 million, EUR 16 million, EUR 18 million and EUR 20 million for the first, second, third and fourth years respectively in accordance with Article 2(1) of this Protocol. This financial support shall contribute to the development and implementation of the *Stratégie Nationale de Développement durable du secteur des Pêches de Mauritanie* (national strategy for the sustainable development of Mauritania's fisheries sector) with a view to introducing sustainable and responsible fishing in its waters in keeping with the strategic objectives of conservation of fish stocks and better integration of the sector into the national economy, and in particular to the areas of activity listed in paragraph 3 below, an indicative list of the indicators of which is given in Annex IV, and to the PNBA." (Article 6)

3. *"The following objectives in the context of fisheries development and rent optimisation:*

- *implementation of fisheries development plans (octopus, prawns, ect.),*
- *stepping up of fisheries and oceanographic research,*
- *reinforcement of the surveillance authority,*
- *control and adjustment of capacities,*
- *development of new fisheries (sardines, anchovies, etc.)*

The following objectives in the context of the increased economic and social impact of the sector:

- *development of port infrastructure and services,*
- *compliance with standards and promotion of quality, particularly in terms of improving health and hygiene conditions in the production of fisheries products and strengthening the monitoring capacity of the competent Mauritanian authorities,*
- *promotion of private investment in the sector, particularly by upgrading and modernising production equipment, and promotion of global competitiveness factors and comparative advantages,*
- *development of non-industrial maritime fisheries, inland fisheries and aquaculture.*

The following objectives in the context of protection of the marine environment, habitats and the coastline:

- *conservation of the marine environment and aquatic habitats,*
- *reinforcement of capacity for analysing and combating marine pollution.*

The following objectives in the context of the legal and institutional framework:

- *strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Ministry for Fisheries and of the bodies reporting to it,*
- *improvement in the legal framework for the pursuit of fisheries activities and in the institutional environment of the sector."*

(Article 6)

4. *"Sectoral support shall be the subject of a joint mid-term review of the attainment of the performance indicators for the current calendar year in the month of June and a final joint review of the attainment of those performance indicators in the month of January of the following year. In addition, Mauritania shall notify, not later than 30 October of each year, the sectoral budgetary allocation provided for in the Finance Act for the following year.*

4. *For the purpose of preparing for those joint reviews, the Ministry shall send the Commission, not later than one month before the joint mid-term review and joint final review respectively are to be held, an interim and final annual report on the implementation of the results achieved and any difficulties encountered, and on the corrections and remedies proposed.*

The Commission reserves the right to request additional information on those results from the Mauritanian authorities so as to launch consultations with the Mauritanian authorities within the Joint Committee provided for in Article 10 of the Agreement, in order to adopt corrective measures which allow the given objectives to be achieved.” (Article 7)

5. *”4. In order to develop the fresh products sector in particular, by way of an incentive Mauritania shall grant Community operators landing fish in Mauritanian ports (especially for the purposes of sales to local industries, adding value to these products in Mauritania or transporting catches made in Mauritanian fishing zones by land) a reduction in the amount of fees, in accordance with Annex I to this Protocol and with the relevant Mauritanian law.” (Article 8)*
6. *”This Protocol and the Annexes hereto shall apply for a period of four years from 1 August 2008, unless notice of termination is given in accordance with Article 13.” (Article 12)*
7. *”1. In the event of termination of the Protocol, the Party concerned shall notify the other Party of its intention to withdraw from the Protocol in writing at least six months before the date on which such termination would take effect.” (Article 13)*
8. *”Skippers of Community fishing vessels shall allow and facilitate boarding and the discharge of their duties by any Mauritanian official responsible for the inspection and control of fishing activities.
These officials shall not remain on board for longer than is necessary for the discharge of their duties. Once the inspection has been completed, a control report shall be issued to the skipper of the vessel.” (Annex I, Chapter IV)*
9. *”In accordance with Mauritanian law, the percentage of by-catches shall be calculated at any time during fishing according to the total live weight of the catch on board. Appendix 5 to this Annex lists those percentages by fishing category. The regulations on such by-catches shall be entered on the licences issued.” (Annex I, Chapter VI)*
10. *”5. Community vessels making landings or transshipments in Mauritania shall have their licence fees reduced for the period during which the landings or transshipments are made. The reduction shall be 25 % of the cost of the current licence for vessels landing catches and 15 % for vessels carrying out transshipments. However:*
 - The reduction in the licence fee shall not apply to a vessel which lands/tranships less than 15 % of the catches declared in the fishing log for the licence period concerned,*
 - The reduction in the licence fee shall apply on a pro rata basis to a vessel which lands/tranships between 16 % and 65 % of the catches declared in the fishing log for the licence period concerned (example: a vessel landing 30 % of the catches declared shall be entitled to 30 % of the 25 % reduction in the fee),*
 - The reduction in the licence fee shall apply in full to a vessel which lands/tranships more than 65 % of the catches declared in the fishing log for the licence period concerned.” (Annex 1, Chapter VII)*
11. *”tuna vessels (which must sign on three Mauritanian seamen per vessel) and pelagic vessels in category 11 (for which transitional provisions are laid down in point 6 of Chapter XV of this Annex), each Community vessel shall sign on Mauritanian seamen for the duration of the trip. There shall be at least:*
 - 2 seamen plus 1 officer or 1 observer for vessels of less than 200 GT,*
 - 3 seamen plus 1 officer or 1 observer for vessels of at least 200 GT and less than 250 GT,*
 - 4 seamen plus 1 officer or 1 observer for vessels of at least 250 GT and less than 300 GT,*
 - 6 seamen and 1 officer for vessels of at least 300 and less than 350 GT,*
 - 7 seamen and 1 officer for vessels of at least 350 and less than 500 GT,*
 - 8 seamen and 1 officer for vessels of at least 500 and less than 800 GT,*
 - vessels of 800 GT or more and less than 2 000 GT shall sign on a number of seamen*

equivalent to 37 % of the crew, but not less than 8 seamen and 2 officers,
- vessels of 2 000 GT or more shall sign on a number of seamen equivalent to 37 % of the crew, but not less than 12 seamen and 2 officers.

1.2. For vessels of 800 GT or more, the minimum number of seamen to be signed on board shall be reduced by 2 for each additional officer taken on board.” (Annex I, Chapter VIII)

12. *”Mauritanian seamen’s employment contracts, a copy of which shall be given to the signatories, shall be drawn up between the shipowners’ agent(s) and the seamen and/or their trade unions or representatives in consultation with the competent Mauritanian authorities. These contracts shall guarantee the seamen the social security cover applicable to them, including life assurance and sickness and accident insurance.” (Annex I, Chapter VIII)*
13. *”Mauritanian seamen’s wages shall be paid by the shipowners. They shall be fixed, before licences are issued, by mutual agreement between the shipowners or their agents and the Mauritanian seamen concerned or their representatives. However, the wage conditions granted to Mauritanian seamen shall not be lower than those applied to Mauritanian crews and shall comply with ILO standards and under no circumstances be below those standards.” (Annex I, Chapter VIII)*
14. *”Where no Mauritanian seamen are taken on board for reasons other than that specified in the previous point, shipowners shall be obliged to pay as soon as possible a flat-rate amount of EUR 20 per day of fishing in the Mauritanian fishing zone per seaman within a maximum of three months.” (Annex I, Chapter VIII)*
15. *”1. All infringements shall be penalised in accordance with Mauritanian law.
2. In the event of serious or very serious fisheries infringements as defined by Mauritanian law, the Ministry reserves the right to prohibit the vessels, skippers and, where applicable, the shipowners involved in committing such infringements, provisionally or definitively from all fishing activities in Mauritanian waters.” (Annex I, Chapter XII)*
16. *”The amount of fines imposed on Community vessels shall be calculated in accordance with Mauritanian law within minimum and maximum limits specified in Mauritanian law. This amount shall be set in accordance with the procedure provided for in Chapter VI, point 3 of Annex II. The amount of fines imposed shall be converted into euro by the surveillance authority at the rate laid down in paragraph 1 of Chapter III of this Annex. The two amounts shall be notified simultaneously to the shipowner and to the Commission via the Delegation. Mauritanian law, and any subsequent amendments thereto, shall be communicated to the Community.” (Annex I, Chapter XIII)*
17. *”Category 11 pelagic vessels shall be subject to the following rules as regards signing on seamen: - during the first six months of fishing in Mauritanian fishing zones, vessels shall be exempted from signing on Mauritanian seamen, - during the following six months of fishing, vessels shall sign on 50 % of the seamen provided for in point 1 of Chapter VIII.” (Annex I, Chapter XV)*
18. *”In an effort to curb illegal fishing activities in Mauritanian fishing zones which jeopardise fisheries management policy, the Parties agree to exchange information on these activities on a regular basis.
In addition to the measures already applied by the two Parties under existing legislation, they shall consult one another on the possibility of taking supplementary joint or individual action. To this end, they shall step up cooperation, in particular on the fight against illegal fishing.” (Annex II, Chapter X)*

11.2.48 Council of the European Union (2009b)

Council Decision of 22 December 2009 repealing Decision 2009/473/EC concerning the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the provisional application of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Guinea(2009/1016/EU), Official Journal of the European Union, L 348

Database reference: OP-CouD-1016-Guinea

1. *"The Commission decided to withdraw its proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the FPA following the tragic events of 28 September 2009, when Government forces opened fire on protesting crowds resulting in over 150 deaths. (p. 53)*

11.2.49 Council of the European Communities (2006)

2006/113/EC: Council Decision of 14 February 2006 on the signature, on behalf of the European Community, and the provisional application of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol amending the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006 - Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol amending the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006. Official Journal L, 0022-0025.

Database reference: OP-CouD-113-Mauritania-2006

11.2.50 Council of the European Communities (2001a)

2001/926/EC: Council Decision of 17 December 2001 on the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006, Official Journal L, 0125-0126

Database reference: OP-CouD-926-Mauritania-2001

OP-CouD-926-Mauritania-2001

11.2.51 Council of the European Communities (2001b)

2001/926/EC: Council Decision of 17 December 2001 on the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006, Official Journal L 341, 0125-0126

Database reference: OP-CouD-926-Mauritania-2001

11.2.52 Council of the European Union (2010)

Council Decision (2010/73/EU) of 25 January 2010 repealing Decision 2009/472/EC and concerning the follow-up to the consultation procedure with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Official Journal of the European Union L 37/50

Database reference: OP-CouD-472-Mauritania-2010

11.2.53 Council of the European Union (2009a)

Council Decision (2009/472/EC) of 6 April 2009 concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Official Journal of the European Union L, 156/26

Database reference: OP-CouD-472-Mauritania-2009

11.2.54 European Commission (2009)

Proposal for a Council Decision repealing Decision 2009/472/EC of 6 April 2009 and concerning the follow-up to the consultation procedure with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement: COM(2009)670 final, European Commission

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2009

11.2.55 Commission of the European Communities (2006a)

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters on the provisional application of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing in Mauritanian fishing zones and of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution which applies from 1 August 2006 to 31 July 2008: COM(2006)505 final: (presented by the Commission), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2006

11.2.56 Commission of the European Communities (2007)

Proposal for a Council Decision on the termination of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution under the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania: COM(2007) 782 final: (presented by the Commission), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-2007

1. *"The financial contribution under the Protocol is fixed at EUR 86 000 000 per year for fishing opportunities in eleven categories, which may be used by twelve Member States. Optimum use is not being made of these fishing categories, most of which are under-utilised, thus jeopardising the economic and financial viability of this Protocol. Consequently, it is proposed that this Protocol should not be tacitly renewed, but should be terminated in accordance with Article 13 thereof, so that fresh negotiations can be opened with Mauritania with a view to negotiating a new protocol offering fishing opportunities which are adapted to the established requirements of the fleets of the Member States concerned and a financial contribution which has been adjusted accordingly"* (p. 2)

11.2.57 Commission of the European Communities (2009)

Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Islamic Republic of Mauritania under Article 96 of the revised Cotonou Agreement (presented by the Commission), COM(2009) 92 final

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop-Cotonou-DeAid-2009

1. *"In addition to any individual sanctions decided by each Member State of the European Union targeted at those responsible for the coup and their closest associates, economic sanctions will be taken to drastically reduce the amount of EU aid paid directly to the government, state agencies and state-owned enterprises. These restrictions on cooperation will not affect humanitarian aid, or direct aid to the people of Mauritania and Mauritanian civil society."* (p. 8) (The detailed reductions can be derived from the document)

11.2.58 Council of the European Union (2006a)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1316/2006 of 22 May 2006 on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol amending the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006, Official Journal of the European Union L 242/1

Database reference: OP-CR-No1316-Mauritania-2006

11.2.59 Council of the European Union (2006b)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1801/2006 of 30 November 2006 on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Official Journal of the European Union L 343/1

Database reference: OP-CR-No1801-Mauritania-2006

11.2.60 Council of the European Union (2008)

Council Regulation (EC) No 704/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2008 to 31 July 2012, Official Journal of the European Union L 203/1

Database reference: OP-CR-No704-Mauritania-2008

11.2.61 Council of the European Communities (1996a)

Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/96 of 25 June 1996 on the conclusion of the supplement to the protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the agreement between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, on fishing off the coast of Mauritania, for the period 15 November 1995 to 31 July 1996, Official Journal L 163, 0007-0009

Database reference: OP-CR-No1258-Mauritania-1996

11.2.62 Commission of the European Communities (2001b)

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided for in the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania for the period 1 August 2001 to 31 July 2006: (2001/0246 (COD)), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CR-Prop-Mauritania-2001

11.2.63 Council of the European Communities (1996b)

Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the conclusion of an Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and laying down provisions for its implementation /* COM/96/0417 FINAL - AVC 96/0210 */ , Official Journal C 352, 0005

Database reference: OP-CR-Prop-Mauritania-1996

11.2.64 Commission of the European Communities (2006b)

Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania: (2006/0168 (CNS)): (presented by the Commission), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CR-Proposal-Mauritania-2006

11.2.65 Commission of the European Communities (1996e)

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Supplement to the Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the provisional application of the Supplement to the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing off the coast of Mauritania for the period 15 November 1995 to 31 July 1996 & Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on the conclusion of the Supplement to the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing off the coast of Mauritania for the period 15 November 1995 to 31 July 1996: COM(95) 726 final, 96/0005 (CNS), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop-Mauritania-1996

1. *"Whereas these fishing opportunities should be allocated to Member States in accordance with Article 8(4)(iii); whereas, in view of the loss of fishing opportunities in Moroccan waters, it is equitable to allot all the fishing opportunities to vessels flying the Spanish flag,"* (p. 3)

11.2.66 Commission of the European Communities (1993)

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters concerning the provisional application of the Protocol setting out, for the period 1 August 1993 to 31 July 1996, the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing off the coast of Mauritania & Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out, for the period from 1 August 1993 to 31 July 1996, the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Agreement between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on fishing off the coast of Mauritania: Catalogue Number: CB-CO-93-403-EN-C, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg

Database reference: OP-CR-Proposal-Mauritania-1993

1. *"Whereas, in order to avoid any interruption in the fishing activities of Community vessels, it is essential that the new Protocol be applied as soon as possible"* (p. 2)

11.2.67 Commission of the European Communities (1996d)

Proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion of an Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters concerning the provisional application of the Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania initialled in Brussels on 20 June 1996 & Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of an Agreement on cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and laying down provisions for its implementation: COM(96) 417 final, 96/0210 (AVC), Brussels

Database reference: OP-CouD-Prop2-Mauritania-1996

(The Protocol of the 1996-2001 Agreement between the EU and Mauritania is attached to the appendix of this document)

1. "3. The new agreement saw some of the Community's priority objectives achieved: - a period of validity of 5 years in order to ensure greater stability for the Community fleet's fishing activities;
extended fishing opportunities thereby allowing vessels to be employed in increasing numbers. The fishing opportunities create new fisheries for cephalopods and pelagic species; taken as a whole, they reflect closely the wishes expressed by Community shipowners prior to the negotiations and take account of the state of fish stocks in Mauritanian waters and the situation of Mauritania's fisheries sector;
- increased cooperation in the area of monitoring, notably through a more effective system for communicating information on fishing operations and tighter organization of scientific observation on board vessels and in the ports of either Party. In addition, a pilot scheme aimed at the continuous monitoring of vessels by satellite is to be worked out in the course of the implementation of the Agreement.
- the stepping-up of socio-economic cooperation for the mutually advantageous, joint development of the Community and Mauritanian fisheries sectors." (p. 3)
2. "Of the total amount of financial compensation referred to in Article 2, Mauritania shall allocate an amount of ECU 600 000 per year in the form of a financial contribution, as laid down in Article 2 of the Agreement, to help build up health inspections and fisheries research and implement the policy for the development of Mauritania's fish stocks." (Article 5, p. 21-22)
3. "1. Of the total amount of financial compensation referred to in Article 2 above, Mauritania shall allocate an amount of ECU 250 000 per year in the form of a financial contribution, as laid down in Article 4 of the Agreement, towards sea-going training schemes to develop and strengthen human resources, infrastructure and facilities in sea training institutes in Mauritania.
2. Of the total amount of financial compensation referred to in Article 2 above, Mauritania shall allocate an amount of ECU 200 000 per year to the Ministry to cover expenses relating to seminars, participation in international meetings and training visits. (Article 6, p. 22)
4. "PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF BOARDING
1. Transmission of information The Ministry shall inform the Delegation within 48 hours of any boarding of a Community fishing vessel operating in Mauritania's fishing zone and shall provide a brief report of the circumstances and reasons for this boarding.
2. Statement of boarding After the Mauritanian surveillance authorities have drawn up a statement, the master of the vessel shall sign it. This signature does not prejudice the rights of the master or any defence which he may make to the alleged infringement. He shall take the vessel to the port of Nouadhibou. In the case of minor infringements, the surveillance authorities may authorize the vessel to continue its fishing activities." (Annex II, Chapter VI, p. 55)

11.2.68 Commission of the European Communities (1995)

Proposal for a Council Decision on a specific measure for the grant of an indemnity to fishermen from certain Member States of the Community who have had to suspend their fishing activities in waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Morocco, COM(95) 469 final - 95/0246 (CNS)

Database reference: OP-CR-Prop-Morocco-1995

1. "The Agreement on relations in the sea fisheries sector between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco, which applied from 1 May 1992, expired on 30 April 1995. Negotiations between the two parties entered into well before that date have not yet resulted in a compromise for a new agreement. Some 700 Spanish and Portuguese vessels have been

immobilized since then and have been unable to carry on any alternative activity. In view of the fact that the redeployment of those fleets in Community waters or the waters of other third countries presents difficulties on account of the restrictive policy concerning access now applied in relation to the fleets which normally fish in those waters, the Commission is planning to pay an indemnity to the shipowners and crews who have had to suspend their activities.” (p. 3)

2. *”Under Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 3669/93, shipowners may qualify temporarily for Community assistance through the FIFG. Application of the scales set out in the Regulation would offer shipowners for the whole of the period (May to December) compensation totalling ECU 52 million (ECU 48 million for Spain and ECU 4 million for Portugal). The Community would bear 75 % of the cost, in accordance with the Structural Funds rules for Objective 1 regions. This Community compensation for shipowners would be charged against the FIFG under the appropriations for the operational programmes for Spain and Portugal.” (p. 4)*

11.2.69 Commission of the European Communities (2001a)

Proposal for a Council Regulation aiming to promote the conversion of vessels and of fishermen that were, up to 1999, dependent on the fishing agreement with Morocco, COM(2001) 384 final - 2001/0163 (CNS)

Database reference: OP-CR-Prop-Morocco-2001

1. *”The agreement on the relations as regards sea fishing between the European Community and the Kingdom of Morocco became null and void on 30 November 1999; at that date, more than 400 vessels and about 4300 fishermen were forced to stop their activities. Since then, they have benefited from the compensation provided for in Article 16(1), point b), of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999, with the assistance of the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). Beyond the payment of compensation, a broad conversion operation must be successfully concluded. The Council noted the rupture of the negotiations on a new fishing agreement, and thus the vessels and fishermen mentioned above are permanently deprived of fishing opportunities in the Moroccan waters.” (p. 14-15)*
2. *”With regard to the ”restructuring of the fleet” , there are opportunities for a redeployment in Community waters, in the context of other fishing agreements with third countries, as well as under private licence arrangements between vessel owners and third countries but this possibility does not cover all the fleet that has operated within the fisheries agreement with Morocco. Concerning the fishermen, there is no doubt that a significant number of them will be unable to find a place on another vessel, and the Community should contribute to their reclassification or eventually help them to stop working. An existing provision of Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999 makes it possible to allocate public appropriations, with FIFG cofinancing, to the implementation of individual or collective social plans for their conversion from sea fishing. The FIFG can also co-finance the existing early retirement schemes.” (p. 15)*
3. *”On the basis of the derogation conditions included in the legislative proposal, and by applying the rates of interventions that are applicable in the Regions of the Objective No 1 of the Structural Funds, the Community assistance necessary for the reconversion of the whole fleet and all fishermen is estimated at approximately 281 Mio EUR.” (p. 15)*
4. *”It is proposed that the supplementary Community effort - outside FIFG - takes in charge some 70 % of total Community effort, thus the estimated amount necessary for the execution*

of the present action is 197 Mio EUR in supplementary credits.” (p. 16)

5. *”The breakdown of these credits between Spain and Portugal is calculated from the lists of boats having operated under the fishing agreement with Morocco. The calculation based on the respective tonnages of the two fleets and the calculation based on the tonnages weighted by the number of licences give the same result, that is, 186.36 Mio EUR (94.6 %) for Spain and 10.64 Mio EUR (5.4 %) for Portugal.” (p. 16-17)*

11.3 Interviews

11.3.1 Interview 1

1. PN: How would you describe the relationship between the EU and Mauritania and Guinea? Is it more an economic relationship is it an exploitive relationship or one of Aid? 00:02:20-4

I: I think one of the differences between the relationship between the relationship between EU and Mauritania one the one side and the relationship between the EU and Guinea is that in the case of Mauritania there is the neighborhood factor. The kind of, the main state interested in the EU Mauritania agreement is Spain. And if you look, Spain is really a neighbor of Mauritania. So there is this dimension of Neighborhood which is absent from the EU-Guinea relation. Which explains for example that, with all the difficulties which have been appearing in the partnerships in the last years with both countries. We still have a fishery agreement with Mauritania and I am pretty sure we will still have one in the years to come. And we have no more fisheries agreement with Guinea. So I think in the case of Mauritania the neighborhood relation is quite important. And there will always be a relation, I think, formal relation between the two. Same with Morocco but not with the other countries of West Africa. That is one difference I see. Otherwise, yes, there is a relation of exploitation and for me the main sign that it is a relation of exploitation or even a relation of overexploitation of resources. But the exploitative aspect of it, one aspect, which for me is very important is the fact that they are not landing catches locally. So like in Mauritania that's an important demand of the authorities but also of the processing sector is to have raw material for value addition. But the European vessels do not land anything in Mauritania. So, for me that is really exploiting Mauritanian resources but to European benefits. Because all the value adding is done in Europe. So and that was also the case Guinea. So that is, for me, one aspect of the exploitative relation. But, jea, I would say there is a, also there is some kind of an un-trust, If you like, on both sides which is also because both, Mauritanian authorities and Guinean authorities leave the door open to overexploitation. So it is not like they are, often it is not as simple as describing one is the victim of overexploitation and the other one is the exploitative actor. Because, often, there is a lot of responsibility on the third countries. Particular on some decision makers to leaf the door open to overexploitation. So like there is a lot of untransparency, there is quite a lot of corruption and people just sell licenses to who ever pays for it. So that is also an important element of the fact that the relation is not on a good basis. In terms of cooperation I think that there is some cooperation but which is not in the exploitation of the resource relation, which would be more in the kind of scientific cooperation. There is a bit of cooperation on monitoring, survey and control. There is some support for some project there. But that is very little. And ja, that is Is not very important. So it is mainly exploitative relation in both cases with the element of Mauritania of the neighborhood relation. 00:06:00-6

2. PN: And would you say that there are strategies the EU uses in both cases. That they have a strategy of how they act with Mauritania in this relationship. Or what is the influence of the EU and the influence of the vessel of the fishery companies? 00:06:37-1

I: Probably the influence of the US (?) decreases in the years because what they are doing is not really (?) by the local populations. So they are not landing the catches, a lot of the money which they are providing to the government does not really serve to realize much in terms of infrastructure etc. So there is not much of visible tenable effects of the agreement with the EU. So I think for the local population it is becoming very questionable whether there should be agreements at all. So that is one thing. So I think in that sense the influence of the EU may have decreased compared to the influence for example of China in the region. But if you look only at the influence of the EU I think, unfortunately it is mainly through their Euros that the Europeans have an influence. So they put a lot of money on the table and they expect that that will solve a lot of things. So like for example it is the same even in the EU's fishery policy. Because if you talk to them about how they manage and control the fleets active in fishery agreements. All they will say is that it is the third countries' responsibility. But of course it is also their responsibility as flag state. But the only concrete way they can take their responsibility as flag state is by trying to stop the funding of some of activities of the boat owner. So there is very little they can do. If they had no money there would be very little the EU could do in terms of managing the fleets and the negotiating with third countries. 00:08:20-6

I: And the question about the fleets. Yes they have a lot of influence. The problem is that it is, as I was mentioning earlier. It's influencing in an untransparent way. I am not against the sector trying to influence decision making because basically decision making should be open to kind of not influence but to consultation with the sector, with the stakeholders, with NGOs, civil society etc.. But it should be done in a transparent way, and not through the backdoor like it is often the case. So we are very supportive, also it has its limitation. We are very supportive of what has been set up by the EU in the last five or six years, which are these regional advisor committees. So you have one of these regional advisor committees dealing with FPAs. Where you have around the table the industry, the NGOs, trade unions, etc. And also, as I said it has its limitation, at least it is a kind of exercise to have a kind of transparent consultation of the stakeholders which we support. But yes, as you were asking for the industry in particular it is often not through these channels that they are trying to influence but rather through the back door. Ja, they are usually lobbying as one may imagine. 00:09:42-6

3. PN: And from the perspective of the third country, Guinea and Mauritania. Which kind of interest in the relationships do you see? Why are they entering the relationship? 00:10:01-9

I: Ja, as I say there is less and less interest of third countries to enter into this kind of relationship with the EU. It is interesting to see that in ten years ago we had at least five or six more agreements. And since we have started, the EU has started to call them partnerships there it is at least three or four important countries which have refused to sign an agreement. Like Angola, like Senegal etc. So I think there is less and less interest of third countries to enter into this kind of relation. Also because there is no visible, tenable affect of it. There is an interesting view that one of my Mauritanian colleague was explaining to some weeks ago. That is that in the case of Mauritania most of the financial compensation, because when they are negotiating they are setting the amount of financial compensation in proportion to the fishing possibility they have just negotiated. So for the third country before the end of the negotiation they don't know how much money they will get. Which means that for their budget they often put this money for covering running costs of what ever, research, monitoring survey control etc. But the problem is that the infrastructure for these research surveillance and control does not exist. So rather than financing infrastructure, what would mean that you need to know far in advance how much you have, plan how you will spend it etc. Because there is this kind of improvisation existing about the amount of money you will receive. Because that depends on the outcome of the negotiations is goes to running costs for infrastructure that does not exist. So that is really a door opened to corruption and inefficiency. And that is also the reason why the EU now says that there is a lack of absorption capacity in the third countries. There is no absorption capacity because there is

nothing to absorb the money. So that is really a big problem. 00:12:02-2

4. PN: And when looking at the difference between Mauritania Guinea. It is indicated in graphs that landing of fish in Guinea is more and more done by Guinean companies and artisanal fishery. 00:13:07-7

I: Ja, when you say Guinean company what happens a lot in Guinea is that you have three or four Guinean business men who charter Chinese vessels, so you have a lot of Chinese trawlers there. And these Chinese vessels are chartered by local people so. Often it is declared as being landed by Guinean vessels, but they are not Guinean vessels, they are Chinese vessels with a Guinean front. So that is the main situation in Guinea as I know it. There is some small scale fishing but it is not in terms of landing. I volume it is maybe important because they land a lot of small pelagic but I don't think the difference comes from there. I think difference will come from the Chinese fleet. And in Mauritania the Chinese fleet is again there. It makes about 80 % of the local, national fleet is made up of Chinese trawlers which have a Mauritanian flag and this fleet is particularly old. It is now about thirty years old and so on. So I guess it's capacity is kind of limited. Well, I don't know. There is also the set of the resources. What is strange to me is that the state of the resources in Guinea is certainly not better than in Mauritania. So ja I don't. Again these figures need to be taken with a bit of caution. 00:14:44-3

5. PN: Considering the financial dependency of the countries. I read that in Mauritania actually around 20 % of the general budget of the state comes from the fishery relationships with the EU. I don't know how high it is in Guinea. But which options do these countries have? 00:15:22-6

I: Ja, the interesting example is. In Guinea it is really very difficult to, I don't know if you have been there, but it is really very difficult to see or to think of any particular strategy from the Government. Because the Government has been changing quite a lot and changing in kind of dramatic circumstances so you have basically in the last ten years that we have been dealing with our partners in Guinea, there has not been much Government at all if you see what I mean. There have been governments but with a lack of governance all together. So there is no real policy from the Guinean authorities, long term policies with clear views etc. There are policies but they change every now and then. There is a total lack of governance, of transparency. So it is a very difficult country to. Ja, sorry, I am not very positive about Guinea but it is really a difficult place. 00:16:32-3

PN: And in Mauritania? 00:16:31-4

I: Ja Mauritania there have also been changes of government but if you know a bit Mauritania it is a kind of, how would I describe that, it is a, there are few families in Government and when there is a change of government, even it goes from one family to the other family. So it is not like the old political system is changing. It is just, there are the same people involved. So they have quite similar ideas. It just that the people in power are changing among a quite small circle of people, so it is a bit a different situation. And there you can see that from the end of the 80s till now the old policies are more or less at the same pillar if you like. One being landing of the catches and the other being to limit the fishing efforts. So these have been the policies but it has never been possible to implement them. And one of the reasons is that one of their main partners, the EU, does not by either condition. So, they do not land the catches and they do not by the limitation of effort particularly on some species like the demersal stocks, octopus etc. They contribute quite a lot to the overexploitation of these stocks. So that's an element of perturbation if you like of the national policies. In terms of the budget, as you said it is about 20 % of the budget, what is interesting to compare is that there was a time where the fishery agreement, I think it was between 1987 and 1991 or 1992 there was an agreement where there was no access to exploited, overexploited stocks like the octopus and possibly the shrimps, I can't remember. But by that time there was no EU

fishing efforts on these species and so there was a boom of the local artisanal sector in that period, thanks to that because there was much less pressure on the stock from the foreign fleets. And at that time the contribution of the fishing sector to the Mauritanian budget was still 20 % and, but it was 20 % also coming from taxes from the artisanal sector. So, on the one side you have a model where all the money comes from a kind of foreign donor, if you like, or foreign partner, centrally with very little transparency and all the kind of difficulties to absorbed it as I explained earlier and than on the other side you have a model where the money to the budget comes form the local sector from many different contributors, if you like and where you can have a better understanding of, well, where the money is going but also if you pay taxes generally you want know what the money will be used for. So there is much more public scrutiny about how the money is used and ja, it is more conducive to transparency than having this kind of load of Euros coming centrally and not being spend properly. 00:19:53-7

6. PN: Would you say that the relationship has changed over time? That there is a dynamic in the relationship. You said it is an exploitive relationship, has it always been like this or has it been a stronger exploitive relationship before than now? 00:20:28-7

I: Yes, in a way there was a stronger exploitive relation but it is just that fish is not there anymore. So there was more exploitation 20 years ago, because there was more fish. Today, all the fish is overexploited in this are more or less, so of cause there is less of an exploitative relation. But it is just that the basis for exploitation is slowly disappearing. So, I don't think much has changed in terms in terms of the will to have a less exploitative relation, unfortunately. 00:20:57-3

7. PN: Ok, also from the EU? Because ... now is this big topic about the FPAs, this fishery partnership agreements, that this is a different kind of relationship than it was before. That they invest a lot of money that should directly benefit the ... 00:21:26-3

I: Ja, but I think, there may be a will from some groups in the European side, even in the European commission but it is just the basis that they have at the moment to negotiated agreements. Is basically value for money? So this really keeps until this link between of how much you negotiate in terms of fishing opportunity and how much you get in terms of money until this link exist there will never be a change in the nature of the relation. Because, than you enter into this kind of vicious circle where you don't know how much money you get. It means that you are not planning properly to spend it, it means it is not planed, it is not getting spent or you not getting spend properly. So it is not being used or not usefully in terms of development and this is a viscous circle. So until this link is broken there won't be any change in the nature of the relation. 00:22:23-9

8. PN: Ja, I have read a few articles of you and this is one argument you often mention this that it should no be linked the two things. 00:22:44-7

I: That's right 00:22:44-7

9. PN: What are the involved parties in the negotiations? Is it the EU commission and the Mauritanian and Guinean Government only? Or are there more parties involved? 00:23:15-2

I: I think it is mainly them. Civil society has tried to be involved, so at some moments some fishermen get invited but its a gain very talkanistik because they get invited basically at one meeting but they don't receive the paper in advance, (?) observers if you like, so , ja, you may see it is positive but at the same time its not really participation. So there is that. There is now a kind of debate or I don't know, you could call it a fight for power if you like, because we are now in the Lisbon treaty and the European Parliament would like to be more involved in the negotiating process, so they would like to participate in negotiations etc. and it is still under discussion. So I don't really know what will happen. But there is this issue

on the table, is how the European Parliament can more participate in the negotiation. And on the third country often it is only the Government and some times, bon, they may invite a fishermen but it is really talkanistik it is not really participation. They are there just invited to be observer they don't get the information and can not intervene, so. 00:24:27-3

10. PN: And in the negotiation, the power relation between the EU and the third country? Is there a difference between Guinea and Mauritania like the position they have or the power they have in negotiating with the EU? 00:24:47-9

I: No, I think the good thing about Mauritania is that I think they have more capacity in terms of for example research capacity. Day taxpertice general expertise etc, so I think they are better off in the negotiations than Guinea which has very little capacity in terms of research having data etc. That is one thing but than Mauritania what you see intervening is this kind of neighborhood relation where you have diplomatic issues. Also some issues which are non fishing are used. Which in the end of the day there is a difficulty it intervenes as well. So ja, it is definitely different but I think Mauritania has a better capacity than Guinea or Guinea-Bissau. Guinea has no more agreement but Guinea-Bissau still has one. Whereas there is very little capacity. Yes, in term of having the data, being able to defend alternative positions etc. 00:25:51-8

11. PN: And in Mauritania? Is the way the Agreement is designed mainly influenced by the aims of EU? How would you describe the power relationship between the two parties? 00:26:22-7

I: I would say yes. Because also there is also another elemt that intervenes. Is that the EU has many relations with the country like Mauritania. There is a fishery agreement but they can also influence Mauritanian fisheries by other ways. Particularly for example there are trading a lot of fish with Mauritania so they can use the Sanitary and Phyto sanitary regulation to stop Mauritanian products. They can now use the IUU regulation. So they have really a lot of cards to play. If Mauritania doesn't agree to what is on the table so that is also one of the things we are demanding is that when there is a negotiation every thing should be clearly on the table. So the conditions made for the trades of fish products, the FPA content the cooperation etc. All the relations that can influence the development of the third country fishery sector should be discussed at the same table. And the results of these relation should be in favor of the sustainable development of the third countries fisheries sector. So that is also another demand. Because at the moment it is not. And than you have this negotiation on access agreement taking place but than you have other things being mentioned. Even though they are not on the table but they are in the atmosphere. So, Mauritania for example, for Mauritania I have no clear case but some years ago there was a case, I think it was with Ivory coast where there was a negation of the tuna agreement which were taking quite a long time and than suddenly you see that there is a visit from Inspectors, European inspectors for the sanitary conditions, Than there is the kind of threat of a boycott of a export to the EU market etc.. And of cause it is not linked but of cause it has an influence on the outcome of the negotiations. So this kind of coherent approach I think all the relations on the table at the same time making sure that they all together contribute to sustainable fisheries in the third countries, that is also another key demand that we have. 00:28:29-1

12. PN: You mentioned the SPS, those are the sanitary restrictions. It is a barrier for the input of fish from African countries. Is it also a method to keep the fish from the European market or is really about the sanitary issue? 00:28:57-8

I: It is difficult to. I think there are really sanitary problems, but the thing is when you visit all of these countries like also if you visit mainly European countries, if you want to find sanitary problems you will find them. And it is easier in some country than in another. But certainly you will find. If you go to Spain is some ports and you want to find sanitary problems with the fish product you will find them. And if you go to Guinea it is even

much easier. And if you go to Mauritania as well. So there is a political component to the implementation of these regulations that is definite. And there is even more. It is even more political when, for example I was mentioning Ivory Coast. You are negotiating a fishery agreement with Ivory Coast. In the fishery agreement there is a close looking at tuna landings for processing, so canning and exporting to the EU market, so that is part of the FPA. While on the other side, you have another process ongoing, with the sanitary regulation which threaten Ivory Coast to stop their export. So stop also their export of caned tuna to the EU market. So, of cause there is a relation between the two. And of cause there are some political aspects to it. 00:30:24-3

13. PN: And than another influence might be the subsidies into the own fishery sector. How is this influencing the fishery relationship with Mauritania and Guinea? 00:31:14-3

I: Well basically it keeps vessels operating that are not, that would not be profitable otherwise. So Mauritania but also Guinea, well all West Africa, you have a fleet of EU trawlers there which receive important subsidies for various things. So of them receive subsidy for building, for construction, some of them, those for example in Mauritania who come and land their fish in Las Palmas, while (?) fuel in Las Palmas, so they have kind of highly subsidies fuel, which is an very important cost for a trawler. So they receive subsidies in many ways and it is kind of an artificial diminish their running costs which means that even if they don't fish enough to be profitable and would be out of work if they wouldn't receive subsidies. They can continue fishing. So that really enforces the overfishing problems. 00:32:13-3

14. PN: Than there are some new strategies, included in the agreements, e.g. this pre-assessment of the fish stock, than their is this IUU about illegal and unreported fishing. So there are efforts from the EU to tackle those problems. How is this working? For example the VMS and observer programs? 00:32:52-4

I: Ja, well, in general we don't know. Because the evaluations you referring to are not public. So we don't really know what is in it. The IUU regulation we have been asking some kind of update about how it has worked in terms of stopping illegal fishing. And we have not received at the moment an information. So it is very difficult for us and for NGOs and for civil society in general to know whether these regulations and measures work or whether they don't work. So that is the first thing. About programs, so, there was for West Africa, there was a program of monitoring and control and surveillance and there was some money dedicated to it but it was (?). So again because I think the EU didn't find the right kind of partner to implement it. So again that is that problem of absorption of the money proposed so that not on. Research cooperation I don't know of any particular project in West Africa. But often in the past you had a regional research project on fisheries. But they were funded by some EU member states like Germany. Ja, Germany in particular, France as well. So ja it is.

15. PN: Is there an influence of other parties on the fishery relationship of Mauritania and Guinea with the EU? How important are other countries for the relationship of the EU with those countries? 00:34:47-2

I: I think the country that has most leverage in both countries is China at the moment. Because they have always been very present there with their fleets. As I said the Mauritanian industrial fleet is composed of probably 80 % of Chinese trawlers, Chinese vessels. In Guinea most of the industrial vessels are Chinese, less Koreans, but their are also quite a few Koreans there, charter by local business men. So and now in Mauritania I learned that China has just invested I think like 100 million \$ in the local processing sector. So and this is very visible because it means building up processing plants, employing local people etc. so certainly that will make a lot for the image, if you like, with the Mauritanian population. So yes, China is probably the most important competitor if you like with the EU in those countries.

00:35:54-8

PN: Is Mauritania using this in the negotiations with the EU? 00:36:04-9

I: Oh, yes, but it is not. I don't believe that using China against the EU or what ever in the negotiation will lead to more sustainable fisheries in Mauritania and Guinea. I am convinced of that, because neither China nor the EU has the habit of behaving rightly, if you like. There is a lot of involvement of this Chinese fleet in IUU fishing in West Africa, which has been documented over the years. And yes, I don't think that this is the right strategy. Whether they do it or not. Probably they do it a little bit. I don't really know. I am not in the negotiations, but I don't think it is the way really. 00:36:55-0

16. PN: Than something I read in an article you have wrote, I don't know if you have written it by your self. It is mentioned that Las Palmas provided a significant incentive for IUU activities in West Africa. Why is this? 00:37:28-0

I: Oh, this is because it is of its geographical location. It is very easy access for all the fleets fishing in West Africa. It has a lot of facilities there. So it attracts them because it is easy and it is a huge port it is very difficult to control just because it is huge. So it is difficult to control everything, being unloaded there. There must have been at some point also some kind of corruption between the, well, there are Spanish controllers and controlling Spanish trawler coming from Mauritania. So at some point I think there must have been some kind of arrangements between people. Because some years ago a couple of times we have as partner Greenpeace and Greenpeace was contacted by a seamen working on one of these trawlers and both times it the guy told them that some boat, well the boat he was on was coming into Las Palmas with catches of juvenile fish and so gave a date and so on and so forth and what we could see in both cases was that this landing was not controlled. While it should have been controlled, because it is the normal procedure, but this wasn't controlled. We can only suppose that there was some kind of arrangement so this kind of fish, juvenile fish coming to Las Palmas was not going to be controlled. I don't know. 00:39:00-0

17. PN: And the value adding operations is also mentioned in the same article and you also mentioned today that often the value adding does not take place in Mauritania and in Guinea, or if, it takes place in EU owned facilities. Is this still like this or? 00:39:29-9

I: Yes, mainly, so like Mauritania you have when it is EU owned often there will be vessels of Spanish capital reflagged in Mauritania. So I said, the industrial fleet in Mauritania, 80 % will be Chinese origin and the last 20 % lot of them are Spanish vessels, Spanish origin. So these vessels will be linked to some processing plant onshore, so will be landing, but often the processing is very little processing. It will be may filtered than send to Spain for further processing. So it is kind of primary processing that often takes place, but the real value adding is not done there. 00:40:21-2

18. PN: And is the money from the fishery agreements invested also there. 00:40:27-0

I: No. As I was saying the main problem with the money of the fishery agreement is that it is not invested. It is because investment requires planning. And there is no possibility to plan with the money of the fishery agreements. 00:40:40-0

19. PN: And even though there is this portion of about 2 million I think that is in Mauritania directly seen for the fishery sector, for the local fishery sector. 00:41:00-0

I: No, I mean that is a kind of smokescreen because if you look at the fishery agreements text in all fishery agreements it always says that the spending of the money is up to the third country to decide what it does with it. So it can say what ever it likes that it's done for this and this and that. No one can go and check that. That's clear. And for what concern the

small scale fisheries sector, we had a meeting November 2009 to discuss FPAs etc. and still at that time none of the organizations that were there, so we invited the small scale fishery organizations from all the countries in West Africa which either have or had an FPA with the EU. It was about ten countries. And none of the organizations had any information about any money being spent in their sector coming from the fishery agreement. 00:41:59-3

20. PN: You wrote that in the case that Octopus is caught by local fishermen the value of the octopus is higher than when it is caught with the gears from EU boats. Do you have some information on this? 00:43:12-6

I: Yea, it is about the size. So if you use a trawler what you will catch is everything. Well it is not, yea, it is more complicated than that, because if you have a trawler what you will catch is everything and trawlers, particularly Spanish trawlers are still targeting juvenile fish, because juvenile octopus gets a good price on the Spanish market. But if you fish with pots, as the artisanal fishermen do, then you can select the size of octopus you like because you, basically you take the pot the octopus is alive in it so, you see whether it is big enough or it is as you like, you take it or you put it back at the sea. It is a static gear and it doesn't damage the octopus. So what is happening that the artisanal sector goes for the bigger size of octopus which gets a very good price, particularly on the Japanese market? The Japanese market is the most lucrative market for octopus. So they get a very good price on the Japanese market. So it is worth quite a lot. But what the Spanish are targeting is another market which is the Spanish market which is particularly demanding small octopus, juveniles. Which is bad for the environment, which is bad for the stock, but yes. So it is two very different markets. The most lucrative is still the Japanese market, asking for big size octopus which is what the artificial fishing sector targets and the other one is the Spanish market.

11.3.2 Interview 2

Interview 2 has not been used to derive evidence of the case study.

11.3.3 Interview 3 - Representative of the European fishery sector - 05.10.2010 (by telephone)

To guarantee the anonymity of the interviewed person the interview can not be included in the report.

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11.3.4 Interview 4 - Representative of the European Kommission DG Fisheries - 19.10.2010 (by telephone)

(The Interview could not be recorded. Therefore, the conversation could not be reproduced literally.)

1. PN: Was die Pelagische Fischerei betrifft wird gesagt, dass Mauretanien auf die Europäischen Unternehmen zugekommen ist um seine Fanggründe anzubieten. Wie sah das im Fall des ersten EU Abkommen 1987 aus? Welche Partei war da der Initiator für Verhandlungen?

I: Die Antwort ist dem Interviewten nicht bekannt. Vor 89 haben Niederländische Schiffe nicht in Mauretanien agiert. Pelagische Lizenzen wurden exklusive von der UDSSR beansprucht. Das ist heute noch spürbar an den pelagischen Schiffen aus Litauen und Lettland.

2. PN: Die Abkommen werden als Partnerschaftsabkommen bezeichnet. Wie sieht diese Partnerschaft aus welchen Komponenten hat sie? I: Früher waren die Abkommen nur geschäftliche 'fish-and-pay' Verträge. Fischressourcen wurden ausgenutzt und dafür bezahlt. Aus sozialer und politischer Sicht konnte es so nicht weitergehen. Jetzt gibt es zwei Teile:
 - (a) Geschäftsabkommen
 - (b) Sectoral Support (der Teil der die Partnerschaft ausmacht)
 z.B. 18 Millionen der Gesamtzahlungen

3. PN: Werden die Zahlungen des Sectoral Supports als Entwicklungshilfe angerechnet?

I: Der Sectoral Support zählt 'jein' zur Entwicklungshilfe. Von der Struktur und Bestimmung her könnte dieser Teil allerdings zur Entwicklungshilfe zählen. Das Geld wird allerdings nicht von DG Development verwaltet wie es bei anderen Entwicklungshilfegeldern der Fall ist. Fischerei ist da ein Sondergebiet. Der Sectoral Support Anteil taucht fast sicher nicht in Entwicklungshilfestatistiken auf.

4. PN: Würden sie das Abkommen als ausgeglichen und Vorteilhaft für beide Parteien bezeichnen?

I: In Zukunft muss das Abkommen anders konzipiert werden. Wichtig wäre vor allem eine Entkopplung zwischen dem Geschäftsteil und der Entwicklungshilfe. Zurzeit kann entweder die gesamte Summe oder gar nichts bezahlt werden (durch Aussetzung oder Kündigung des Abkommens). Sanktionen können deshalb nur durch eine Gesamtkündigung des Abkommens vollzogen werden. Aus diesem Grund ist das Abkommen in Bezug auf die Umsetzung in der Sectoral Politik Mauretaniens momentan nicht zum Vorteil der EU.

Zu den Plünder Vorwürfen: Einige Sachen die von NGOs angebracht werden (z.B. in der Greenpeace Studie die vor kurzem rauskam) sind schon richtig. Allerdings ist der 'Plündervorwurf' übertrieben. Die EU Flotte ist die Flotte die in Mauretanien am meisten überwacht wird. Fangmöglichkeiten werden exakt aufgelistet. Die Europäische Kommission bemüht sich um eine nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung der Ressourcen und möchte das Beste tun. Andere Fischereibote, vor allem aus China, Südkorea, Russland und Japan, agieren sehr intransparent. Genaue Zahlen sind nicht bekannt und es ist sowohl für Mauretanien als auch für die EU sehr schwierig an diese ranzukommen. Wenn Mauretanien unbegrenzt Lizenzen für Schiffe herausgibt, dann sind auch die Bemühungen der EU um eine nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung eingeschränkt.

Im nächsten Abkommen möchte die Europäische Kommission daher fordern, dass auch mehr Informationen über das Agieren andere Länder bereitgestellt werden. Fangmöglichkeiten sollten für alle, die im EEZ fischen, definiert werden.

Kulturell gesehen ist Mauretanien ein Land von Nomaden. Es sind fast keine Städte an der Küste vorhanden. Nouadhibou ist eine alte Französische Kolonialstadt. Deswegen soll nicht gesagt sein, dass die EU das Recht hätte alles zu nehmen. Allerdings nutzt Mauretanien seine Ressourcen nicht komplett. Es gab sogar Kampagnen in Mauretanien um den Leuten zu zeigen wie man Fisch isst. Mauretanien hat fast keine Industrielle Flotte.

5. PN: Auflagen und Kontrollmechanismen über den zweckgebundenen Anteil der EU Zahlungen wurden mit der Zeit verstärkt. Was waren die Gründe dafür?

I: Als Überprüfung der Verwendung der Zahlungen, die für den Sectoral Support bestimmt sind gibt es ein midtimereview und ein endtimereview. Mauretanien stellt aber zurzeit sogar mehr Informationen zur Verfügung als verlangt werden. Die Indikatoren, die für die Überprüfung der Ausgaben angewendet werden sind andere Indikatoren als die, die von der DG Development verwendet werden und relativ eigen. Damit soll nicht gesagt werden, dass sie besser oder schlechter sondern, dass sie anderes sind. Dieses Jahr gab es ein Problem. Mauretanien hat die für Juni geforderten Informationen nicht zur Verfügung gestellt. Später hat sich herausgestellt, dass die Gelder nicht ans Ministerium für Fischerei gingen sondern im Finanzministerium verblieben. Mauretanien hat dann den Vorschlag gemacht dass zunächst

nur ein Teil des Sectoral Supports gezahlt werden sollte. 50 % (9 Millionen EUR) wurden deshalb im Sommer bezahlt, die anderen 50 % werden im Dezember 2010 bezahlt. Damit soll gezeigt werden, dass die EU mit der Situation nicht einverstanden ist und es soll Druck gemacht werden.

Vor 2008 gab es den Sectoral Support nicht. Gelder waren sehr gering und es gab keine Bewertung der Verwendung.

Eine besondere Situation trat mit dem Putsch 2008 auf. Aus politischen Gründen waren keine Verhandlungen mit Mauretanien mehr möglich. Allerdings wurde das Geld für die Fischereiabbeziehung weiterhin bezahlt. Aus diesem Grund konnte es erst jetzt zur Kontrolle kommen. Eine richtige Bewertung der Verwendung der Sectoral Support Zahlungen wird erst ab nächstem Jahr möglich sein. Allerdings rückt dann das Ende des aktuellen Abkommens wieder näher.

6. PN: Es wird gesagt dass ca. 20 % des Mauretanischen Staatsbudgets von Geldern aus dem Fischereiabkommen mit der EU kommen. Hat diese Situation Einfluss auf die Verhandlungen zwischen der EU und Mauretanien?

I: Ja, das stellt eine Ungesunde Situation. Dadurch wird eine Verzerrung der Verhältnisse bewirkt. Die Zahlungen der EU sind zu hoch gemessen am Budget. Sie sind auch zu hoch wenn man sie mit den Zahlungen über DG Development an Mauretanien vergleicht.

Der Putsch 2008 hat eine Sondersituation bewirkt. Nach Art. 96 (Staat ist nicht mehr Demokratisch und Verletzt Menschenrechte) des Cotonou Abkommens wurde die EU Beziehung zu Mauretanien suspendiert und die Entwicklungshilfe gecancelt. 2 1/2 Jahre lang hat Mauretanien nur aus den Fischereibeziehungen Gelder von der EU bekommen. Erst jetzt gibt es wieder Realisationen von Projekten des DG Development.

Es ist fast sicher, dass im nächsten Abkommen nicht so viele Finanzmittel zur Verfügung gestellt werden können. Es wird wahrscheinlich sehr schwierig sein, diese Situation an Mauretanien zu erklären.

Die Zahlungen der EU stellen ungefähr 1/3 des Nationalbudgets Mauretaniens da. Die Zahlungen sind sehr hoch und für andere Schiffe (nicht EU Schiffe) würde Mauretanien nicht so viel bekommen. Die EU unterstützt mit den Zahlungen die Lizenzgebühren der Europäischen Schiffe. Dabei werden die Schiffe heftig (er möchte eigentlich das Wort vermeiden) subventioniert. Das stellt vor allem eine Hilfe für Spanien und die Niederlande da.

7. PN: EU Schiffe sind verpflichtet der EU ihre Fangmengen zu melden. Werden diese Daten veröffentlicht?

I: Die Daten werden nicht veröffentlicht.

8. PN: Mit dem neuen Protokoll wurden in 2008 Fischereirechte und Zahlungen der EU reduziert. Was war der Grund für diese Reduktion? (Es wird vermutet das Pelagische Lizenzen zu hoch angesetzt wurden um höhere Zahlungen an Mauretanien zu rechtfertigen und das später der Druck des EU Parlamentes zu der Reduktion geführt hat.)

I: Genaues ist nicht bekannt. Es könnte sein, dass es ein politischer Deal war und das etwas künstlich gemacht werden musste, um die hohen Zahlungen zu rechtfertigen

9. PN: In verschiedenen Webartikeln wird angedeutet, dass Mauretanien bewirken möchte, dass über 50 % der Fänge aus dem EEZ in Mauretanien gelandet werden. Wie steht die Europäische Kommission zu dieser Forderung?

I: Aus politischer Sicht hat die EU ein Anliegen, dass Anlandungen so oft wie möglich stattfinden. Solange die Infrastruktur nicht gut entwickelt ist können Schiffseigentümer allerdings nicht gezwungen werden in Mauretanien anzulanden. Um die Infrastruktur in Mauretanien wirklich zu verbessern sind die Zahlungen der EU (Sectoral Support) allerdings zu kurz. Eine Möglichkeit wäre eine zwischenstaatliche Kooperation (bilateral) oder ein Joint Venture. Die Niederlande hatten zum Beispiel schon mal den Plan vorgebracht den Hafen von Nouadhibou zu vertiefen, so dass auch große Trawler dort landen könnten. Allerdings gab es dann einen Regierungswechsel in Den Haag und damit wurde der Plan auf Eis gelegt. Verantwortliche Regierungen wären da vor allem Spanien und die Niederlande. Ein Problem ist allerdings auch, dass nicht viele EU Investoren in Mauretanien investieren möchten, auf Grund der schwierigen Umstände.

Es gibt für Schiffseigentümer keine Pflicht in Mauretanien Fisch anzulanden. In Nouadhibou gibt es Ermäßigungen für Schiffbesitzer die gewillt sind Fisch anzulanden. Meistens wird der Fisch in Las Palmas oder Lanzarote gelandet. Die Niederlande wollten den Hafen vergrößern. Das Processing von Fischprodukten ist auch schwierig auf Grund der Infrastruktur, der schlechten Entwicklung. Nouadhibou kann eigentlich fast nicht als Stadt bezeichnet werden.

10. PN: Am 30. April 1995 lief das EU-Marokkanische Fischereiabkommen aus. Zu dieser Zeit lagen ca. 700 Spanische und Portugiesische Schiffe still. Die EU sollte für ca. 75 % der Kompensationskosten von ca. 52 Millionen ECU (May bis Dezember) (ISSN 0254-1475, COM(95) 469 final). Mit einem Zusatz Protokoll mit Gültigkeit von November bis Juli 1996 öffnete Mauretanien zum ersten Mal die Cephalopod Kategorie für EU Schiffe. In vorherigen Abkommen wurden auf Grund des Bestandes Zustandes keine Cephalopod Lizenzen vergeben. Inwiefern hat der Abbruch des Marokkanischen Abkommens die Verhandlungen mit Mauretanien beeinflusst?

I: Die Antwort auf diese Frage ist nicht bekannt

11. PN: Es wird oftmals behauptet das SPS Reglementierungen einen marktwirtschaftlichen Nachteil für Afrikanische Staaten bedeuten und das sie deshalb gezwungen sind Fischereiabkommen mit der EU abzuschließen. Wie stehen Sie zu dieser Behauptung?

I: SPS sind wichtig aber genaueres ist nicht bekannt. Empfehlung an DG SANCO

12. PN: Welche Rolle spielt das Joint Committee?

I: Das Joint Committee stellt eine Plattform da, die dazu dient das 'daily business' der Fischereibeziehung zu regeln. Es ist eine technisch-politische Arbeitsgruppe.

13. PN: Welche Rolle spielt das Scientific Committee?

I: Das Scientific Committee besteht im Schnitt aus 10 Personen. Es sind Forscher aus Mauretanien und der EU. Hauptaufgabe besteht darin zu gucken, dass die Fangmengen nicht zu hoch für die biologische Kapazität des EEZs sind. Die Informationen, die vom Scientific Committee bereit gestellt werden sind besonders wichtig für politische Verhandlungen.

Zum Beispiel war vor zwei Wochen gerade ein Treffen in Spanien. Im nächsten Monat werden bereits die Verhandlungen für 2012 begonnen. Dafür werden die Informationen von dem Scientific Committee sehr wichtig sein.

14. PN: Wie unterscheidet sich das Mauretanische Abkommen von anderen Fischereiabkommen der EU?

I: Es gibt eigentlich nur drei Mischabkommen:
Mauretanien
Marokko
Guinea-Bissau

Das Besondere an Mauretanien ist das es (a) über die besten Fischressourcen verfügt. Der National Park in Mauretanien ist eine wichtige Quelle der Fischbestände. Der Reichtum ist begründet durch eine besondere Kombination verschiedener Faktoren (Temperatur, Sand). (b) Mauretanien liegt sehr nah an Europa. (c) Mauretanien verwendet selber wenig Fisch.

Das Marokko Abkommen zeichnet sich besonders durch die Politischen Komponenten aus. Es werden nicht so hohe Gelder gezahlt und es wird nicht so viel gefischt.

In Guinea Bissau wird nicht so viel Geld gezahlt und es wird nicht so viel gefischt. In Guinea Bissau besteht allerdings bereits eine Entkopplung zwischen dem kommerziellen Geldern und der Entwicklungshilfeszahlungen. Von der EU wurde schon seit längerem kein Sectoral Support Geld mehr überwiesen weil Guinea-Bissau die geforderten Verwendungen nicht umsetzen kann. Guinea-Bissau könnte als 'failed country' bezeichnet werden. In Guinea Conakry gab es einen Putsch mit Massakern was dem EU Parlament Anlass zur Kündigung des Abkommens geben hat. In Mauretanien könnte dass mittlerweile auch passieren da das EU Parlament immer stärker wird und es nein sagen könnte. In Conakry tat die Kündigung vielleicht aber auch nicht so weh. In Mauretanien würden die Mitgliedstaaten ihnen den Hals brechen.

15. PN: Hatte die Umstellung von GRT GT Auswirkungen auf die Messzahlen der Lizenzen wie sie in den Agreements angegeben wurden?

I: Antwort ist nicht bekannt aber wird nochmal nachgeprüft.

16. PN: Gibt es noch aus Ihrer Sicht noch wichtige Punkte, die ich mit meinen bisherigen Fragen nicht abgedeckt habe, die Sie aber gerne ansprechen möchten?

I: Thunfisch Lizenzen werden zurzeit nur zu ca. 30 % genutzt.
Cephalopod Lizenzen werden zurzeit komplett genutzt (von Spanien)
Kategorie 1 wird nicht gut genutzt
Kategorie 3 wird nur zu 40 % genutzt
Die Pelagische Fischerei hat nicht genug Lizenzen. Kategorie 9 wird zu 100 % genutzt. Kat-

egorie 11 wird fast nicht genutzt aber es besteht die Möglichkeit 2 Lizenzen der Kategorie 9 auf dieser Kategorie fischen zu lassen und dieses ist zurzeit der Fall.

Oftmals werden die Fangmengen für pelagischen Fisch sogar überschritten. Eigentlich sind 250000 tonnen vorgesehen aber eine Überschreitung von 50000 tonnen ist in nach dem Abkommen möglich. Letztes Jahr (bis Juli 2009) war das der Fall. Wahrscheinlich wird es auch von 2009-2010 Überschreitungen geben.

Die PFA aus den Niederlanden ist die stärkste pelagische Gesellschaft. Sie haben auch britische, litauische und deutsche Schiffe. Die deutschen Schiffe fischen zurzeit nicht in Mauretanien aber werden wahrscheinlich ab nächstem Jahr nach Mauretanien fahren.

Wahrscheinlich wird die CFP Reform am 1. Januar 2013 statt finden. Der Inhalt ist noch nicht ganz klar. Es soll aber mehr Wert auf Menschenrechte gelegt werden. Lizenzgebühren sollen mehr bei Schiffseigentümern übernommen werden bis ca. 2020 sollen Redereien zu 100 % der Lizenzen aufkommen. Die Kommission nimmt die Kritiken der NGOs wahr. Es sollte aber gesagt sein, dass nicht alles so düster ist wie es aussieht. Es gibt einen klaren Rechtsrahmen und eine Hohen Transparents (viel Information ist online verfügbar). Außerdem gibt es gute Kontrollen. Senegalesische Fischer stellen auch ein großes Problem für die Fischressourcen dar. Es ist zwar überwiegend artisanale Fischerei aber die fischen sehr nah an der Küste. Der EU ist es verboten näher als 6 Meilen vor der Küste zu fischen. Das Abkommen stellte einen allgemeinen Rahmen dar um die Situation zu verbessern. Es wurde auch über ein Aufgabe der Abkommen und die Vergabe von privaten Lizenzen nachgedacht. Das würde allerdings eine Katastrophe darstellen. Man kann sich ja vorstellen dass es eine große Grauzone gibt und dass Logbücher nicht immer korrekt geführt werden.

Es gibt EU Inspektoren zur Kontrolle. Diese haben allerdings nur begrenzte Rechte da sie nur die nationalen Inspektoren kontrollieren können. Bei einem Besuch in Las Palmas wurde auch gesehen was Spanier dort besser machen könnten.

Statement of Authenticity of Material

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any institution and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the research contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text of this thesis.

Philipp Nagel

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